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I. Introduction
The preceding Article' on appellate practice emphasized con-
cepts: jurisdiction, standing, finality, and the like. This Article, in
contrast, shall focus on precepts, that is, the codified rules that con-
stitute the nuts and bolts of the procedural processing of an appeal,
from birth to briefing. These precepts or rules are known as the
Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure.
The prior Article was an essential prologue to the material
herein. Admittedly, the reader may have viewed the concepts dis-
cussed in the prior Article as frustratingly arcane and elusive. Those
theories and concepts, however, are the fundamental preliminaries to
an appeal's genesis; in a sense, ideas such as jurisdictional power and
standing to appeal are just that - ideas - the primordial matter of
an appeal. Once the appeal is filed, those ideas take form and be-
come an integral part of a new, distinct procedural entity whose exis-
tence will be dictated, sustained, or destroyed by the rules of an in-
tricate procedural universe.
There is perhaps some basis for the lamentation that today's
society is preoccupied too much with procedure and rules rather than
I. See Pines, Pennsylvania Appellate Practice: Procedural Requirements and the Va-
garies of Jurisdiction, 91 DIcK. L. REV. 55-149 (1986).
2. Hereinafter referred to as rules. The major codification of the appellate rules occurred
in 1976 pursuant to article V, section 10 of the Constitution of Pennsylvania. The codification
represented an outstanding collaborative attempt to establish uniformity of practice, predict-
ability, and fairness in appellate practice.
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substance and values. Yet rules are indeed necessary to the enjoy-
ment of life and the pursuit of justice. Almost all rational human
endeavors - from the mundane erection of cities, to the creation of
laws, the ritualization of faith, the codification of moral behavior,
the dramatization of the human predicament or the communal enter-
prise of a sporting event - yearn for order. For it is through order
that one can express and achieve those values that we so deeply cher-
ish, be it comfortability, justice, salvation, aesthetic enjoyment, or
vicarious victory. In all such endeavors and aspects of our lives, rules
play a pivotal role, symbolically and functionally. The philosopher
Isaiah Berlin once noted in his essay on equality that
[a]ll rules, by definition, entail a measure of equality. In so far
as rules are general instructions to act or refrain from acting in
a certain way, in specified circumstances, enjoined upon persons
of a specific kind, they enjoin uniform behavior in identical
cases. To fall under a rule is pro tanto to be assimilated to a
single pattern. To enforce a rule is to promote equality of be-
havior or treatment. This applies whether the rules take the
form of moral principles and laws or codes of positive law, or the
rules of games or of conduct adopted by professional associa-
tions, religious organizations, political parties, wherever patterns
of behavior can be codified in a more or less systematic manner.'
As he further notes, "some minimum degree of prevalence of rules is
a necessary condition for existence of human society ...and the
kind of equality with which obedience to rules is virtually identical is
among the deepest needs and convictions of mankind."4
Having had the opportunity of working for the appellate courts
for almost ten years and having seen thousands of appeals come and
go, this writer can preliminarily suggest that there are two critical
elements to competent appellate advocacy: obedience and knowledge.
As to the first, the appellate process demands obedience to its rules.
Disobedience, regardless of intent or ignorance, subverts order, cre-
ates disequilibrium, and invites grave consequences, including the ex-
tinction of an appeal. The rules impose a sense of rationality and
order that are essential to maintaining procedural parity among the
parties, as well as consistency and predictability. Only through order
can the system's ideal of justice for all attain maximum fulfillment.
Aside from the obvious necessity of obedience, the reader is
again forewarned that there can be no substitute for a thorough, per-
3. 1. BERLIN, CONCEPTS AND CATEGORIES 84-85 (1978) (emphasis added).
4. Id. at 85.
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sonal knowledge of the procedural rules, rules that are subject to the
ongoing process of ad hoc amendments. One need only examine
caselaw and the rule books of the past to appreciate the appellate
system's ancestry of obsolete rules and practices. Indicative of this
occupational hazard is the last minute incorporation into this text of
amendments recently proposed by the procedural rules committee.0
Now, a word about this Article's exposition. The format of this
Article is actually simpler than the volume and contents superficially
suggest. The Article basically parallels the five major steps of the
appellate process, which is essentially an eminently rational method
for the channeling of grievances. The five steps, the reader is cau-
tioned, is an arbitrary construct designed for purely pedagogical sim-
plicity and convenience. While the steps are distinct, some of them
are temporally overlapping. Again, the reader is warned that the
subject of this segment is appellate practice at the primary stage. No
attempt is made to analyze specialized procedures concerning appel-
late analogues (the petition for review) or post-appeal options (rear-
gument or the petition for allowance of appeal).
The text attempts to synthesize a mass of material into manage-
able chunks. Buttressing the text's exposition is an intricate under-
ground network of footnotes, selectively collating relevant cases and
rules. A significant amount of parenthetical information is offered so
that the references may provide the reader with greater meaning and
guidance. Purposely avoided are numerous skeletal references.
Thus, this Article begins at the beginning - the creation of the
appeal. The focus is on the following major steps of an appeal's
growth:
1. the timely filing of the notice of appeal after the entry in the
lower court of an appealable order;
2. the filing of the lower court's statement of explanation (often
referred to as the opinion) and the appellant's statement of
grievances;
3. the transcription and transmission of the original record from
5. See infra notes 39 and 143.
6. See, e.g., PA. R. App. P. 1511-1561 (petition for review), 2541-2547 (reargument),
111 I-1123 (petition for allowance of appeal to the supreme court).
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the lower court to the appellate court;
4. the preparation and filing of the reproduced record; and
5. the preparation and filing of the parties' briefs.
II. Phase One: Filing the Notice of Appeal and Cross Appeal
The filing of a notice of appeal in the lower court is the first
major step in formally commencing the appeal. Aside from the care-
ful presentation of specific issues in the lower court, the existence of
a jurisdictionally appealable (final or interlocutory) order, and the
procedural prerequisite of standing,' the timely filing of an accurate
notice of appeal is one of the most critical events in the appellate
process. Careful compliance with various procedural rules is
mandatory because the timely filing of a notice of appeals concerns
and affects a matter that can be neither overlooked nor waived by
the parties or the court - namely, the jurisdiction of the appellate
court.9 The notice of appeal serves to invoke the jurisdiction of the
appellate court. If a party fails to invoke the appellate court's juris-
diction in a procedurally proper manner, the result may be drastic
and devastating.
Because the right of appeal is an important statutory and con-
stitutional right,9 appellate courts have recognized a policy in favor
of preserving the right of appeal when there is substantial compli-
ance with the appellate rules. The appellate rules are not intended to
be so rigidly applied as to result in manifest injustice.10 This policy
of preservation is, in fact, in conformity with the expressed philoso-
phy of the rules of appellate procedure. Rule 105(a) reads as follows:
(a) Liberal construction and modification of rules. These rules
shall be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy and inex-
pensive determination of every matter to which they are applica-
ble. In the interest of expediting decision, or for other good
cause shown, an appellate court may, except as otherwise pro-
vided in Subdivision (b) of this rule, disregard the requirements
or provisions of any of these rules in a particular case on appli-
cation of a party or on its own motion and may order proceed-
7. See Pines, supra note 1, at 62-69.
8. See id. at 75-78. If a notice of appeal is not timely filed, the briefs of a purported
appellant will not be considered. See Hanover Bank of Pa. v. United Penn Bank, 326 Pa.
Super. 593, 598 n.I, 474 A.2d 1137, 1139 n.1 (1984).
9. See Pines, supra note 1, at 57-58.
10. See Stout v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 491 Pa. 601, 421 A.2d 1047 (1980),
on remand, 320 Pa. Super. 240, 467 A.2d 18 (1983); Peterson v. Philadelphia Suburban
Transit Co., 435 Pa. 232, 255 A.2d 577 (1969).
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ings in accordance with its direction.
The liberal policy in the construction of the appellate rules must,
however, be carefully distinguished from the discretionary authority
vested in the appellate courts as to the application of the rules when
the parties fail to comply with procedural requirements. Existing
Rule 90211 authorizes an appellate court to take any action it deems
appropriate, including dismissal of the appeal, when there is a viola-
tion of the appellate rules. Knowledge of the various procedural re-
quirements is, therefore, imperative. In order to invoke the appellate
court's jurisdiction, the aggrieved party appealing should be aware of
the following procedural requirements in connection with the filing
of a notice of appeal.
A. Filing the Notice of Appeal: Procedural Requirements
1. "Entry" of an Appealable Order.-As the prior Article
pointed out, an aggrieved party cannot file an appeal unless there is
an appealable order, that is, a lower court order that is within an
appellate court's specific jurisdiction. A necessary corollary to this
jurisdictional principle is that an order is not appealable until the
lower court clerk or prothonotary" formally "enters" the appealable
order on the "docket". 1 The "date of entry," as the reader will later
see, is of utmost significance because it is the focal point for deter-
mining the mandatory time within which an aggrieved party must
file the notice of appeal. Rule 301 makes clear that the entry of an
appealable order is a condition precedent to the filing of an appeal:
11. PA. R. App. P. 902 provides as follows:
Manner of Taking Appeal
An appeal permitted by law as of right from a lower court to an appellate
court shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the lower court
within the time allowed by Rule 903 (time for appeal). Failure of an appellant
to take any step other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal does not affect
the validity of the appeal, but it is grounds only for such action as the appellate
court deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal.
The proposed amendment to Rule 902 would delete the option of dismissal in the last
sentence of the text but recognize it in the accompanying comment as an ultimate sanction
when counsel fails to correct formal defects. See infra note 39.
12. The appealable order may be final or nonfinal (that is, interlocutory). See Pines,
supra note 1, at 75-136. Jurisdiction may be based on the statutes or rules of court.
13. "Prothonotary" is described as the "title given (in e.g. Pennsylvania) to an officer
who officiates as principal clerk of some courts." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1101 (5th ed.
1979). For the statutory provisions regarding the prothonotary, see 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 2731-2738. (Purdon 1981). See also PA. R. App. P. 3301, 3502, 3702.
14. "Docket" has been described as a "minute, abstract, or brief entry; or the book
containing such entries . . . A book containing an entry in brief of all the important acts done
in court in the conduct of each case from its inception to conclusion." BLACK'S LAW DICTION-
ARY 431 (5th ed. 1979).
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(a) Entry upon docket below. No order of a court shall be ap-
pealable until it has been entered upon the appropriate docket in
the lower court. Where under the applicable practice below an
order is entered in two or more dockets, the order has been en-
tered and reduced to judgment for the purposes of appeal when
it has been entered in the first appropriate docket.' 5
The rules, however, provide for an exception in emergency situa-
tions.' The requirement that an appealable order be entered on the
dockets in the lower court is jurisdictional and, therefore,
mandatory. 17 The appellate rules also require that every order shall
be set forth on a separate document.18 The appellant must be careful
in distinguishing the specific entry requirements based upon the na-
ture of the case in the following situations.
(a) Entry of appealable orders (civil cases).-Under the rules of
civil procedure, in a civil case, the lower court clerk must give the
parties notice of an order of the lower court by forwarding the order
to the parties by regular mail.19 The lower court clerk must also rec-
ord the fact of such notice on the docket in the lower court. For
purposes of identifying the date of entry under the appellate rules,
15. PA. R. App. P. 301(a) (requisites for an appealable order) (emphasis added). As to
the requirement of reducing an order to judgment, however, see the proposed amendment,
infra note 39.
16. PA. R. App. P. 301(e) provides as follows:
(e) Emergency appeals. Where the exigency of the case is such as to impel
an immediate appeal and the party intending to appeal an adverse action is una-
ble to secure the formal entry of an appealable order pursuant to the usual pro-
cedures the party may file in the lower court and serve a praecipe for entry of an
adverse order, which action shall constitute entry of an appealable order for the
purposes of these rules. The interlocutory or final nature of the action shall not
be affected by this subdivision.
17. See, e.g., Murphy v. Brong, 321 Pa. Super. 340, 468 A.2d 509 (1983); Coren v.
DiDomenico, 291 Pa. Super. 331, 435 A.2d 1252 (1981).
18. See PA. R. App. P. 301(b); see also Grossman v. Commissioner of Police, 318 Pa.
Super. 584, 588, 465 A.2d 1007, 1009 (1983); G.E. Credit Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co., 437 Pa. 463, 263 A.2d 448 (1970) (citing cases). The commentary to PA. R. App. P. 512
indicates that there should be one appeal per appealable order. The comments to Rule 301
note that subdivision (b) is patterned after Fed. R. Civ. P. 58, as interpreted in United States
v. Indrelunas, 411 U.S. 216 (1973), "so as to render certain the date on which an order is
entered for purposes of computing the running of the time for appeal." See also Bankers Trust
Co. v. Mallis, 435 U.S. 381 (1978) (separate document requirement may be waived by appel-
lee). In a recent statement dissenting to the denial of a petition for writ of certiorari, Justices
Blackmun and O'Connor stated that "the separate document requirement must be applied
mechnically in order to protect a party's right of appeal, although the parties may waive this
requirement in order to maintain appellate jurisdiction of their case." Amoco Oil Co. v. Jim
Heiling Oil & Gas, Inc., 55 L.W. 3355 (emphasis in original).
19. PA. R. Civ. P. 236 states as follows: "(a) The prothonotary shall immediately give
written notice by ordinary mail of the entry of any order, decree of judgment; (b) The pro-
thonotary shall note in the docket the giving of the notice and, when a judgment by confession
is entered, the mailing of the required notice and documents."
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the date of entry is the date that (a) the lower court clerk gave no-
tice to the parties and (b) made a Rule 236(b) notation2 0 on the
docket in the lower court.21 Therefore, a lower court's order is not
appealable in a civil case until the order has been entered upon an
appropriate docket in the lower court and a proper notation appears
that notice has been given to the parties regarding the entry of the
order.22 The appellate rules, in fact, specifically recognize that the
"date of entry of order in a matter subject to the Pennsylvania Rules
of Civil Procedure shall be the day on which the clerk makes the
notation in the docket that notice of the entry of the order has been
given as required by Pa. R. Civ. P. 236(b). 28
(b) Entry of appealable orders (criminal cases).-The appellate
rules contain a general provision defining what is the "date of en-
try." Technically, the applicable rule"4 contains four possibilities for
the date of entry of an order in noncivil matters. These possibilities
include: (1) the day the clerk of the court mails or delivers copies of
the orders to the parties; (2) if such delivery is not required, the day
the clerk makes such copies available to the public; (3) the day of
the order's adoption by the court; or (4) any subsequent day, as re-
quired by the actual circumstances.25
20. See supra note 19.
21. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Schultz, 281 Pa. Super. 212, 421 A.2d 1224
(1980); Rub v. Ruh, 268 Pa. Super. 82, 407 A.2d 447 (1979).
22. See Yeaple v. Yeaple, 485 Pa. 399, 402 A.2d 1022 (1979); see also Estate of
Kefauver, - Pa. Super. -, - A.2d - (1986) (appeal filed more than 30 days after
date of final decree not defective where no record notation of Rule 236 notice).
23. See PA. R. App. P. 108(b); but cf. In re Fourth Statewide Investigating Grand Jury,
- Pa. -, 509 A.2d 1260 (1986), involving an appeal from a civil contempt order in
which the supreme court rejected the dates of mailing or delivery as the "day of entry." The
court applied a "date of adoption" test. According to the court, the order was entered when
the contempt finding was made, imprisonment was imposed, and a contemporaneous written
order embodying the finding was made.
24. PA. R. App. P. 108(a)(1) states as follows:
(a) General rule. (I) Except as otherwise prescribed in this rule, in comput-
ing any period of time under these rules involving the date of entry of an order
by a court or other government unit, the day of entry shall be the day the clerk
of the court or the office of the government unit mails or delivers copies of the
order to the parties, or if such delivery is not otherwise required by law, the day
the clerk or office of the government units makes such copies public. The day of
entry of an order may be the day of its adoption by the court or other govern-
ment unit, or any subsequent day, as required by the actual circumstances.
25. The rules do not indicate any preference among the various options. The ascertain-
ment of the critical "day of entry" event may, therefore, prove troublesome especially if more
than one event applies. It would seem that the safest course would be to choose whatever entry
event first applies in order to estimate the applicable time constraints conservatively. The last
event of subsection (a)(I) ("or any subsequent day, as required by the actual circumstances")
is noticeably ambiguous.
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In Commonwealth v. Dorman,2' the superior court noted that
the rules of criminal procedure do not contain the equivalent of the
notice requirement of Rule 236 in civil cases.27 The court noted that,
in any event, such a requirement would be superfluous since, in a
criminal case, the sentence is placed on the record in the presence of
the defendant who is appearing before the sentencing court. At the
time of the opinion, however, the rules of criminal procedure did
contain a provision that is substantially similar to the following pre-
sent rule:
Notice and Docketing of Orders
Upon receipt of an order from a judge, the clerk of court shall
immediately docket the order and record in the docket the date
it was made. Except as may be provided by local rules, the clerk
shall forthwith furnish a copy of the order, by mail or personal
delivery, to each party or attorney, and shall record in the
docket the time and manner thereof.
28
The significance of the criminal procedural rule regarding no-
tice and docketing of orders lies in its relationship to the four varia-
ble possibilities of the "date of entry" contained in the general appel-
late rule.29 In criminal cases, is the all-important "date of entry" (a)
the date of mailing or delivering a copy of the order to the parties,
(b) the date such copies are made public, (c) the date of the "adop-
tion" by the court, or (d) "any subsequent day, as required by the
actual circumstances?" The court in Dorman stated that the possible
dates of mailing, delivering, or making public could not be deter-
mined by the court from the record. 0 Therefore, the court deter-
mined that, in that case, the "date of entry" would be construed as
the "date of adoption," that is, the date when the court (1) entered
the order on the docket and (2) informed the defendant of the sen-
tence and his right to appeal.31 In a recent appeal from a civil con-
tempt order that imposed imprisonment, the supreme court also used
a "date of adoption" approach to determine when the lower court's
order was "entered" for purposes of determining the relevant time to
26. 272 Pa. Super. 149, 414 A.2d 713 (1979).
27. Id. at 154-55 n.6, 414 A.2d at 716 n.6.
28. PA. R. CRIM. P. 9024, which is derived from former PA. R. CRIM. P. 309(d).
29. See supra note 24.
30. See Dorman, 272 Pa. Super. at 155-56, 414 A.2d at 717; see also Commonwealth v.
Mays, 288 Pa. Super. 129, 132 n.I, 431 A.2d 322, 323 n.1 (1981); Commonwealth v. Gott-
shalk, 276 Pa. Super. 102, 419 A.2d 115 (1980).
31. Dorman did not consider the nature or applicability of the nebulous fourth "actual
circumstances" option for determining date of entry under Rule 108(a).
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appeal. 2 Because the defendant did not timely appeal from the date
of entry, the supreme court quashed the defendant's appeal.
(c) Entry of orders (miscellaneous cases).-In a case governed
by the Juvenile Act, the superior court determined that the first
three "entry" possibilities (date of mailing, date of delivery, date of
making public) of Rule 108(a) could not be determined from the
record. Therefore, the panel determined that the second sentence of
Rule 108(a) governed and that the date of entry would be the "date
of adoption" by the court. Under the circumstances, the date of en-
try/adoption would be the date that the lower court both informed
the appellant's attorney of the custody order and also entered the
final order on its dockets."
2. Existence of an Appealable Order (final orders, judg-
ments).-The preceding discussion of the importance of the "date of
entry" requirement presupposes the existence of a jurisdictionally
appealable order. The first segment of this Article noted that the
appealability of an order goes to the heart of appellate jurisdiction.
3 4
An appealable order is the nucleus or basic building block of an ap-
peal. In most cases, an appealable order for jurisdictional purposes is
a "final order." Appeals may be taken "as of right" from any final
order of an administrative agency or lower court." A "final order" is
generally one that either finally terminates the litigation between the
parties or denies a litigant relief so as to effectively put him or her
"out of court."8 6
Often a final order is a judgment entered at the conclusion of a
case. For example, in criminal cases, interlocutory or nonfinal orders
are not generally appealable. The general rule is that a defendant
may appeal only from a final judgment of sentence. Therefore, dis-
missal of post-verdict motions, even though entered on the docket,
would not be an appealable order until judgment of sentence was
32. See In re Fourth Statewide Investigating Grand Jury, - Pa. -, 509 A.2d
1260 (1986).
33. See In re Gorham, 272 Pa. Super. 145, 414 A.2d 712 (1979). The court quashed the
appeal as untimely.
34. See Pines, supra note 1, at 75-78.
35. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5105 (Purdon 1981 & supp. 1986) (right to appel-
late review); see also PA. R. App. P. 341(a) (final orders generally), 702(a) (final orders).
36. See Pines, supra note 1, at 78-107. A final appealable order may also include a pre-
trial order "collateral" to the merits of the controversy. See id. at 107-115.
37. See Commonwealth v. Myers, 457 Pa. 317, 319, 322 A.2d 131, 132 (1974); Com-
monwealth v. Sites, 430 Pa. 115, 117, 242 A.2d 220, 221 (1968); Commonwealth v. Pollick,
420 Pa. 61, 62-63, 215 A.2d 904, 905 (1966); Commonwealth v. Nugent, 291 Pa. Super. 421,
435 A.2d 1298 (1981).
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imposed.
Likewise, in civil cases, the general rule is that an appellant
usually appeals from a final judgment entered after the disposition of
post-trial or post-verdict motions. 8 In pretrial or nontrial matters,
one would appeal, for example, the entry of a summary judgment or
a judgment on the pleadings, both of which effectively terminate a
case.
The general rule, therefore, is that an appealable order is often
(though not always) 89 a judgment actually entered on the dockets in
the lower court that effectively terminates the litigation. The appel-
late rules make clear that it is the actual entry of an appealable
order on the docket that is dispositive. Rule 301(d) is captioned "Re-
duction of decision to judgment" 40 and should be considered in con-
junction with the applicable civil procedural rules providing for entry
of final judgments upon praecipe4 1 of a party.4 2 Rule 301 also speci-
fies that an anticipatory or directory judgment is not appealable until
it has been entered on the docket.
Rule 301 states as follows:
(c) Orders not appealable. A direction by.the lower court that a
specified judgment, sentence or other order shall be entered, un-
accompanied by actual entry of the specified order in the docket,
or a direction that a verdict of a jury be recorded or entered, or
an order denying a motion for a new trial, does not constitute an
appealable order. Any such order shall be reduced to judgment
and docketed before an appeal is taken."
38. See PA. R. Civ. P. 227.1 (post-trial relief).
39. It is important to note that, inasmuch as appealable orders and final judgments are
not necessarily equivalent, the proposed amendment to appellate rule 904 would require appel-
lant to simply specify in the notice of appeal that the appealed order has been entered in the
docket. See LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 16, 1985, at I, 12, 13, published in 16 Pa. Bull.
3924-3933 (1986).
40. PA. R. App. P. 301(d) states as follows:
(d) Reduction of decision to judgment. Subject to any inconsistent general
rule applicable to particular classes of matters, the clerk of the lower court shall
on praecipe of any party (except a party who by law may not praecipe for entry
of an adverse order) forthwith prepare, sign and enter an appropriate order evi-
dencing any action from which an appeal lies either as of right or upon permis-
sion to appeal or allowance of appeal.
41. "Praecipe" definitionally includes "an order to the clerk of court to issue an execu-
tion on a judgment already rendered .... [or] requesting him to issue a particular writ." See
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1055-56 (5th ed. 1979).
42. See, e.g., PA. R. Civ. P. 227.4 (entry of judgment upon praecipe of a party), which is
made applicable to actions at law and in equity, tried with or without a jury.
43. PA. R. App. P. 301(c). See also Novoseller v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 293 Pa. Super.
93, 437 A.2d 1007 (1981) (judgment must be actually entered). It is also important to note
that a valid judgment cannot be entered in the lower court until the time for filing a motion for
new trial has expired. A prematurely filed judgment, before disposition of the pending motion
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Thus, before perfecting an appeal, the litigant must be extremely
cautious that an appealable order, which is often a final judgment,"
has been entered on the docket in the lower court. In this regard, the
appellant should be aware that the procedural propriety of an appeal
is determined at the time the appeal is taken. If an appeal is filed
from an unappealable order, the appellee may file a motion to dis-
miss or quash the appeal because of the absence of appellate juris-
diction, that is, the appellate power to decide.4
(a) Exceptions to requirement of entry of final judgment.-The
preceding discussion indicates that, in most cases, one may only ap-
peal a final judgment actually entered on the docket in the lower
court. There are instances, however, in which the absence of a final
judgment will not be detrimental to the appellant. The circumstances
are very limited.
(i) Interlocutory orders.-The first and obvious exception to the
jurisdictional requirement of the entry of a "judgment" is the special
class of cases in which an appeal from an interlocutory, nonfinal or-
der is permitted by statute or rule of court. In a criminal case, for
example, the entry of a judgment is not a condition precedent to an
appeal from an order changing criminal venue, awarding a motion
for new trial, or denying a defendant's motion to dismiss based on
double jeopardy. Such orders, however, must be formally entered
on the lower court dockets before an appeal can be filed. 8
Likewise, in civil cases, an appeal may be filed in some in-
stances without the entry of a judgment on the dockets in the lower
court. An appellant should be careful to determine what is specifi-
cally an appealable order because the failure to timely appeal an
immediately appealable order may result in the dismissal of an ap-
peal. This is true even if the appellant filed a timely appeal from the
subsequent entry of a judgment, given that the entry of the judgment
for new trial or before the expiration of the time within which to file a motion for post-trial
relief (see PA. R. Civ. P. 227.1(c); PA. R. CRIM. P. 1123) has been construed as void and of no
legal effect. See Moore v. Quigley, 402 Pa. 636, 168 A.2d 334 (1961); Murphy v. Brong, 321
Pa. Super. 340, 468 A.2d 509 (1983). Local rules of court should also be examined in order to
determine the appropriate time limitations for filing post trial motions.
44. See supra notes 34-39.
45. See Pines, supra note 1, at 76 n. 85.
46. See PA. R. App. P. 1972 (dispositions on motion), 123 (applications for relief).
47. See, e.g., PA. R. App. P. 311 (interlocutory orders identified); see also Pines, supra
note 1, at 81, 82, 112, 118 and 120.
48. PA. R. App. P. 301(a) (entry upon docket below), supra note 15.
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may have been superfluous or unnecessary.49 For example, orders
opening or refusing to open or strike a judgment, confirming or dis-
solving an attachment, granting or refusing an injunction, granting a
new trial, or directing partition would be immediately appealable or-
ders under the appellate rules without the necessity of entry of a
formal "judgment."50
(ii) Exceptions to "reduction to judgment" rule.-Not all final
orders (in the sense that they actually, constructively, or pragmati-
cally terminate litigation between the parties) require the formal en-
try of "judgment" in order to be appealable.5 1 For example, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted in United States National Bank
v. Johnson"' that, in a multidefendant lawsuit, the dismissal of a
party had the same effect as the dismissal of a complaint and was
immediately appealable without the need to "reduce" such an order
to judgment. The date of entry of the appealable order (the dismissal
of the complaint) was thus the focal point for computing the time
period within which the appellant had to file the notice of appeal in
the lower court.
There are other final orders that do not require the formal entry
of a judgment as a procedural precondition for an appeal. The re-
fusal to strike or remove a nonsuit in a civil case is an immediately
appealable order; no reduction to judgment is required."3 In an eq-
uity case, the supreme court noted that the docketing of a final de-
cree in equity (declaring a partnership and awarding fees), not the
subsequent entry of a judgment, was the determinative event for
computing whether appellant timely filed his notice of appeal.54
The commonwealth court has also recognized that, in certain
situations, the entry of a final appealable order does not necessarily
require the entry of a judgment. In Commonwealth v. Kayden
Corp.,55 the lower court's order sustaining an appeal from the Penn-
sylvania Liquor Control Board and directing issuance of a restaurant
49. See Hawthorne v. Dravo Corp., 313 Pa. Super. 436, 439 n.2, 460 A.2d 266, 267 n.2
(1983) (appeal from refusal to remove a nonsuit is proper; amending notice of appeal from
subsequent judgment was unnecessary surplusage).
50. See PA. R. App. P. 311 (interlocutory appeals as of right); see also Pines, supra note
1, at 115-123.
51. In recognition of this fact, the appellate rules committee has recommended changes
in the appellate rules. See supra note 39.
52. 506 Pa. 622, 487 A.2d 809 (1985).
53. See Miller v. Hurst, 302 Pa. Super. 235, 448 A.2d 614 (1982); see also Hawthorne
v. Dravo Crop. 313 Pa. Super. 436, 460 A.2d 266 (1983).
54. See Stotsenberg v. Frost, 465 Pa. 187, 348 A.2d 418 (1975).
55. - Pa. Commw. -, 505 A.2d 393 (1986).
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liquor license did not have to be reduced to judgment, especially
since the procedural requirement of post-trial motions had no appli-
cability. The order was appealable when it was formally entered on
the docket. The judgment rule was, likewise, inapplicable in a man-
damus action. The commonwealth court stated that an order dis-
missing exceptions in a mandamus cause of action was a final, ap-
pealable order; judgment was not necessary because the appealed
order decided the only matter in dispute."
If there is more than one relevant docket, entry in one docket
may be sufficient without the necessity of entry of judgment."7 The
commonwealth court, in Commonwealth v. Hess,58 noted that in an
eminent domain proceeding, a final order concerning detention dam-
ages was appealable once it was entered in the appropriate appear-
ance docket, notwithstanding the practice in Montgomery County of
entering such orders on both the "appearance" and "judgment"
dockets. However, when an appealed order admittedly had not been
entered formally on the appearance docket or reduced to judgment
in any way prior to the filing of the appeal, the commonwealth court
granted a motion to quash the appeal."
(b) The premature appeal exception (appeals filed before the
formal entry of an appealable order).--Generally, an appeal cannot
be filed from a verdict or the dismissal of post-trial, post-verdict mo-
tions until a final judgment or sentence has been formally entered on
the lower court dockets.60 Although the procedural propriety of an
appeal is determined at the time the appeal is filed,61 an appeal pre-
maturely filed from a nonappealable order will be "perfected" if an
appealable order is subsequently entered on the dockets. The appel-
56. See Beharry v. Mascara, 92 Pa. Commw. 484, 488 n.5, 499 A.2d 1129, 1131 n.5
(1985); see also Shellen v. Springfield School Dist., 6 Pa. Commw. 527, 297 A.2d 179 (1972).
57. See PA. R. App. P. 301(a), supra note 15, which recognizes the entry of an order in
more than one docket.
58. 55 Pa. Commw. 27, 423 A.2d 435 (1980). The court noted, in denying the motion to
quash, that the rules of civil procedure were not applicable.
59. See Commonwealth, Dept. of Transp. v. Jennings, 76 Pa. Commw. 453, 463 A.2d
1290 (1983).
60. See Straw v. Stands, 426 Pa. 81, 231 A.2d 144 (1967) (absent entry of judgment, a
verdict is not a final appealable order); Litt v. Rolling Hill Hosp., 293 Pa. Super. 97, 437 A.2d
1008 (1981) (post-verdict appeal premature before lower court's disposition of post trial mo-
tion); Kopchak v. Springer, 292 Pa. Super. 441, 437 A.2d 756 (1981) (appeal from dismissal
of exceptions premature until judgment has been entered); Commonwealth v. Nugent, 291 Pa.
Super. 421, 435 A.2d 1298 (1981) (defendant may appeal only from final judgment of sen-
tence); see also supra note 12-33 (entry of orders on the docket).
61. See, e.g., Rosen v. Rosen, - Pa. Super.., - n.2, 510 A.2d 732, 734 n.2
(1986) (by implication); Praisner v. Stocker, 313 Pa. Super. 332, 343 n.4, 459 A.2d 1255,
1261 n.4 (1983). See supra note 45.
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late rules have made an accommodation for the precipitous, prema-
ture filing of an appeal by providing that "[a] notice of appeal filed
after the announcement of a determination but before the entry of
an appealable order shall be treated as filed after such entry and on
the day thereof. 62 Thus, if an appellant, for example, has prema-
turely appealed within 30 days from the denial of post-trial or post-
verdict motions, the appeal will be considered jurisdictionally proper
if the formal entry of judgment on the lower court's docket is subse-
quently accomplished." As one superior court judge noted, the rules
of appellate procedure provide for a legal fiction - the notice of
appeal "relates forward" to the day of the entry of judgment."
Thus, although an appellate court may not have jurisdiction over an
appeal taken when only the denial of a post-trial motion had been
entered on the lower court's docket, jurisdiction will be perfected
when the judgment or appealable order is thereafter entered on the
docket in the lower court." A litigant, however, should be careful
not to confuse a prematurely filed appeal with a prematurely filed
void judgment of the lower court; the former concerns appellate
court jurisdiction while the latter concerns the lower court's
jurisdiction."
3. The Notice of Appeal: Form and Content.-The current
appellate rules specify the proper form and content of the notice of
appeal that is to be filed in the lower court. Rule 904 states the
following:
(a) Form. The notice of appeal shall be in substantially the fol-
lowing form:
COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
OF ............. COUNTY
A.B., Plaintiff Docket or File No ......
V.
62. See PA. R. App. P. 905(a) (filing of notice of appeal with clerk).
63. Compare the prior practice before the amendment to PA. R. App. P. 905(a) in Aloi
v. Aloi, 290 Pa. Super. 125, 434 A.2d 161 (1981) (premature appeal quashed and subsequent
divorce decree entered during appeal vacated).
64. See Minich v. City of Sharon, 325 Pa. Super. 178, 472 A.2d 706 (1984).
65. Id.
66. See supra note 17; see also Pines, supra note 1, at 77 n. 88.
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C.D., Defendant Offense Tracking Number
NOTICE OF APPEAL
Notice is hereby given that C. D., defendant above named,
hereby appeals to the (Supreme) (Superior) (Commonwealth)
Court of Pennsylvania from the order entered in this matter on
the ..... .day of ............. , 19. . . . This order has
been reduced to judgment and entered in the docket as evi-
denced by the attached copy of the docket entry.
(S ) ...............................................
(Address and Telephone Number)
b. Caption. The parties shall be stated in the caption as they
stood upon the record of the lower court at the time the appeal
was taken.
The "reduction to judgment" certification arguably would be unnec-
essary in those previously identified situations6'7 in which appellate
jurisdiction is not predicated on the existence of a judgment (for ex-
ample, order refusing to remove a nonsuit or order denying a motion
to dismiss based on double jeopardy), as the recently proposed
amendments to the appellate rules acknowledge. 6 In such cases, an
assertion that the appeal is taken from an "appealable order" and
that it has been entered on the docket would seem sufficient.
(a) Specific identification of lower court's order(s).-A failure
to properly identify the lower court's order(s) in the notice of appeal
may constitute a critical or fatal technical pitfall, especially in crimi-
nal cases. On a few occasions, for example, the superior court has
refused to review issues concerning a defendant's convictions when
the notice of appeal failed to specifically identify the informations
upon which defendant was sentenced or the specific judgments of
sentence imposed on the defendant."9 There have been instances,
67. See supra text accompanying notes 49 and 50.
68. See supra notes 15 and 39.
69. See Commonwealth v. Montgomery, 341 Pa. Super. 573, 578 n.2, 492 A.2d 14, 17
n.2 (1983) (review of Commonwealth's appeal limited to bills of information listed in notice of
appeal); Commonwealth v. Keys, 313 Pa. Super. 410, 460 A.2d 253 (1983) (defendant's notice
of appeal erroneously listed information for which defendant was not convicted; since appellate
court cannot extend time to appeal, appeal was quashed); Commonwealth v. Dozier, 294 Pa.
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however, in which an appellate court has overlooked or excused a
notice of appeal that was defective in such form or content.7 0 In any
event, the practitioner should be careful in drafting and typing the
notice of appeal because the notice of appeal is the critical event that
invokes the appellate court's jurisdiction.
(b) Caption and parties (appeals, cross appeals, joint ap-
peals).-The appellate rules specify that the "parties shall be stated
in the caption as they stood upon the record of the lower court at the
time the appeal was taken."17' The aggrieved party filing the notice
of appeal is the "appellant"; the nonappealing party is designated as
the "appellee". In a cross appeal situation 7  in which more than one
party files a notice of appeal, the plaintiff or moving party in the
lower court is designated the appellant for purposes of briefing and
argument s.7  In a joint appeal situation, parties interested jointly or
severally in the same matter may join as appellants or be joined as
appellees in a single appeal when the grounds for the appeal are sim-
ilar .7  All parties in the appellate court, other than the appellant, are
appellees.7 5 An amicus curiae is not a "party" to an appeal.7 6
(i) Disinterested parties.-All parties in the lower court are
deemed to be parties in the appellate court. 7 Parties who have no
interest in the appeal, however, can be designated as "disinterested."
Super. 249, 252 n.1, 439 A.2d 1185 n.1 (1982) (defendant's arguments concerning convictions
on informations not identified in notice of appeal not considered); Commonwealth v. Hill, 267
Pa. Super. 140, 142 n.1, 406 A.2d 558, 559 n.1 (1979) (failure to specifically appeal judgment
of sentence fatal notwithstanding appellate court's review of other judgments of sentence).
70. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gumpert, - Pa. Super. -. , 512 A.2d 699 (1986)
(erroneous caption identifying lower court's disposition of post verdict motion rather than sen-
tence overlooked); Commonwealth v. Brown, 264 Pa. Super. 127, 127 n.l, 399 A.2d 699, 699
n.1 (1979) (erroneous notice of appeal, listing wrong informations, viewed as nonfatal clerical
or typing error); Commonwealth Dept. of Transp. v. Florek, 71 Pa. Commw. 615, 455 A.2d
1263 (1983) (timely filed appeal not quashed even though notice of appeal did not comply in
form or content with procedural requirements); see also Hawthorne v. Dravo Corp., 313 Pa.
Super. 436, 460 A.2d 266 (1983); Commonwealth v. Dozier, 294 Pa. Super. 249, 258 n.3, 439
A.2d 1185, 1190 n.3 (1982) (notice of appeal listed only one bill of information; in fairness to
appellant, appellate court said that on remand, lower court should consider appellant's entire
sentence); see also the policy of the proposed amendments in affording an appellant an oppor-
tunity to correct formal defects, supra note 11.
71. See PA. R. App. P. 904(b) (caption of notice of appeal).
72. See PA. R. App. P. 903(b), 511 (cross appeals); see also infra notes 177-182 and
accompanying text.
73. See PA. R. App. P. 2136; see also Kremer v. State Ethics Comm'n, 503 Pa. 358, 469
A.2d 593 (1983).
74. See PA. R. App. P. 512 (joint appeals).
75. See PA. R. App. P. 908 (parties on appeal).
76. See PA. R. App. P. 531 (participation by amicus curiae); infra text accompanying
notes 183-185.
77. See PA. R. App. P. 908 (parties on appeal).
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In such circumstances, the appellant can advise the appellate court
prothonotary of that person's disinterested status. A copy of the no-
tice must be served on all parties. The disinterested party, however,
may elect to remain a party on appeal by notifying the appellate
prothonotary.
7 8
(ii) Substitutions or Additions (death of a party).-If a party
dies after a notice of appeal is filed or while the appeal is pending in
the appellate court,79 the personal representative of the deceased
party may be substituted as a party pursuant to an application80 filed
by the representative or by any party. The application should be filed
with the prothonotary of the appellate court.81 If the deceased party
has no representative, "any party may suggest the death on the rec-
ord and proceedings shall be had as the appellate court may
direct. ' 2
When a party against whom an appeal is filed (the appellee)
dies before an appeal is taken, the appellant may proceed with the
filing of the appeal as though the party were still alive. After the
appeal is filed, necessary steps should be taken in the appellate court
to substitute the party or suggest death on the record." Where the
appellant dies before the taking of the appeal, that party's attorney
or personal representative may file the appeal and thereafter obtain
substitution in the manner prescribed by the rule. 4
(iii) Parties: substitution (public officer).-If a public officer is a
party to an appeal in his official capacity and, during its pendency,
the officer dies, resigns, or otherwise ceases to hold office, his or her
successor is automatically substituted as a party. The proceedings
shall thereafter be in the name of the substituted party.
88
(iv) Attorney General or Court Administrator as an Intervening
Party.-When a party seeks to question the constitutionality of a
statute of the Commonwealth in an appeal in which the Common-
78. Id.
79. Death of a party does not necessarily abate or moot the appeal. See Henszey v.
Henszey, 195 Pa. Super. 377, 382-83, 171 A.2d 837, 840 (1961) (death of appellee in appeal
from divorce decree did not abate appeal); see also Pines, supra note 1, at 71 n. 59.
80. See PA. R. ApI. P. 123 (applications for relief).
81. See PA. R. App. P. 502(a) (substitution; death of a party).
82. Id.
83. See PA. R. App. P. 502(a); see also Rhinehart v. Rhinehart, 197 Pa. Super. 558, 180
A.2d 82 (1962) (death of appellee pending appeal from divorce decree; appellate court permits
executor to be substituted as appellee).
84. PA. R. App. P. 502(a).
85. PA. R. Asp. P. 502(c).
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wealth or its officers are not parties, the party must give notice to the
attorney general in writing. If the attorney general thereafter wishes
to be heard and files a brief, the attorney general is designated as an
intervening party.86 The same practice applies when a party wishes
to question the constitutionality of any general rule. Notice in writ-
ing must be given to the Pennsylvania Court Administrator, who
may then be heard as an intervening party.8 7 The failure to give
proper notice may preclude a party from raising on appeal an issue
of constitutionality.8
4. Timely Filing of Notice of Appeal (Jurisdictional Prereq-
uisite).-Appellant must timely file the notice of appeal in the lower
court because the appellate courts and rules view timeliness as essen-
tially a jurisdictional matter. The appellate courts may indepen-
dently question the timeliness of an appeal and quash on its own an
untimely filed appeal. In Bass v. Commonwealth, Justice Roberts ex-
plained the importance of such time limits: "The statutory thirty day
filing requirement is a legislative determination that appeals if taken
must be within that period. That requirement is a legislative judg-
ment that statutory timely appeals and adjudicative finality advance
the quality of our jurisprudence."8
The appellate rules are strict as to the time requirements for
filing a notice of appeal.' 0 The policy of liberal construction of the
86. See PA. R. App. P. 521 (notice to attorney general regarding constitutional chal-
lenge). When a party seeks to challenge the constitutionality of an Act of Assembly in the
lower court, the party must likewise give prompt notice by registered mail to the attorney
general. See PA. R. Civ. P. 235; see also Faust v. Messinger, 345 Pa. Super. 155, 497 A.2d
1351 (1985) (failure to give notice barred claim); Commonwealth v. Hassine, 340 Pa. Super.
318, 490 A.2d 438 (1985); Irrera v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 231 Pa. Super. 508, 331
A.2d 705 (1974); cf Ekin v. Board of Commissioners, - Pa. Commw. -, 502 A.2d 303
(1985) (Rule 235 not applicable absent constitutional challenge to an Act of Assembly).
87. See PA. R. App. P. 522 (notice to court administrators regarding constitutional chal-
lenge to rules). In both cases, the attorney general or the court administrator must be given
written notice upon the filing of the official record, see infra notes 229-316 and accompanying
text, "or as soon thereafter as the question is raised in the appellate court." PA. R. App. P.
521(a). As with the failure to notify the attorney general in the court below, failure to notify
the court administrator may preclude a party from challenging a rule of court in the appellate
court. See. e.g., Havelka v. Sheraskey, 295 Pa. Super. 326, 441 A.2d 1255 (1982).
88. See supra note 86; cf Commonwealth v. Linder, 284 Pa. Super. 327, 333 n.4, 425
A.2d 1126, 1129 n.4 (1981) (no waiver of constitutional issue for failure to notify attorney
general in accordance with PA. R. App. P. 521(a) in the interests of judicial economy and in
view that Rule 521(a) is not applicable where Commonwealth is in fact a party); James v.
Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 321 Pa. Super. 512, 515 n.6, 459 A.2d 338, 340 n.6 (1983)
(failure to give notice in lower court overlooked when party gives notice at appellate stage),
rev'd, 505 Pa. 137, 477 A.2d 1302 (1984).
89. 485 Pa. 256, 266, 401 A.2d 1133, 1138 (1979) (dissent on denial of application for
reargument).
90. Time limitations for filing appeals are strictly construed. See Commonwealth v. Hos-
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appellate rules is specifically subject to the proviso that the appellate
court "may not enlarge the time for filing a notice of appeal." 91
Therefore, if a notice of appeal is untimely filed, the appellate court
will quash the appeal.92
(a) Appellate time clock: critical time restrictions.-Since the
timeliness of an appeal is a critical jurisdictional factor, specific rules
and statutes must be consulted in order to ascertain particular time
limitations. The time limitations vary. The general appellate rule
provides that the notice of appeal must be filed within thirty days
after the entry of the order from which the appeal is taken. 3
Generalities, such as the thirty day rule, may prove deceptively
dangerous. In a small minority of cases, the appellate rules provide
for a lesser time limit within which to file a notice of appeal. For
example, the appellate rules specifically require that a notice of ap-
peal be filed within ten days from the entry of the following orders:
(1) an order changing venue or venire in a criminal proceeding;94 (2)
an order in any matter arising under the Pennsylvania Election
Code; and (3) an order in any matter arising under the Local Gov-
ernment Unit Debt Act or any other similar statute relating to the
authorization of a public debt.9 5 Likewise, when a lower court order
in a civil action has sustained venue or personal or in rem jurisdic-
tion, 96 the actual time to appeal may be less than the general thirty
day period when the plaintiff elects to treat the interlocutory order
kins, 329 Pa. Super. 226, 478 A.2d 45 (1984). See also Pines supra note I at 76 n. 82.
91. See PA. R. App. P. 105(b); see also 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5501 (general rule,
time limitations), 1722 (time limitations), and 5504 (judicial extension of time) (Purdon 1981
and Supp. 1986).
92. The parties cannot by agreement or otherwise consent to an extension of the appel-
late court's jurisdiction nor, as the rules make clear, can the appellate court extend its jurisdic-
tional authority beyond the limits of the law. See Commonwealth v. Riebow, 299 Pa. Super.
458, 445 A.2d 1219 (1982); Commonwealth v. Molyneaux, 277 Pa. Super. 264, 419 A.2d 763
(1980); Baker v. Commonwealth Human Relations Comm'n, 75 Pa. Commw. 296, 462 A.2d
881 (1983) (timeliness of appeal concerns subject matter of court and can be raised at any
time). See also Pines, supra note 1 at 76.
93. See PA. R. App. P. 903(a) (time for appeal), which provides as follows: (a) General
Rule. Except as otherwise prescribed by this rule, the notice of appeal required by Rule 902
(manner of taking appeal) shall be filed within 30 days after the entry of the order from which
the appeal is taken; see also supra note 22 as to effect of record absence of notice.
94. See PA. R. App. P. 31 l(a)(3) (change of venue or venire). In In re Fourth Statewide
Investigating Grand Jury, - Pa. -, 509 A.2d 1260 (1986), the supreme court quashed
an appeal from a civil contempt order because it was not filed within the applicable 10 day
time limit of PA. R. App. P. 1512(b)(3).
95. See generally PA. R. App. P. 903(c) (time for appeal, special provisions).
96. See PA. R. App. P. 311 (b). Such an order sustaining jurisdiction does not put anyone
out of court and is generally an unappealable interlocutory order. See Pines, supra note 1, at
121-122.
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as final.97 Although beyond the scope of this Article, caution is also
suggested as to the special constricting time limits applicable to peti-
tions for review.9
(b) Appellate time clock: computation of appeal period.-The
date of entry of the lower court's order is generally the pivotal event
that causes the appellate clock to begin ticking. As noted previously,
the formal entry of the lower court's order may, in civil cases, be the
day on which the clerk makes the notation in the docket that notice
of the formal entry of the order has been given.9 In criminal cases,
the formal entry may be the day that the lower court "adopts" the
order by entering the judgment of sentence on the docket and in-
forming the defendant of his rights. 100
To compute the appeal period, one excludes the date that the
lower court's order was entered, but includes the final day (that is,
the thirtieth day) of the appeal period. 10 If, for example, the appeal
period is thirty days from the lower court's entry of the appealed
order, a notice of appeal filed on the thirty-first day creates a juris-
dictionally untimely appeal subject to dismissal or quashing. 02 To be
97. See PA. R. App. P. 903(c) (special provisions), 311(b) (order sustaining venue or
personal or in rem jurisdiction). The comment to Rule 311 (b) states as follows: "The appeal
period under Rule 903 (time for appeal) ordinarily runs from the entry of the order, and not
from the date of the filing of the election, which procedure will ordinarily afford at least 20
days within which to appeal. See Rule 903(c) as to the treatment of special appeal times."
Rule 903(c), in turn, states that "Where an election has been filed under Rule 311 (b) ... the
ten day period under this subdivision shall run from the filing of the election." As to the
computation of appeal time when the lower court certifies the interlocutory jurisdictional order
under PA. R. App. P. 311(b)(2), see Martin v. Gerner, 322 Pa. Super. 507, 481 A.2d 903
(1984) (thirty day appeal period runs from date lower court amended its initial order).
98. See PA. R. App. P. 1512 (time for petitioning for review); see also In re Fourth
Statewide Invest. Grand Jury, - Pa. at -, 509 A.2d at 1261 (civil contempt, 10 day
time limit).
99. See supra text accompanying notes 19-23.
100. See supra text accompanying notes 24-32.
101. See I PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1908 (Purdon Supp. 1986), which states as follows:
When any period of time is referred to in any statute, such period in all
cases, except as otherwise provided in section 1909 of this title (relating to publi-
cation for successive weeks) and section 1910 of this title (relating to computa-
tion of months) shall be so computed as to exclude the first and include the last
day of such period. Whenever the last day of any such period shall fall on Satur-
day or Sunday, or on any day made a legal holiday by the law of this Common-
wealth or of the United States, such day shall be omitted from the computation.
See also State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Schultz, 281 Pa. Super. 212, 421 A.2d 1224
(1980). The proposed amendments to the appellate rules would modify the official commentary
to PA. R. App. P. 903 by incorporating reference to § 1908. See supra note 39.
102. See Commonwealth v. Baines, 334 Pa. Super. 97, 99, 482 A.2d 1099, 1100 (1984)
(untimely pro se appeal filed on thirty-first day quashed), (citing Commonwealth v.
Molyneaux, 277 Pa. Super. 264, 265-67, 419 A.2d 763, 764 (1980)); Commonwealth v. Rie-
bow, 299 Pa. Super. 458, 445 A.2d 1219 (1982) (appeal quashed). Note, however, that accom-
modations are made if the thirteenth day falls, for example, on a Saturday or Sunday. See I
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distinguished from such an untimely filed appeal is an appeal that is
prematurely filed. The appellate rules now make accommodation for
such premature appeals, which will not be quashed as long as a
proper appealable order is subsequently entered. 10 3
(c) Extension of time: impermissible attempts.-The time limi-
tations for filing a notice of appeal are strictly construed. The courts
have recognized that various common procedural maneuvers in the
lower court will not extend the time to appeal after the formal entry
of an appealable order in the lower court. For example, a "motion
for reconsideration" of the lower court's order will not, by itself, ex-
tend the time within which to appeal.104 Likewise, a petition for spe-
cial relief in the supreme court does not extend the time in which an
aggrieved party must appeal to the commonwealth court.105 Simi-
larly, in criminal cases, a motion for modification of sentence 0 6 does
not in itself stop or affect the time limitations for filing a notice of
appeal. 101
If an aggrieved litigant wants to preserve her appellate rights
while still pursuing the option of reconsideration by the lower court,
the preferable procedure according to the appellate commentary is to
(a) file an application for reconsideration and (b) file a notice of
appeal in the lower court.108 The appellate rules specify the proper
PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 1908, supra note 101.
103. See PA. R. App. P. 905(a); see also supra text accompanying notes 60-66.
104. A denial of a motion to reconsider is not an appealable order. The appeal must be
timely filed from the initial order if the lower court denies reconsideration. See Provident Nat'l
Bank v. Rooklin, 250 Pa. Super. 194, 378 A.2d 893 (1977).
105. See Beharry v. Mascara, 92 Pa. Commw. 484, 499 A.2d 1129 (1985) (appeal
quashed as untimely).
106. See PA. R. CRIM. P. 1410.
107. See Commonwealth v. Hoskins, 329 Pa. Super. 226, 478 A.2d 45 (1984). However,
the time for taking an appeal may be extended when there is pending a timely motion to
withdraw a guilty plea under PA. R. CRIM. P. 32. The commentary to PA. R. App. P. 343
provides that the "time for filing an appeal from the judgment on the plea does not begin to
run until such motion is decided by the lower court." The comments to PA. R. App. P. 343 also
state as follows:
In the event an appeal from the judgement on a plea of guilty has been filed
before a timely motion under Pa. R. Crim. P. 321 has been made, the filing of
such motion acts as an automatic grant of reconsideration under Rule
1701(b)(3) (authority of lower court or agency after appeal), so as to render
inoperative the prior appeal. In such event, an appeal could be filed anew after
disposition of the Pa. R. Crim. P. 321 motion.
See Commonwealth v. Villaloz, 303 Pa. Super. 518, 450 A.2d 47 (1982), reviewed disapprov-
ingly in Commonwealth v. Hoskins, 329 Pa. Super. at 231, 478 A.2d at 48 (Spaeth, J., dissent-
ing); see also Commonwealth v. Sayko, 333 Pa. Super. 265, 268 n.4, 482 A.2d 559, 561 n.4
(1984). The cases suggest that a motion to withdraw a guilty plea could not extend the period
of time to appeal when the appellant is basically challenging a sentence rather than the refusal
of the lower court to permit withdrawal.
108. See PA. R. App. P. 1701(b)(3) commentary, which states in part as follows:
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procedure to be followed if the lower court timely grants a motion
for reconsideration:
A timely order granting reconsideration under this paragraph
shall render inoperative any such notice of appeal or petition for
review of a quasijudicial order theretofore or thereafter filed or
docketed with respect to the prior order, and the clerk of any
court in which such an inoperative notice or petition has been
stricken under this rule. Where a timely order of reconsideration
is entered under this paragraph, the time for filing a notice of
appeal or petition for review begins to run anew after the entry
of the decision on reconsideration, whether or not that decision
amounts to a reaffirmation of the prior determination of the trial
court or other government unit. No additional fees shall be re-
quired for the filing of the new notice of appeal or petition for
review.109
If the lower court decides to grant reconsideration, it must formally
and expressly do so within the relevant time period (usually thirty
days) measured from the entry of the appealable order. 110 After re-
consideration is timely and expressly granted, the appeal then lies
from the subsequent new order, which may or may not amount to
reaffirmation of the initial order reconsidered by the lower court. 1 '
(d) Extension of time.- permissible reasons.-Other than a
The better procedure under this rule will be for a party seeking reconsidera-
tion to file an application for reconsideration below and a notice of appeal, etc. If
the application lacks merit the trial court or other government unit may deny
the application by the entry of an order to that effect or by inaction. The prior
appeal paper will remain in effect, and appeal will have been taken without the
necessity to watch the calendar for the running of the appeal period. If the trial
court or other government unit fails to enter an order "expressly granting recon-
sideration" (an order that "all proceedings shall stay" will not suffice) within
the time prescribed by these rules for seeking review, Subdivision (a) becomes
applicable and the power of the trial court or other government unit to act on
the application for reconsideration is lost.
(emphasis added.)
109. PA. R. App. P. 1701(b)(3); see infra text accompanying notes 186-209.
110. PA. R. App. P. 1701(b)(3)(ii) states that the lower court can grant reconsideration
of an order after an appeal is filed if:
an order expressly granting reconsideration of such prior order is filed in the
trial court or other government unit within the time prescribed by these rules for
the filing of a notice of appeal of petition for review of a quasijudicial order with
respect to such order, or within any shorter time provided or prescribed by law
for the granting of reconsideration.
The lower court must grant reconsideration expressly and in a timely manner. A stay of pro-
ceedings in itself is insufficient and does not amount to reconsideration. See Commonwealth v.
Gordon, 329 Pa. Super. 42, 477 A.2d 1342 (1984).
111. See Dillon by Dillon v. National R. Corp. (Amtrak), 345 Pa. Super. 126, 497 A.2d
1336 (1985) (when reconsideration is granted, prior appeal becomes inoperative).
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lower court's timely and express grant of a motion for reconsidera-
tion, an extension of time to file an appeal may be possible in cer-
tain, very limited circumstances. Cases recognize that the untimely
filing of an appeal may be excused and the filing of an appeal nunc
pro tuncl"2 may be permitted when the failure to timely file a notice
of appeal is attributable to any one of the following: (a) fraud or
breakdown in the lower court's operations," s including a wrongful or
negligent act by a governmental officer;"' (2) non-negligent failure
to timely file a notice of appeal;" 5 (3) ineffectiveness of counsel in a
criminal case in failing to file an appeal or failure of the lower court
to specifically inform the criminal defendant of his right to appeal;"10
or (4) service of an inaccurate notice.' 7 When such factors exist, a
procedural option is apparently to file a motion in the lower court
seeking permission to file an untimely notice of appeal or, as is com-
112. Nunc pro tunc has been defined as "[a] phrase applied to acts allowed to be done
after the time when they should be done, with a retroactive effect, i.e., with the same effect as
if regularly done." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 964 (5th ed. 1979).
113. See generally Purdy Estate, 447 Pa. 439, 291 A.2d 92 (1972) (failure of court
official to mail); Pierce v. Penman, - Pa. Super. -, 515 A.2d 948 (1986) (additional
time to appeal proper since failure to notify counsel of court's adjudication represented break-
down in operation of court); Nixon v. Nixon, 329 Pa. 256, 198 A.2d 154 (1938) (failure of
prothonotary to notify). The appellate rules specifically acknowledge in the official commen-
tary that the proscription against extensions of time is not intended to affect the power of a
court to grant relief when there is fraud or a breakdown in the processes of a court. See PA. R.
App. P. 105 commentary; see also 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5504(b) (Purdon 1981) (judicial
extension of time, fraud).
114. See Baker v. Commonwealth Pa. Human Relations Comm'n, 75 Pa. Commw. 296,
462 A.2d 881 (1983) (error of public official in misleading complainant as to proper appellate
procedure may be equivalent to fraud).
115. See Bass v. Commonwealth, 485 Pa. 256, 401 A.2d 1133 (1979). This exception is
a troublesome one and, as one superior court judge noted, has not been readily applied. See
Moring v. Dunne, 342 Pa. Super. 414, 418, 493 A.2d 89, 91 (1985) (Beck, J.). In Bass, the
permissible non-negligent failure to timely appeal involved an illness of a secretary who had
typed the appeal papers and placed them in a folder on her desk. The death of appellant's
attorney in Moring did not establish non-negligent failure under the particular facts.
The federal rules permit untimely appeals only upon showing of excusable neglect or good
cause. See FED. R. App. P. 4(a)(5); see also Winchell v. Lortscher, 377 F.2d 247 (8th Cir.
1967).
116. See Commonwealth ex rel Light v. Cavell, 422 Pa. 215, 217, 220 A.2d 883, 884
(1966) (appeal must be taken within time prescribed by law unless the failure to do so resulted
from an unconstitutional deprivation of assistance of counsel) (citing Douglas v. California,
372 U.S. 353 (1963); Commonwealth v. Martin, 346 Pa. Super. 129, 499 A.2d 344 (1985)
(untimely appeal, filed more than 30 days after sentence, reviewed when lower court failed to
adequately inform the defendant of his right to appeal; therefore, no evidence that defendant
waived his right to appeal); cf. Commonwealth v. Riebow, 299 Pa. Super. 458, 445 A.2d 1219
(1982) (untimely appeal quashed when defendant was advised); see also PA. R. CRIM. P.
1405(c) (at sentencing proceeding, trial court advises defendant of right of appeal and time
limits).
117. See Commonwealth v. Horner, 449 Pa. 322, 296 A.2d 760 (1972) (Common-
wealth's appeal nunc pro tunc permitted because of service of inaccurately dated order from
court office).
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monly described, an appeal nunc pro tunc." 8 Once the lower court
grants such a petition, the appeal must be filed within the relevant
time period, often thirty days.1 9 If the lower court denies a petition
to appeal nunc pro tunc, the aggrieved party can nonetheless file a
notice of appeal from the entry of the order of denial. 20 Such an
appeal could raise the propriety of the lower court's order of refusal
to permit an untimely appeal.
The out-of-time appeal is a rare exception subject to careful ap-
pellate scrutiny. If the lower court, for example, has improperly
granted a motion to file a notice of appeal nune pro tunc, the appel-
late court may review the lower court's action and conclude that the
jurisdictionally untimely appeal was not justified. Such an action, in
effect, represents an attempt by the lower court to extend appellate
jurisdiction beyond the limits of the law. In one case, the death of an
appellant's attorney, for example, did not justify an untimely appeal;
the superior court therefore quashed the appeal.12 ' Hardship alone
will not authorize an untimely appeal. It is important to recognize
that nune pro tune appeals are not permissible when the failure to
appeal is attributable to mere negligence or inadvertence.
5. Filing the Notice of Appeal: Place.-Two copies 22 of the
notice of appeal must be timely filed with the clerk of the trial
court. 1 a The comments to the appellate rules indicate that insofar as
the clerk of the trial court is concerned, the notice of appeal serves
as a writ in the nature of certiorari.'2 4 Upon the receipt of the notice
of appeal, the lower court clerk must immediately stamp the notice
with the date of receipt. The stamped date constitutes the official
date when the appeal was taken'2 5 and it is from this stamped date
118. See, e.g., Moring, 342 Pa. Super. 414, 493 A.2d 89; Commonwealth v. Smith, -
Pa. Super. -, 501 A.2d 273 (1985) (denial of post-conviction relief to file appeal nunc pro
tunc affirmed). It would seem that the lower court is in the best position to ascertain the
existence and veracity of facts concerning why a timely appeal was not filed. But see Common-
wealth v. Moore, 321 Pa. Super. 1, 10 n.5, 467 A.2d 862, 867 n.5 (1983); Bass v. Common-
wealth, 485 Pa. 256, 401 A.2d 1133 (1979); Purdy's Estate, 477 Pa. 439, 291 A.2d 92 (1972).
119. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5571(e) (Purdon 1981); Commonwealth v. Moore,
321 Pa. Super. 1, 467 A.2d 862 (1983).
120. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Smith, - Pa. Super. - , 501 A.2d 273 (1985).
121. See. e.g., Moring v. Dunne, 342 Pa. Super. 414, 493 A.2d 89 (1985) (superior
court quashes erroneously granted appeal nunc pro tunc when no evidence of fraud or break-
down) and cases cited therein. The death of appellant's attorney did not establish non-negli-
gent failure.
122. Parties and counsel should always be alert to changes in the filing requirements.
Presently, two copies are required.
123. See PA. R. App. P. 905(a) (filing of notice of appeal).
124. See id. commentary.
125. See id.
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that one determines if a notice of appeal was timely filed.
(a) Filing the appeal in erroneous place.-Unlike the untimely
filing of a notice of appeal, the timely filing of a notice of appeal in
the wrong forum is not necessarily fatal from a jurisdictional point
of view. The appellate rules provide as follows:
If a notice of appeal is mistakenly filed in an appellate court, or
is otherwise filed in an incorrect office within the unified judicial
system, the clerk shall immediately stamp it with the date of
receipt and transmit it to the clerk of the court which entered
the order appealed from, and upon payment of an additional fil-
ing fee the notice of appeal shall be deemed filed in the trial
court on the date originally filed. 126
(b) Transfers and the improper designation of the appellate fo-
rum.-The appellant must designate in the notice of appeal the
proper appellate forum that has jurisdiction of the appealable order.
Whether exclusive, concurrent, or original jurisdiction exists, for ex-
ample, in the supreme, superior, or commonwealth court can only be
determined after one has examined the order to be appealed and the
relevant jurisdictional statutes.1 27 If the notice of appeal designates
the wrong appellate forum, the mistake is not fatal. The appeal, for
example, can be reviewed by the designated appellate court, if it so
decides, or it can be transferred by the appellate court to the proper
appellate forum.1 26 The policy is thus to preserve the right of appel-
late review.
129
126. Id. 905(a); cf. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5103(a) (Purdon Supp. 1986); PA. R.
App. P. 751 (transfer of erroneously filed cases), which states as follows:
Transfer of erroneously filed matters
(a) General rule. - If an appeal or other matter is taken to or brought in a
court or magisterial district of this Commonwealth which does not have jurisdic-
tion of the appeal or other matter, the court or district justice shall not quash
such appeal or dismiss the matter, but shall transfer the record thereof to the
proper tribunal of this Commonwealth, where the appeal or other matter shall
be treated as if originally filed in the transferee tribunal on the date when the
appeal or other matter was first filed in a court of magisterial district of this
Commonwealth. A matter which is within the exclusive jurisdiction of a court or
district justice of this Commonwealth but which is commenced in any other tri-
bunal of this Commonwealth shall be transferred by the other tribunal to the
proper court or magisterial district of this Commonwealth where it shall be
treated as if originally filed in the transferee court or magisterial district of this
commonwealth on the date when first filed in the other tribunal.
127. See Pines, supra note I, at 139-145.
128. See PA. R. App. P. 751 (transfer of erroneously filed cases), 752 (transfers between
superior and commonwealth courts); see also 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 705 (transfers be-
tween intermediate appellate courts), 5103 (transfer of erroneously filed matters) (Purdon
1981). See Pines, supra note I, at 139.,
129. See Commonwealth v. Carter, 36 Pa. Commw. 569, 575, 389 A.2d 241, 244 (1978)
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If an appellee has failed to file an objection to the jurisdiction of
the improperly designated appellate forum on or prior to the last day
for the filing of the lower court record in the appellate court, °30 the
failure to object may operate to "perfect" the jurisdiction of the ap-
pellate court under Rule 741(a). Waiver of jurisdiction, however,
does not apply to untimely filed appeals from nonappealable
orders.'
The appellate courts, on their own motion or an application
132 of
any party, may transfer an appeal to another court when there is
pending any matter involving the same or related questions of fact,
law, or discretion. 138 An application for transfer, however, does not
stay proceedings in the appeal or the other related matter.' 3 ' The
superior court, for example, has suggested the following considera-
tions in determining the advisability of transfers: (1) whether the
case has already been transferred; (2) whether conflicting lines of
authority might develop with regard to the same subject matter; and
(3) whether transfer would disrupt the legislatively ordained division
of labor. 85 It has also been noted that, in appropriate circumstances,
an appellate court may refuse in the interests of judicial economy to
transfer a matter when the court determines that under no circum-
stances could the transferee tribunal grant the requested relief. 86
6. Contemporaneous Filing Requirements (the transcript or-
der and docket entries).-In addition to the filing of the notice of
appeal, the appellant may also have to comply with other contempo-
raneous procedural requirements. For example, if at the time of the
(citing Gaitley's Adoption, 303 Pa. 200, 202, 154 A. 368, 369 (1931)); Field's Appeal, 305 Pa.
125, 157 A. 262 (1931); but see State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Schultz, 281 Pa. Super.
212, 421 A.2d 1224 (1980) (docketing of appeal with prothonotary of appellate court did not
constitute the proper filing of an appeal nor excuse tardy filing), an isolated case that reached
a harsh result under prior practice, which is now rectified by the 1982 amendments to PA. R.
App. P. 905(a) and note thereto. The policy to preserve appeals is also reflected in the com-
mentary to the proposed amendment to Rule 902, supra note II.
130. See infra notes 321-326 and accompanying text.
131. See PA. R. App. P. 741(b)(1), (2).
132. See supra note 80.
133. See PA. R. App. P. 752(a) (transfer between superior and commonwealth courts;
general rule).
134. See PA. R. App. P. 752(c) (transfer between superior and commonwealth courts;
effect of filing application).
135. See United Plate Glass v. Metal Trims Industries, - Pa. Super. -, 505 A.2d
613 (1986) (citing Karpe v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 315 Pa. Super. 185, 461 A.2d 859
(1983)).
136. See Smock v. Commonwealth, 496 Pa. 204, 208-09, 436 A.2d 615, 617-18 (1981)
(citing Meehan v. Cheltenham Township, 410 Pa. 446, 189 A.2d 593 (1963)); Lyons v. Port
Auth. of Allegheny County, 327 Pa. Super. 166, 170 n.4, 475 A.2d 151, 153 n.4 (1984)
(quashed).
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filing of the notice of appeal, the lower court's record has not been
transcribed, appellant will have to accompany the notice of appeal
with an order for transcript." s" The order for transcript will thus put
the lower court's stenographer on notice of the necessity for tran-
scribing all or part of the lower court's testimony to be reviewed by
the appellate court. The rules of judicial administration also require
appropriate service of the "transcript order" on various individu-
als." 8' The absence of or defect in the order for transcript, however,
does not affect the validity of an appeal.' 3 9 In addition to the notice
of appeal and order for transcript, the appellant must file (1) proof
of service1 40 and (2) a copy of the lower court's docket entry evidenc-
ing that the appeal is taken from an appealable order.
1
(a) Superior court: docketing statement.-Counsel should also
consult the appellate rules and amendments for any other procedural
requirements, either contemporaneous with or closely related in time
to the filing of the notice of appeal. For example, the superior court
requires counsel for appellant to complete a docketing statement
shortly after the superior court receives notice that an appeal has
been filed and docketed.1 43 This docketing statement will be filed in
the appellate court.
(b) Supreme court: jurisdictional statement.-The Advisory
Committee on Appellate Court Rules has proposed changes and ad-
ditions to the appellate rules."4s At the time of preparing this Arti-
cle, the proposed rule change would require the filing and service of
137. See PA. R. App. P. 904(c) (order for transcript), 905(a) (filing notice of appeal and
transcript order with clerk of trial court), 1911 (order for transcript); see also PA. R. Civ. P.
227.3 (transcript of testimony). See infra text accompanying notes 282-292.
138. See PA. R. J. A. 5000.5(a), which specifies service on the (1) reporter, (2) clerk of
the trial court, (3) district court administrator or designee, and (4) clerk of the appellate court.
PA. R. J. A. 5000.5(b) states that the transcript order shall be made part of the notice of
appeal.
139. See PA. R. App. P. 904(c) (order for transcript).
140. See PA. R. App. P. 905(a); see also infra text accompanying notes 151-153.
141. See PA. R. App. P. 904; see also supra notes 12-46 and accompanying text.
142. PA. R. App. P. 3517 states as follows:
Whenever a notice of appeal to the Superior Court is filed, the Prothonotary
shall send counsel for appellant a docketing statement form which counsel shall
complete and return within ten (10) days in order that the Court shall be able to
more efficiently and expeditiously administer the scheduling of argument and
submission of cases on appeal.
143. See supra note 39. The proposed rules are PA. R. App. P. 909, 910 and 911, re-
ported in LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 16, 1986 at 1, 12, 13. Additions have also been pro-
posed to PA. R. App. P. 905(a) (filing of notice of appeal) and 906(b) (service of notice of
appeal) to accommodate the proposed jurisdictional statement requirements.
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a jurisdictional statement in direct 14 ' appeals to the supreme court.
The proposed new rule1 5 would require (1) filing of the jurisdic-
tional statement with the clerk of the trial court; (2) serving copies
of the jurisdictional statement upon all parties to the matter in the
trial court; and (3) completing proof of service. The proposed rule
requires an original and eight copies of the jurisdictional statement
to be filed with the prothonotary of the trial court.1"
According to the proposed rule, 14 7 the jurisdictional statement
would have to contain the following in the order set forth: (1) refer-
ence to the official and unofficial opinions of the lower courts, includ-
ing citations if reported, and the inclusion of unreported opinions;
(2) statements in support of the basis for the supreme court's juris-
diction in the case, including reference to supporting cases; (3) text
of the appended order (or portions thereof) to be reviewed and the
date of its entry; and (4) a succinct identification of questions, in-
cluding subsidiary questions, presented for review. The statement,
excluding the appendix, should not exceed five pages. Noncompli-
ance with the jurisdictional statement rule could result in sanctions,
including dismissal. 1 " The proposed rule would also entitle an oppos-
ing party to file a brief in opposition to the jurisdictional statement
with the supreme court prothonotary within fourteen days after ser-
vice of the appellant's jurisdictional statement.1 49 Since these re-
quirements are proposals, the practitioner is cautioned to ascertain
and carefully review any procedural amendments specifically con-
cerning appeals in the supreme court. 150
7. Service, Proof of Service and Filing Fees, and Pauper Sta-
tus.-Concurrently with the filing of the notice of appeal in the
lower court, appellant must serve the following individuals with cop-
ies of the notice of appeal and, if appropriate, the transcript order:
(1) all parties to the matter in the trial court; (2) the trial court
144. See Pines, supra note i, at 139-142.
145. See PA. R. App. P. 906(b) (service of notice of appeal) and 909(a) (appeals to
supreme court; jurisdictional statement) (proposed amendment), supra note 143.
146. See PA. R. App. P. 909(a) (appeals to the supreme court; jurisdictional statement)
(proposed amendment), supra note 143.
147. See PA. R. App. P. 910 (jurisdictional statement; content; form) (proposed amend-
ment), supra note 143.
148. See PA. R. App. P. 909(d) (appeals to the supreme court; jurisdictional statement;
sanctions) (proposed amendment), supra note 143.
149. See PA. R. App. P. 909(b) (appeals to the supreme court; jurisdictional statement;
brief in opposition) (proposed amendment), supra note 143.
150. The comments to the proposed rule indicate that the purpose of the jurisdictional
statement rules is to provide the supreme court with sufficient information to screen attempted
direct appeals that have no jurisdictional basis.
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judge; (3) the official court reporter of the trial court; and (4) the
district court administrator or his/her designee.151 Appellant must
file two copies of the proof of service, showing compliance with the
rule, along with the notices of appeal.16 2 The appellate rules provide
an example of the appropriate content and form of the proof of
service.158
Filing fees for the lower and appellate courts are payable upon
the filing in the lower court. The comment to the rules'" suggests
that the better practice is to pay the fee for the filing of the notice of
appeal in the lower court and the docketing 155 fee in the appellate
court by separate checks payable to the respective clerks or protho-
notaries. The respective clerks of the courts should be contacted for
information concerning current fee requirements.
16
A party entitled to proceed in forma pauperis (I.F.P.) is not
required to pay the filing fees. I.F.P. status may be obtained in the
lower or appellate courts. Parties who have been granted leave by
the lower court to proceed I.F.P. may likewise proceed in an appel-
late court provided they file with the lower court two copies of a
verified statement. The statement must state (1) the date that the
lower court granted I.F.P. relief; (2) the absence of any substantial
change in the financial condition of the appellant since the grant of
such relief; and (3) the inability of the party to pay the fees and
costs in the appeal.
167
If the appellant is not eligible to file such a verified statement to
secure automatic I.F.P. status upon filing the notice of appeal, the
appellant can apply for I.F.P. relief in the lower court. The applica-
tion may be filed before or after the filing of the notice of appeal.1"8
The application must be accompanied by a verified statement as
specified by the appellate rules. 15' No contemporaneous filing fee is
required in the lower court. 160 The application, one should note, will
151. See PA. R. App. P. 906 (service of notice of appeal).
152. See PA. R. App. P. 905(a) (filing of notice of appeal).
153. See PA. R. App. P. 122 (content and form of proof of service). PA. R. App. P. 121
concerns the filing and service of papers filed in the appellate court. A knowingly false proof of
service constitutes a misdemeanor of the second degree. See PA. R. App. P. 122 commentary.
154. PA. R. App. P. 905(c) (filing of notice of appeal; fees).
155. See infra notes 168-169 and accompanying text.
156. See also PA. R. App. P. 2701 (payment of fees required).
157. See PA. R. App. P. 551 (continuation of informa pauperis status for purposes of
appeal).
158. See PA. R. App. P. 522 (application to lower court for leave to appeal in forma
pauperis).
159. See PA. R. App. P. 561 (form of I.F.P. verified statement) and 552(b). Cf. PA. R.
Civ. P. 240 (in forma pauperis relief in civil actions).
160. PA. R. App. P. 552(c).
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be automatically approved if the applicant is represented by counsel
who certifies on the application or in a separate document that the
applicant is indigent and counsel is providing free legal service. 161
The lower court must decide the application within twenty days of
filing and state its reasons if it denies the application in whole or
part.162 The comments to the rules' 63 also recommend that a party
who intends to request I.F.P. relief in the lower court should trans-
mit a copy of the application to the appellate court's prothonotary.
If the appellant is unable to secure I.F.P. relief automatically or
upon application in the lower court, the appellant can request relief
in the appellate court by filing an application with the required veri-
fied statement.'" The rules specify the effect of the application upon
the pending or subsequent appeal.'65 If the application is denied, all
applicable fees must be paid.'66 Failure to comply with these proce-
dural requirements may lead the appellate court to deny a request
for I.F.P. relief.
167
8. "Docketing" of the Appeal in the Appellate Court.-After
the notice of appeal, proof of service and, if applicable, the transcript
orders are filed with the clerk of the trial court, the trial court clerk
must immediately transmit to the prothonotary of the appellate court
a copy of the notice of appeal, proof of service, and receipt of docket-
ing fees collected.'68 Upon receipt of the transmitted papers from the
trial court, the appellate court prothonotary enters the appeal on the
docket. 169 Thus, the notice of appeal is filed in the lower court and
the appeal is docketed in the appellate court. The appellate prothon-
otary will then give notice of the appellate docket assignment num-
ber to the lower court clerk, appellant, and parties.
9. Appearances.-Counsel on appeal will be those listed on the
notice of appeal. Counsel for purposes of appeal can be changed
upon the praecipe of a counsel for a party within thirty days after
161. PA. R. App. P. 552(d).
162. See PA. R. App. P. 552(e).
163. See PA. R. App. P. 2701 (payment of fees required).
164. See PA. R. App. P. 553 (application in appellate court), 561 (form of in forma
pauperis verified statement).
165. See PA. R. App. P. 554 (effect of application and approval thereof).
166. See PA. R. App. P. 554(c).
167. See Commonwealth v. Frisoli, 255 Pa. Super. 593, 595 n.2, 389 A.2d 136, 137 n.2
(1978).
168. See PA. R. App. P. 905(b) (filing of notice of appeal; transmission to appellate
court).
169. See PA. R. App. P. 907 (docketing of appeal). As the official comments note, the
present procedure makes the appeal "self-docketing."
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the filing of the notice of appeal. Thereafter, one must request per-
mission from the appellate court to withdraw.
1 70
(a) Criminal Cases: duty of representation and requirements
for withdrawal.-The criminal procedural rules provide that when
counsel has been assigned, such assignments shall be effective until
judgment, including any proceedings on direct appeal.7 1 The consti-
tutional right to assistance of counsel includes assistance to those
who seek appellate review.' 72 Appointed counsel for a defendant,
therefore, has an important and special obligation to preserve the
client's appellate rights. Once an appeal is filed, counsel is obligated
to file a proper brief and serve as the client's advocate in the appel-
late court. Assigned counsel must strictly comply with particular
procedural requirements in seeking to obtain permission from the ap-
pellate court to withdraw as counsel in an allegedly frivolous
appeal.
73
(b) Criminal cases: "pro se" appeals.-A defendant has a con-
stitutional right to represent himself, that is, to appear pro se.1'7
Nevertheless, one case has stated that a pro se appeal, filed prior to
appellant's acquiring leave to proceed pro se, has no legal effect
while defense counsel remains authorized to represent the accused in
all respects.
76
170. See PA. R. App. P. 907(b) (entry of appearance).
171. See PA. R. CRIM. P. 316(c)(iii) (implements Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353
(1963)); see also Commonwealth v. Hickox, 433 Pa. 144, 249 A.2d 777 (1969).
172. See Commonwealth v. Daniels, 491 Pa. 289, 420 A.2d 1323 (1980) (regardless of
merits of petition, defendant was entitled to representation by public defender in seeking peti-
tion for allowance of appeal; counsel directed to file proper petition within 30 days); Common-
wealth v. West, 334 Pa. Super. 287, 482 A.2d 1339 (1984) (assistance of counsel includes
assistance to those seeking allowance of appeal); cf. Commonwealth v. Finley, 330 Pa. Super.
313, 479 A.2d 568 (1984), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 61 (1986) (application of constitutional
right of counsel to collateral criminal proceedings).
173. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); Commonwealth v. McClendon, 495
Pa. 467, 434 A.2d 1185 (1981); Commonwealth v. Thomas, __ Pa. Super. -, 511 A.2d
200 (1986); Commonwealth v. Wallace, 322 Pa. Super. 157, 469 A.2d 230 (1983).
174. See McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984).
175. The superior court characterized the represented defendant's pro se appeal as a
nullity. See Commonwealth v. Hall, 327 Pa. Super. 390, 476 A.2d 7 (1984) (citing Common-
wealth v. Williams, 270 Pa. Super. 27, 410 A.2d 880 (1979)) One should compare the nuga-
tory effect in the appellate court when a represented defendant independently profers issues
pro se. Commonwealth v. Kibler, 294 Pa. Super. 30, 439 A.2d 734 (1982), distinguished in
Commonwealth v. Moore, 321 Pa. Super. 1, 9 n.4, 467 A.2d 862, 866-67 n.4 (1983); see also
Commonwealth v. Johnson, No. 00113 Harris. 1986 (Pa. Super. -, 1986) (WESTLAW, Pa. -
CS library) (trial court properly denied defendant's pro se motion to suppress when he was
represented by counsel).
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(c) Corporations.-In Walcavage v. Excell 2000, Inc., 76 the su-
perior court noted that the federal and state courts have consistently
held that a corporation may appear in court only through an attor-
ney at law admitted to practice before the court. The superior court
concluded that the same rule applied in Pennsylvania.
B. Filing a Cross Appeal. The Nondelegable Duty to Appeal
As a general rule, any party that is separately aggrieved by an
order should independently file a notice of appeal in the lower
court. Generally, a cross appeal should be filed after the filing of a
notice of appeal when an appellee also wants to challenge an appeal-
able order. Although an aggrieved party has initially filed a notice of
appeal, that party's notice of appeal will not automatically provide
the requisite jurisdictional base for another aggrieved party to chal-
lenge the lower court's order. 177 For example, a plaintiff might ap-
peal the inadequacy of a monetary judgment in a civil case. In order
for the defendant to challenge or attack the propriety of the judg-
ment itself, he should file a cross appeal. If the party does not wish
to challenge the order already appealed, such party would not have
to file a cross appeal.
178
1. Cross-Appeal: Procedural Requirements.-A cross appeal,
generally, must be (1) timely filed 179 in the lower court and (2) must
176. 331 Pa. Super. 137, 480 A.2d 281 (1984) and cases cited therein; cf. Phoenix Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Radcliffe on the Delaware, Inc., 439 Pa. 159, 266 A.2d 698 (1970).
177. See Pines, supra note 1, at 136-139, characterizing this procedural situation as
"piggy back jurisdiction." Chief Justice Nix presented an insightful analysis of this particular
jurisdictional vagary in his dissent in Commonwealth v. Goldhammer, - Pa. ,
A.2d - (1986).
178. See, e.g., R. 1. Lampus Co. v. Neville Cement, Inc.. 474 Pa. 199, 378 A.2d 288
(1977) (appellee could not question correctness of superior court's order disallowing certain of
its claims when it did not file a petition for allowance of appeal from that court's order; motion
to strike portion of appellee's brief granted); Donegal Mut. Ins. Co. v. Egler, - Pa. Super.
- .. n. 4, - A.2d - , n. 4 (1987) (failure to cross appeal fatal); Goodrich v.
Luzerne Apparel Mfg. Co., - Pa. Super. -, 514 A.2d 188 (1986) (issues raised in brief
of defendants, in support of appeal of other defendants, not considered when they did not
appeal separately or join in the appeal); PA. R. App. P. 512 (joint appeals); see also Cochran v.
M&M Transp. Co., 110 F.2d 519 (1st Cir. 1940) (if litigant fails to appeal or cross appeal
from judgment granting him only part of the relief sought and denying the rest, he can be
heard only in support of judgment, and such judgment becomes res judicata as to issues de-
cided against him) (citing Alexander v. Cosden Pipe Line Co., 290 U.S. 484, 487 (1934);
United States v. Hickey, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 9 (1872)); see also Peoria & P.U.R.Y. Co. v.
United States, 263 U.S. 528, 536 (1924); Robertus v. Candee, - Mont. -. , 670 P.2d 540
(1983) (failure to cross appeal fatal). For a detailed discussion, see Stein, When to Cross-
Appeal or Cross-Petition - Certainty or Confusion?, 87 HARV. L. REv. 763 (1974). See also
4 AM. JUR. 2D Appeal and Error §§ 117, 294; BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 338 (5th ed. 1979)
(defining cross appeal as an appeal filed by the appellee).
179. Cf Welsh v. Elevating Boats, Inc., 698 F.2d 230 (5th Cir. 1983) (federal practice).
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concern an order, or portion thereof, that is within the appellate
court's jurisdiction. The appellate rules provide that "if a timely no-
tice of appeal is filed by a party, any other party may file a notice of
appeal within 14 days of the date on which the first notice of appeal
was filed, or within the time otherwise prescribed by this rule, which-
ever period last expires."180 If an aggrieved litigant fails to cross ap-
peal, the appellate court may refuse to consider any argument or
claims challenging the lower court's order.181
The procedures, herein described concerning the entry of an ap-
pealable order, the importance of timely filing, the content of the
notice of appeal, the appearance of counsel, the place of filing, and
the appropriate service and fees, apply equally to the filing of a
cross-appeal. For purposes of briefing, if a cross appeal is filed, the
plaintiff or moving party in the lower court is designated as the ap-
pellant, unless the parties agree or the appellate court otherwise
orders. 182
2. Amicus Curiae's Participation Distinguished.-An amicus
curiae (that is, a friend of the court) is not a party to an appellate
proceeding '8 and is therefore neither obligated nor permitted to file
a notice of appeal. It has been stated that since an amicus is not a
party, it cannot assume the functions of a party. The amicus has no
control over the litigation and no right to institute proceedings; it
must, therefore, accept the case before the court with the issues
framed by the parties." 4 The appellate rules permit nonparty partic-
ipation of an amicus curiae. Anyone "interested" in a question in-
volved in any matter pending in an appellate court may, without re-
questing appellate court permission, file an amicus curiae brief.185
C. Significance and Effect of Filing an Appeal
The obvious, paramount objective of an appeal is to secure ap-
180. PA. R. App. P. 903(b) (time for appeal; cross appeals); see also 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 5571(f) (Purdon 1981). For timely filing requirements of cross-petition for allowance
of appeal in the supreme court see PA. R. App. P. I113(b).
181. See supra notes 177 and 178; see also Pines, supra note 1, at 136-137 n. 367.
182. PA. R. App. P. 2136 (briefs in cases involving cross appeals); see also Kremer v.
State Ethics Comm'n, 503 Pa. 358, 360, 469 A.2d 593, 594 (1983). For the format of oral
argument in cross appeals, see PA. R. App. P. 2322.
183. See PA. R. App. P. 531(a) (participation by amicus curiae).
184. See Frank v. Peckich, 257 Pa. Super. 561, 590 n. 15, 391 A.2d 624, 638 n.15
(1978).
185. See PA. R. App. P. 531(a). Oral argument, however, may be presented by amicus
curiae only upon application or as the appellate court directs. The appellate courts require
presentation of extraordinary reasons. See PA. R. App. P. 531(b).
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pellate review of a purportedly erroneous order of the lower court.
There may be, in addition, a significant interim benefit for the appel-
lant when a notice of appeal is filed in the trial court. The appellate
rules provide that after an appeal is taken, the trial court "may no
longer proceed further in the matter."'' 86 The major effect of an ap-
peal, therefore, is to tie the hands of the lower court from taking
further action during the pendency of the appeal. The rule, which
has its roots in common law,1 87 thus limits the exercise of the lower
court's jurisdiction. The cases, therefore, emphasize that when an
appeal is filed or when the supreme court grants an application for
extraordinary jurisdiction, 88 the lower court may not proceed fur-
ther in the matter. Any improper further action of the lower court
during an appeal would be nugatory since the effect of the appeal is
to divest the lower court of jurisdiction. 89
The appellate rules,' however, recognize that the lower courts
186. See PA. R. App. P. 1701(a), infra note 190; see also 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
5105(e) (appeal shall operate as a supersedeas).
187. See Commonwealth v. Burkett, 352 Pa. Super. 350, 507 A.2d 1266 (1986) (citing
Gilbert v. Lebanon Valley St. Co., 303 Pa. 213, 218, 154 A. 302, 304 (1931)); see also
Corace v. Balint, 418 Pa. 262, 210 A.2d 882 (1965); Kingsley Clothing Mfg. Co. v. Jacobs,
344 Pa. 551, 26 A.2d 315 (1942); Wilson v. Wilson, 297 Pa. Super. 14, 23, 442 A.2d 1189,
1193-94 (1981) (citing statutory predecessor, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1154); Weise v.
Goldman, 229 Pa. Super. 187, 323 A.2d 31 (1974). A useful jurisdictional fiction, at least
under modern appellate practice, is that once the record of the lower court is actually or
constructively lodged in the appellate court, the lower court has no record upon which to take
action.
188. See Beharry v. Mascara, 92 Pa. Commw. 484, 499 A.2d 1129 (1985).
189. See, e.g., Jones v. Commonwealth, 495 Pa. 490, 497-98, 434 A.2d 1197, 1200-01
(1981) (appeal from suppression order deprived the lower court of jurisdiction to proceed fur-
ther with trial; trial was automatically stayed pending disposition of appeal); Rosen v. Rosen,
353 Pa. Super. 421, 510 A.2d 732 (1986) (taking of then jurisdictionally proper appeal pre-
vented lower court from proceeding further); Mandia v. Mandia, 341 Pa. Super. 116, 491
A.2d 177 (1985) (procedurally peculiar case in which lower court lacked authority to dismiss
exceptions to economic claims while appeal from order of bifurcation was pending); Common-
wealth v. Hall, 327 Pa. Super. 390, 476 A.2d 7 (1984) (lower court's instituting trial while
defendant's pro se appeal from nonappealable, interlocutory order was improper prior to
amendment of PA. R. App. P. 1701(b)(6)); Appeal of Affected and Aggrieved Residents, 325
Pa. Super. 8, 472 A.2d 619 (1984) (trial court's exercise of jurisdiction over petition for coun-
sel fees during appeal was improper); Leasing Serv. Corp. v. Benson, 317 Pa. Super. 439, 455-
56, 464 A.2d 402, 410 (1983) (while appeal from order refusing to strike or open confessed
judgment was pending, lower court could not evaluate the merits of appellants' claim to have
judgment marked satisfied since appeal was, in effect, challenge to validity and effect of judg-
ment); Commonwealth v. Green, 312 Pa. Super. 265, 458 A.2d 951 (1983) (lower court prop-
erly refused to rule on motion to withdraw guilty plea while appeal was pending); Wilson v.
Wilson, 297 Pa. Super. 14, 442 A.2d 1189 (1981); Yeager v. Long, 284 Pa. Super. 76, 425
A.2d 426 (1980) (lower court had no power to grant appellee's motion to strike appellant's
exceptions after appeal was filed); Commonwealth v. Boris, 280 Pa. Super. 369, 421 A.2d 767
(1980) (trial court could not accept defendant's guilty plea pending appeal).
190. The applicable rule, PA. R. App. P. 1701, provides, in part as follows:
(a) General rule. Except as otherwise prescribed by these rules, after an
appeal is taken or review of a quasijudicial order is sought, the trial court or
other government unit may no longer proceed further in the matter.
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may proceed further during appeal in some specifically limited situa-
tions. The lower court, for example, may take the following actions
during appeal: (1) timely and specifically grant a motion to recon-
sider the appealed order;191 (2) preserve the status quo;19 (3) correct
formal errors or omissions in record papers; 193 (4) grant leave to ap-
(b) Authority of a trial court or agency after appeal. After an appeal is
taken or review of a quasijudicial order is sought, the trial court or other govern-
ment unit may:
(1) Take such action as may be necessary to preserve the status quo,
correct formal errors in papers relating to the matter, cause the record to
be transcribed, approved, filed and transmitted, grant leave to appeal in
forma pauperis, grant supersedeas, and take other action permitted or
required by these rules or otherwise ancillary to the appeal or petition for
review proceeding.
(2) Enforce any order entered in the matter, unless the effect of the
order has been superseded as prescribed in this chapter.
(3) Grant reconsideration of the order which is the subject of the
appeal or petition.
(4) Authorize the taking of depositions or the preservation of testi-
mony where required in the interest of justice.
(5) Take any action directed or authorized on application by the ap-
pellate court.
(6) Proceed further in any matter in which a nonappealable interloc-
utory order has been entered, notwithstanding the filing of a notice of
appeal or a petition for review of the order.
(c) Limited to matters in dispute. Where only a particular item, claim or
assessment adjudged in the matter is involved in an appeal, or in a petition for
review proceeding relating to a quasijudicial order, the appeal or petition for
review proceeding shall operate to prevent the trial court or other government
unit from proceeding further with only such item, claim or assessment, unless
otherwise ordered by the trial court or other government unit or by the appellate
court or a judge thereof as necessary to preserve the rights of the appellant.
191. See supra text accompanying notes 104-111; see also Commonwealth v. Gordon,
329 Pa. Super. 42, 49-51, 477 A.2d 1342, 1345-46 (1984) (lower court can modify base sen-
tence pending appeal provided that defendant files a timely motion under PA. R. CRIM. P. 1410
to reconsider sentence within ten days and trial court expressly grants reconsideration within
thirty days of sentence; preferred practice is for lower court to vacate sentence when timely
granting reconsideration); Provident Nat'l Bank v. Rooklin, 250 Pa. Super. 194, 378 A.2d 893
(1977) (citing 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5505) (Purdon 1981)); 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. §
5505 (1981) (lower court's authority to modify its order within 30 days after entry). See also
Simpson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 350 Pa. Super. 239, 504 A.2d 335 (1986); Livolsi v. Crosby, 344
Pa. Super. 34, 495 A.2d 1384 (1985).
192. See, e.g Leasing Serv. Corp. v. Benson, 317 Pa. Super. 439, 464 A.2d 402 (1983)
(although lower court was prevented from taking action in other respects, it could order the
satisfaction demand nullified in order to preserve the status quo of a pending appeal that chal-
lenged the validity of a confessed judgment).
193. See PA. R. App. P. 1701, supra note 190; PA. R. App. P. 1926 (correction or modifi-
cation of record); see also Commonwealth v. Adams, 350 Pa. Super. 506, 504 A.2d 1264
(1986) (en banc) (court may correct clerical error regarding sentence); Metropolitan Edison
Co. v. Old Home Manor, 334 Pa. Super. 25, 482 A.2d 1062 (1984) (lower court could modify
order pending appeal to reflect pre-award interest since modification was a permissible correc-
tion to a formal error in court's papers and computation of interest involved a simple clerical
matter); cf. Commonwealth v. McDonald, 285 Pa. Super. 534, 428 A.2d 174 (1981) (pending
appeal, lower court could proceed to correct omission in record, namely, that petitioner was, in
fact, advised that he could participate in the selection of the jury) (citing Commonwealth ex.
rel. Tanner v. Claudy, 378 Pa. 412, 106 A.2d 820 (1954); PA. R. App. P. 1926); but see Corabi
415
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peal in forma pauperis; 194 (5) grant supersedeas relief;195 (6) enforce
any order entered in the matter unless the order has been superseded
by the appellate rules; 196 (7) decide matters that are "separate and
distinct" from matters raised in the pending appeal;19 7 (8) provide
relief on matters that are "ancillary" 198 to the appeal; 99 and (9) pro-
v. Curtis Publishing Co., 437 Pa. 143, 150, 262 A.2d 665, 668 (1970) (Rule 1701 does not
permit fundamental corrections of record); Schreiber v. Schreiber, 308 Pa. Super. 243, 454
A.2d 112 (1982) (lower court can take steps to reconstruct or correct record, but it cannot
"clarify" appealed support order by requiring payment of alimony pendente lite nunc pro
tunc).
194. See supra text accompanying notes 157-167; see also PA. R. App. P. 552 (applica-
tion to lower court to appeal in forma pauperis).
195. See PA. R. App. P. 1732(a) (application for stay in lower court). For example, in
order to prevent enforcement or execution of a judgment involving solely the payment of
money, the appellant would have to request the lower court for a stay if he was unable to post
security of 120% of the amount under PA. R. App. P. 1731. As the supreme court pointed out
in Young J. Lee v. Commonwealth, 504 Pa. 367, 474 A.2d 266 (1983), a stay, like a superse-
deas, is an auxiliary process designed to supersede or hold in abeyance the enforcement of a
judgment of an inferior tribunal. See also Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Process Gas
Consumers, 502 Pa. 545, 467 A.2d 805 (1983) (criteria for granting stay pending appeal);
Conston v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 366 Pa. 219, 77 A.2d 603 (1951); Madden v.
Madden, 336 Pa. Super. 569, 486 A.2d 410 (1985) (citing Groner; PA. R. CIv. P. 1910.24);
Groner v. Groner, 328 Pa. Super. 191, 476 A.2d 957 (1984) (improper to place supersedeas on
a child support order) (citing Goodin v. Goodin, 240 Ark. 541, 400 S.W.2d 665 (1966)); Shinn
v. Stember, 159 Pa. Super. 129, 47 A.2d 294 (1946) (supersedeas acts only in favor of those
who comply with necessary procedures).
196. For example, a lower court could proceed to enforce an order by proceeding to
garnishment and judgment when the appellants have failed to obtain a supersedeas under PA.
R. App. P. 1731 (automatic supersedeas of orders for payment of money). See Rice v. Shuman,
343 Pa. Super. 318, 494 A.2d 866 (1985); cf. Laxton v. Laxton, 345 Pa. Super. 450, 498 A.2d
909 (1985) (trial court did not lack jurisdiction to enforce separate order for payment of ar-
rearages notwithstanding appeal from order that froze marital assets and granted divorce). But
see School Dist. of Pittsburgh v. Rankin, 55 Pa. Commw. 371, 423 A.2d 1087 (1980) (pending
appeal to commonwealth court from order approving reassignment plan in school desegrega-
tion case, trial court's order directing its plan to be implemented was not permissible action
but constituted impermissible attempt "to proceed further in the matter").
197. See Litt v. Rolling Hill Hosp., 293 Pa. Super. 97, 100 n.2, 437 A.2d 1008, 1010 n.2
(1981) (purpose of PA. R. App. P. 1701(c) is to prevent pending appeal from affecting separate
disputes between other parties or separate subject matter) (citing Commonwealth v. Baldwin,
282 Pa. Super. 82, 87, 422 A.2d 838, 841 (1980); Commonwealth v. Mazzocone, 8 Pa. D. &
C.3d 309 (1978)).
198. "Ancillary" means, for example, aiding, attendant upon, auxiliary, or subordinate.
See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 78 (5th ed. 1979).
199. See PA. R. App. P. 1701(b)(l); see also Fortune/Forsythe v. Fortune, 352 Pa.
Super. 547, -, 508 A.2d 1205, 1209-10 (1986) (trial court had jurisdiction to proceed on
husband's petition to vacate support for college aged son while prior appeal from order denying
father's motion for modification was pending when petition concerned matters arising subse-
quent to those in the pending appeal and order denying modification was unaffected by disposi-
tion of petition to vacate); Rosenberg v. Holy Redeemer Hosp., 351 Pa. Super. 399, 410-411,
506 A.2d 408, 413-14 (1986) (trial court's denial of supplemental post-summary judgment
motions pending appeal was proper since lower court had jurisdiction to clear up matters ancil-
lary to appeal regarding appellant's motion to find hospital in contempt); Laxton v. Laxton,
345 Pa. Super. 450, 498 A.2d 909 (1985) (jurisdiction existed to enforce separate order for
payment of arrearages pending appeal); Litt v. Rolling Hill Hosp., 293 Pa. Super. 97, 437
A.2d 1008 (1981); Commonwealth ex rel. Brown v. Brown, 254 Pa. Super. 410, 386 A.2d 15
(1978) (appeal from divorce decree did not divest the trial court of jurisdiction to award or
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ceed further in the matter when the appeal concerns a nonappealable
interlocutory order,200 such as, for example, a frivolous double jeop-
ardy appeal.2 0
In most cases, the filing of an appeal will prevent the lower
court from proceeding further "in the matter." In those instances,
however, in which an appeal does not preclude further action by the
lower court or in which the lower court is specifically entitled to take
limited action, the practitioner must seek a stay or specific superse-
deas relief in the lower or appellate courts °0 in order to hold all
related matters in abeyance. For example, an appeal from an order
involving solely a money judgment does not automatically operate as
a supersedeas.208 In addition, an appeal generally does not operate as
a supersedeas of government agency action.204 In a criminal case,
supersedeas relief may be of crucial importance to a convicted and
sentenced defendant.205
terminate support when support involved issues collateral to appeal; award or termination of
alimony pendente lite is collateral to an appeal from a divorce decree; lower court, however,
was barred from entering any order premised upon the existence of a final divorce decree).
200. PA. R. App. P. 1701 was amended to specifically address the effect of a jurisdiction-
ally improper appeal in subdivision (b)(6). See supra note 190. Prior practice prevented a
lower court from taking any further action even when the appeal was jurisdictionally improper.
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hall, 327 Pa. Super. 390, 476 A.2d 7 (1984) (noting that PA. R.
App. P. 1701(b)(6) was not to be applied retroactively); Aloi v. Aloi, 290 Pa. Super. 125, 434
A.2d 161 (1981); see also Commonwealth v. Burkett, 352 Pa. Super. 350, 507 A.2d 1266
(1986) (trial court's commencement of trial pending defendant's improper interlocutory appeal
from pretrial order denying his motion to quash; exception under 1701(b)(6) applied).
201. The supreme court recently announced a modification of the procedure as to frivo-
lous pre-trial double jeopardy appeals in Commonwealth v. Brady, - Pa. - , 508 A.2d
286 (1986). If the trial court states on the record that the double jeopardy motion is frivolous,
the lower court may proceed further in the matter, notwithstanding the appeal. The supreme
court noted as follows:
The availability of an automatic stay upon filing a Bolden [double jeopardy]
appeal encourages the use of frivolous appeals as a means of avoiding prosecu-
tion. The trial court should not be powerless to prevent such intentional dilatory
tactics . . . . The needless delays engendered by frivolous appeals hinder the
administration of justice as well as the public interest.
Id. at -, 508 A.2d at 291.
202. Generally, supersedeas relief should be first sought in the lower or trial court. See
PA. R. App. P. 1702 (stay ancillary to appeal), 1732(a) (application to lower court for stay or
injunction pending appeal).
203. See PA. R. App. P. 1731 (automatic supersedeas of orders for payment or money),
1733 (requirements for supersedeas on agreement or application), 1734 (appropriate security
for supersedeas), 1735 (effect of supersedeas on execution or distribution), 1736 (exemptions
from security), 1737 (objections to security), 1739 (order for sale of perishable property), 1751
(appropriate form of a bond).
204. See PA. R. App. P. 1701 commentary.
205. See PA. R. App. P. 1762 (release in criminal matters), 1764 (other stays in criminal
matters); PA. R. CRIM. P. 4010 (bail after finding of guilt). If the lower court denies bail
pending appeal, the lower court should file of record a brief statement for its reasons or specify
where in the record such reasons can be found so that, upon application in the appellate court,
the appellate court will have an adequate basis for review. See PA. R. App. P. 1762(0.
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In addition to an awareness of when a specific request for super-
sedeas relief is required under the rules and facts of one's case, the
practitioner will also have to maneuver the definitional but practical
hurdles of such terms as "may no longer proceed in the matter,"
"take other action . . . ancillary to the appeal," "enforce any order
entered in the matter," and "limited to matters in dispute."2 °0 Such
terms require one to ascertain the difficult dividing line between per-
missible lower court action pending appeal and impermissible juris-
dictional intrusion into matters that are the subject of pending appel-
late review. As the commonwealth court once noted, for example, it
is often difficult to distinguish the lower court's right to enforce the
appealed order from the concommitant restraint that generally pre-
cludes the lower court from proceeding further in the matter on
appeal.1
0 7
It should be noted that the appellate rules committee has pro-
posed an amendment to Rule 1701 regarding a lower court's timely
granting reconsideration of its appealed order. Rule 1701 would re-
quire a party whose notice of appeal has been rendered inoperative
by the granting of reconsideration2 08 by the trial court to notify the
appellate prothonotary so that the appeal can be stricken from the
appellate court dockets. 20 9
III. Phase Two: Statements by the Appellant and Lower Court
In between the time of the filing of the notice of appeal in the
lower court and the transmission of the official lower court record to
the appellate court, both the appellant and lower court judge have
distinct obligations under the appellate rules. The appellant, if or-
dered by the lower court to do so, must file what is called a "state-
ment of matters complained of," which hereinafter will be referred
to as the appellant's "Rule 1925 statement." Likewise, the lower
court judge must file a statement that explains the reasons for his or
her actions challenged on appeal. This statement shall be referred to
as the "lower court's opinion." Specifically, the relevant appellate
rule provides as follows:
(a) General rule. Upon receipt of the notice of appeal the judge
who entered the order appealed from, if the reasons for the or-
206. See PA. R. App. P. 1701.
207. See School Dist. of Pittsburgh v. Rankin, 55 Pa. Commw. 371, 423 A.2d 1087
(1980).
208. See supra notes 108-111.
209. See LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 17, 1986, i, 23, published in 16 Pa. Bull. 3924,
3929 (1986); see also supra note 39.
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der do not already appear of record, shall forthwith file of record
at least a brief statement, in the form of an opinion, of the rea-
sons for the order, or for the rulings or other matters complained
of, or shall specify in writing the place in the record where such
reasons may be found.
(b) Direction to file statement of matters complained of. If the
lower court is uncertain as to the basis for the appeal, the lower
court may by order direct the appellant forthwith to file of rec-
ord in the lower court and serve on the trial judge a concise
statement of the matters complained of on the appeal. A failure
to comply with such direction may be considered by the appel-
late court as a waiver of all objections to the order, ruling or
other matter complained of.2 10
A. Appellant's Statement: Appellate Preview
As the rule suggests, the appellant's statement becomes neces-
sary when, in preparation of the lower court's opinion, the lower
court judge is uncertain as to what actions the appellant will chal-
lenge on appeal. In the course of a trial, for example, there are often
numerous record objections and allegations of error, some trivial,
others prejudicially momentous. Although the procedural vehicle of
post-trial motions helps to identify and refine the issues for an antici-
pated appeal, the appellant's statement further assists the lower
court judge by eliminating the necessity that the trial court judge
formally explain21 1 reasons for every purported erroneous ruling. In
a sense, the appellant's statement operates as an economical preview
of coming appellate events. With such a statement, the lower court
can then focus on the issues and prepare to file its explanatory
opinion.
The second significant function of the appellant's statement is
closely related to the first. The appellant's statement, by advising the
lower court of specific errors and enabling it to explain its ruling,
facilitates more effective appellate review. When the lower court and
appellant have complied with the procedural requirements, the ap-
pellate court is then at a good vantage point to determine the nature
of the appellant's grievances and the correctness of the lower court's
rulings and rationales.
210. PA. R. App. P. 1925. The predecessor, Supreme Court Rule 56, can be found in In
re Harrison Square, Inc., 470 Pa. 246, 368 A.2d 285 (1977).
211. See Commonwealth v. Crowley, 259 Pa. Super. 204, 211-12, 393 A.2d 789, 792
(1978) (en banc), on remand, 281 Pa. Super. 26, 421 A.2d 1129 (1980), rev'd, 502 Pa. 393,
466 A.2d 1009 (1983) (Rule 1925 is based on giving the trial court an opportunity to explain
its decision, not to correct its errors).
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1. Appellant's Failure to Comply with Rule 1925: Sanc-
tions.-The appellant must file a 1925 statement only if directed to
do so by the lower court,2 12 either specifically by the lower court
judge or by local rule of court. If the appellant has failed to comply
with the rule and the lower court's directive, the appellate court may
later dismiss the appeal, conclude that the briefed issues are waived,
or overlook the noncompliance. Appellate assessment of an appel-
lant's compliance with Rule 1925 is equitable and discretionary in
nature.2  Again, the primary focus is whether appellant's noncom-
pliance defeats effective appellate review, for example, by placing a
handicap on the lower court's preparation of its opinion.2"4
In Commonwealth v. Johnson,1 5 the superior court identified a
need to balance the following considerations: gravity of the case, im-
portance of the issues, and degree of noncompliance. In that case,
the superior court concluded that the noncompliance would not re-
sult in waiver when the defendant filed a brief in the lower court
within a few days of his Rule 1925 deadline, the post-trial motions
identified the issues defendant raised on appeal, and the lower court
considered and rejected the defendant's arguments with reasons on
the record. The supreme court itself has noted that it is improper to
find waiver when the appellant's noncompliance did not defeat effec-
tive appellate review.21  Nevertheless, the appellate courts have dis-
missed cases or found waiver when noncompliance effectively pre-
vented the appellate court from adequately reviewing the appeal.
2 17
212. Commonwealth v. Thomas, 305 Pa. Super. 158, 163 n.8, 451 A.2d 470, 472 n.8
(1982) (noncompliance excused when lower court never directed defendant). Local rules may,
however, automatically require the filing of a statement within a specified time.
213. Commonwealth v. Silver, 499 Pa. 228, 452 A.2d 1328 (1982); Commonwealth v.
Johnson, 309 Pa. Super. 367, 455 A.2d 654 (1982); Barrick v. Fox, 73 Pa. Commw. 6, 457
A.2d 208 (1983).
214. Commonwealth v. Mueller, 341 Pa. Super. 273, 491 A.2d 258 (1985) (appellate
court must assess seriousness of non-compliance in context of entire case); Commonwealth v.
Crowley, 259 Pa. Super. 204, 211-12, 393 A.2d 789, 792 (1978) (en banc), on remand, 281
Pa. Super. 26, 421 A.2d 1129 (1980), rev'd, 502 Pa. 393, 466 A.2d 1009 (1983). See also
supra note I I regarding correction of "formal" defects.
215. 309 Pa. Super. 367, 455 A.2d 654 (1982). The case involved a prosecution for
murder.
216. See Commonwealth v. Silver, 499 Pa. 228, 452 A.2d 1328 (1982).
217. See Geyer v. Steinbronn, - Pa. Super. -, 506 A.2d 901 (1986) (waiver);
Commonwealth v. Warren, 322 Pa. Super. 410, 481 A.2d 681 (1984) (waiver); Hudock v.
Commonwealth, 69 Pa. Commw. 437, 451 A.2d 572 (1982) (waiver); Adams v. Walsh, 295
Pa. Super. 311, 441 A.2d 1248 (1982) (dismissal); Barrick v. Fox, 73 Pa. Commw. 6, 457
A.2d 208 (1983) (waiver); In re Harrison Square, Inc., 470 Pa. 246, 368 A.2d 285 (1977).
Non-compliance, however, was not fatal in the following cases: Commonwealth v. DeGeorge,
506 Pa. 445, 485 A.2d 1089 (1984); Commonwealth v. Silver, 499 Pa. 228, 452 A.2d 1328
(1982); Commonwealth v. Satchell, 306 Pa. Super. 364, 367, 452 A.2d 768, 770-71 (1982);
Commonwealth v. Williams, 269 Pa. Super. 544, 410 A.2d 835 (1979).
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2. Procedural Requirements.-An appellant must file a con-
cise 1925 statement if required or directed by the lower court.2 1 8 The
statement must be (1) filed in the lower court and (2) served on the
trial judge. In a case involving multiple appellants, an individual ap-
pellant cannot evade his obligation to provide a 1925 statement by
relying on the statements filed by other appellants."' It is also im-
portant to realize that a comprehensive or sufficient Rule 1925 state-
ment cannot serve as a substitute for post-trial motions, which pre-
cede the appeal and are indispensable to preserving issues for
appellate review. 220
B. Lower Court's "Statement"
Effective appellate review requires that an appellate court be
adequately informed of the rulings of the lower court with a support-
ing explanation. Otherwise, an appellate court would have to specu-
late as to the factual and legal predicates for the lower court's ac-
tions. Transcription of testimony and on-the-record colloquies with
the lower court are certainly helpful to the appellate court, but such
sources of information are inadequate in themselves to assure the
ideal objective of effective appellate review of the lower court's ac-
tions. Therefore, the appellate rules require the lower court to ex-
plain 21 on the record 222 the reasons for its order.
The common, and perhaps preferable, practice is for the lower
court to file a sufficiently detailed opinion concerning the essential
factual findings and conclusions of law, which explain and support
the lower court's order.2 8 Counsel for the parties will then be strate-
gically poised to adequately support or challenge the lower court's
actions when they prepare their appellate briefs. Nevertheless, it is
important to realize that although an "opinion" may be more advan-
218. See Commonwealth v. Thomas, 305 Pa. Super. 158, 451 A.2d 470 (1982).
219. See In re Harrison Square, Inc., 470 Pa. 246, 368 A.2d 285 (1977).
220. See Commonwealth v. Cargo, 498 Pa. 5, 9 n.7, 444 A.2d 639, 641 n.7 (1982); PA.
R. App. P. 302 (requisite for reviewable issue). See also Pines, supra note I at 76-77, n. 86
and 84 n. 123.
221. The lower court's opinion should explain its decision, not correct any errors. See
Commonwealth v. Crowley, 259 Pa. Super. 204, 209, 393 A.2d 789, 792-93 (1978). In Com-
monwealth v. Silver, 499 Pa. 228, 452 A.2d 1328 (1982), the supreme court pointed out that
Rule 1925 facilitates appellate review by requiring the trial court to supplement the record
with an opinion addressing the merits of the-issues to be raised on appeal. See also Common-
wealth ex rel. Donachy v. Kearney, 294 Pa. Super. 610, 440 A.2d 632 (1982) (stating general
rule and remanding for an opinion).
222. See infra notes 232-277 regarding the record concept.
223. The commonwealth court has strongly suggested that detailed findings of fact and
legal discussion are advisable. See Appeal of Mellon Bank, 78 Pa. Commw. 463, 467 A.2d
1201 (1983).
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tageous, Rule 1925 does not necessarily require the lower court to
prepare an opinion. The lower court's obligation under the rule is
satisfied if it files "of record" a brief statement "in the form of an
opinion" or if it specifies in writing where in the record the reasons
for its order can be found.22 For example, in an equity case in which
the lower court previously made detailed findings of facts and con-
clusions of law,225 the abbreviated process may be adequate for pur-
poses of appellate review.
The existence of an opinion or brief statement from the lower
court is, therefore, crucial to meaningful appellate review. Since the
purpose of the lower court's statement is explanation, the appellate
court may decide to remand on appeal to the lower court if the rea-
sons do not adequately appear on the record or in its supplied state-
ment. 22 6 Moreover, when the lower court has completely failed to
satisfy the requirements of the rule, appellate courts will often re-
mand so that the lower court can promptly provide an adequate
opinion or statement.22 7 Sometimes, because of exigent circum-
stances, an appellate court may have to rely on an opinion prepared
by a lower court judge who did not hear the case.22s
IV. Phase Three: Transcription and Transmission of the Official
Lower Court's Record
If an appealable order is metaphorically the nucleus or basic
building block of the appeal, then the original lower court's record is
perhaps the appeal's marrow. To consider and act on an appeal, the
appellate court needs access not only to the adversarial briefs of
counsel but also to the transcribed, official, original, certified record
224. See, e.g., Malizia v. Beckley, - Pa. Super. , n.l, 513 A.2d 417, 417
n.1 (1986), in which the lower court adopted the trial transcript as its statement of reasons in
a case involving a default judgment.
225. See, e.g., PA. R. Civ. P. 1517 (equity, the adjudication).
226. See Rittel v. Rittel, 335 Pa. Super. 550, 555 n.4, 485 A.2d 30, 33 n.4 (1984)
(despite absence of lower court's opinion to explain its support order, lower court's conclusions
were implicit in its order; nevertheless, appellate court remands for more complete record);
Vision Serv. Plan v. AFSCME, 331 Pa. Super. 217, 219 n.I, 480 A.2d 322, 324 n.l (1984)
(case previously remanded to trial court to prepare supplemental opinion clarifying its rea-
sons); Appeal of Mellon Bank, 78 Pa. Commw. 463, 467 A.2d 1201 (1983) (when rationale of
lower court was actually, although minimally, apparent from the record, not necessary to re-
mand for specific findings, since lower court made credibility determination).
227. See Commonwealth v. Hicks, 328 Pa. Super. 233, 476 A.2d 978 (1984), as supple-
mented, 342 Pa. Super. 57, 492 A.2d 61 (1985); Commonwealth v. Coda, 283 Pa. Super. 408,
424 A.2d 529 (1981); Mims v. City of Philadelphia, 267 Pa. Super. 129, 406 A.2d 552 (1979);
Kaiser v. Meinzer, 265 Pa. Super. 595, 402 A.2d 705 (1979); Commonwealth v. Costlow, 265
Pa. Super. 108, 401 A.2d 824 (1979).
228. See Commonwealth v. Mason, 327 Pa. Super. 520, 529 n.4, 476 A.2d 389, 395 n.4
(1984).
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of the lower court.2 29 Therefore, between the filing of the notice of
appeal and the submission of appellate briefs, the lower court and
the parties must take the necessary steps to assure the transcription
and transmission of an accurate and adequate record for the appel-
late court's review. Whereas the timely filing of a notice of appeal
and existence of an appealable order (properly entered on the lower
court's dockets) were critical for jurisdictional purposes, the require-
ment of an adequate lower court record in modern appellate prac-
tice is fundamental to the effectiveness and scope of appellate re-
view. The failure to provide the appellate court with an accurate and
complete lower court record, moreover, can be just as critical and
fatal in consequence as a jurisdictional defect.230 To appreciate the
importance and requirements of transcribing and transmitting the
lower court's record, one must first understand the functional impor-
tance of the official record concept.231
A. The Official Record Concept
The appellate tribunal is basically a forum for "re-view," not
fact-finding. 282 The appellate tribunal does not listen to witnesses,
does not take testimony, and does not make de novo factual findings.
The appellate court's power of review is circumscribed by what oc-
curred in the lower or trial court. Subject to very limited exceptions,
such as judicial notice of non-record facts,233 appellate review is
therefore limited to the four corners of the lower court's record or, as
229. This record shall be simply referred to as the original record.
230. See infra text accompanying note 267. The failure to provide an adequate and
accurate record may result either in the appellate court's refusal to consider the relevant issues
or dismissal of the appeal because there is an inadequate evidentiary basis for appellate review.
See infra notes 267-268 and accompanying text.
231. For further general references on the original record concept, see Bergan, Gross
Waste and Deadly Poundage: The Record on Appeal, 25 N.Y.S.B. BULL. 251 (1953); Horvitz,
Protecting Your Record on7Appeal, 4 LITIGATION 34 (1978); Rail, Preparing the Record on
Appeal, 4 LITIGATION 37 (1978); cf. Erickson, The Trial Transcript - An Unnecessary
Roadblock to Expeditious Appellate Review, II J. LEGAL REFERENCE 344 (1978).
232. Beyond the scope of this statement are the limited instances in which a legislature
has invested the appellate courts with original jurisdiction and fact-finding functions. As to the
original jurisdiction of the appellate courts in Pennsylvania, see Pines, supra note 1, at 61 n.
10 and 140 n. 378. See also PA. R. APP. P. 106 (original jurisdiction matters), 1513(d) (peti-
tion for review, evidentiary hearing), 1542 (petition for review, oral argument and evidentiary
hearing), 1543 (petition for review, trial by jury), 3734 (record in evidentiary hearing cases),
3102(c) (commonwealth court's evidentiary hearing and election matters). As one author has
pointed out, independent investigation at the appellate level for case facts is virtually nonexis-
tent. See T. MARVELL, APPELLATE COURTS AND LAWYERS: INFORMATION GATHERING IN THE
ADVERSARY SYSTEM 160, 351-52 n.9 (1978).
233. Judicial (appellate) notice of nonrecord facts is an extensive and mercurial concept.
See MARVELL, supra note 232, at 119-204.
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one author states, is circumscribed by tunnel vision. 84 This restraint
upon appellate review, which shall be referred to as the "record con-
cept," is predicated on necessity and fairness. Since the appellate
court is not in the strategic position to assess the existence or truth
of facts never adversarially presented in the lower court, the appel-
late court has no rational basis to review such facts and must there-
fore carefully sift and screen for case facts.2
Limiting appellate review to the four corners of the record satis-
fies the legitimate need to assure predictability and orderliness in the
appellate process. In addition, requiring appellate review to be based
on facts in a record is an economical, rational and expeditious
method of assuring the right of appellate review to the maximum
extent commensurate with a judiciary's capacity and limited re-
sources. Last, one could argue that the record concept, under the
adversarial system of obtaining truth, is certainly important to as-
sure fairness to litigants. Appellate courts simply should not use or
rely on facts that the parties did not have a chance to effectively
contest. 3
Thomas Marvell, in his insightful analysis of the appellate pro-
cess, offered some personal and representative judicial comments on
the importance of the official record to the proper presentation of
case facts. Noting that "probably nothing throws a cog in the wheel
of the appellate process more than when important parts of the rec-
ord are garbled or missing,"237 Marvell relates his findings from in-
234. See M. DAMASKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY 140 (1986). For
cases generally, see Commonwealth v. Young, 456 Pa. 102. 115, 317 A.2d 258, 264 (1974);
Franklin Interiors v. Wall of Fame Management Co., - Pa. -, -. 511 A.2d 761, 763
(1986) (reversing, 343 Pa. Super. 623, 494 A.2d 489 (1985)); McCaffrey v. Pittsburgh Ath-
letic Ass'n, 448 Pa. 151, 293 A.2d 51 (1972); McCaffrey v. Schwartz, 285 Pa. 561, 132 A.
810 (1926); Hudgins v. Jewel T. Discount Store, 351 Pa. Super. 329, 332, 505 A.2d 1007,
1010 (1986); Commonwealth v. Stanton, 294 Pa. Super. 516, 440 A.2d 585 (1982); Zinman v.
Commonwealth, 42 Pa. Commw. 270, 274, 400 A.2d 689, 691 (1979). The superior court, in
Commonwealth v. Velez, 329 Pa. Super. 15, 477 A.2d 879 (1984), noted that limited appellate
review and the record concept were basic to the American adversarial system. See also PA. R.
App. P. 1922(b)(3), infra note 254.
235. "Facts" can be a generically broad and misleading term. Thomas Marvell, in ana-
lyzing the basis and limits of appellate review, distinguishes the following types of factual
information: case facts (facts about the dispute before the court), supporting case facts (facts
that pertain to more than the particular dispute being decided, but used by the judges to
determine what the case facts are), case facts used as social facts (facts about the particular
dispute used as evidence of what a just and workable rule should be for the particular case and
for future cases presenting similar issues), and social facts (the polar opposite of "case facts"
in that they transcend the immediate case, they pertain not only to the parties, and they are
used to create rulings that will be precedent for future dispute resolution). MARVELL, supra
note 232, at 139-40.
236. See MARVELL, supra note 232, at 161; see also Commonwealth v. Velez, 329 Pa.
Super. 15, 477 A.2d 879 (1984).
237. T. MARVELL, supra note 232, at 160.
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terviews with various jurists:
Most of the judges interviewed were asked why it is important
to decide cases solely on the basis of facts in the record. They
usually answered that appellate courts are not set up to find case
facts: The record is the only means the judges have of knowing
what has occurred; any information they receive outside the rec-
ord is not subject to the safeguards of cross-examination, and if
the attorneys were allowed to introduce new facts upon appeal,
there would be never-ending disagreements between counsel that
the court could not resolve. For example [as one judge stated]:
Good man, I can't think of anything more fundamental than
that. You can't have people coming into court and saying,
"Well, that's what the record says, but actually this is what
happened down below." If you depart from that, you're in grave
danger. That's fundamental. . . . How do you know what hap-
pened? You may have - one fellow says "This is what hap-
pened down there," and the other fellow says "Oh, no it didn't."
So then you say, "Well, what's the record show?" You've got to
stand by the record. You'd have judicial chaos if you did any-
thing else.2 88
1. The Official Record Concept (Contents and Require-
ments).-In an appeal, there is only one28 9 official lower court rec-
ord,240 which consists of (1) the original papers and exhibits filed in
the lower court, (2) the transcript of any proceedings, and (3) a cer-
tified copy of the docket entries prepared by the clerk of the lower
238. Id. at 160-61 (emphasis in original).
239. The official lower court record must be distinguished from the reproduced record.
See infra text accompanying notes 317-356.
240. Appellate review is limited to the facts of record of that particular case. Generally,
in Pennsylvania, a court cannot take judicial notice of different or related cases, if not pleaded
or officially made part of the record. See, e.g., Matson v. Housing Authority of Pittsburgh, 326
Pa. Super. 109, 473 A.2d 632 (1984) (appellate court cannot consider non-certified copy of
opinion in prior adjudication); Chorba v. Davlisa Enters., Inc., 303 Pa. Super. 497, 500, 450
A.2d 36, 38 (1982); Commonwealth ex rel. Milk Mktg. Bd. v. Sunnybrook Dairies, 32 Pa.
Commw. 313, 316 n.4, 379 A.2d 330, 332 n.4 (1977); Callery v. Blythe Township Mun. Auth.,
432 Pa. 307, 309, 243 A.2d 385, 386 (1968); Naffah v. City Deposit Bank, 339 Pa. 157, 160,
13 A.2d 63, 64-65 (1940); GOODRICH-AMRAM 2D § 1017(b): 1. at 82 (1976); see also Matson
v. Housing Authority of Pittsburgh, 326 Pa. Super. 109, 473 A.2d 632 (1984) (appellate court
cannot consider opinion in another lower court case when the record did not contain a certified
copy of that opinion); Leasing Serv. Corp. v. Benson, 317 Pa. Super. 439, 449 n.7, 464 A.2d
402, 407 n.7 (1983) (transcript of deposition of federal court testimony, included in appellant's
printed record, not considered when it was not submitted as part of official record in lower
court); but see In re Philadelphia Co. for Guaranteeing Mortgages, 143 Pa. Super. 407, 17
A.2d 662 (1941) (court may take judicial notice of decrees it has previously made in pending
proceedings). Note also that the appellate rules permit inclusion of related proceedings in the
reproduced record. See PA. R. App. P. 2153(b).
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court. 241 Although appellate cases have recognized that the lower
court's opinion2 4 2 technically and definitionally may not be part of
the official record as to facts not otherwise appearing in the rec-
ord,243 the appellate courts often demand that an adequate and com-
prehensive opinion or statement of reasons be provided by the lower
court when it sends the official lower court record to the appellate
court for review.244 As to the lower court's opinion and the four cor-
ners limitation on appellate review, the appellate courts have noted
that the lower court's recitation of facts that are not supported by
the official transcribed record is not judicially cognizable." In addi-
tion, the official court records in other proceedings are considered
part of the official record only if they have been specifically and offi-
cially incorporated into the record in the lower court.2 "
Just as the lower court must respect the restraints of the record
concept, the parties must do likewise. The appellate courts have cau-
tioned counsel not to include any nonrecord facts (that is, facts not
plainly contained in the official record) in their briefs or reproduced
records.2 47 A litigant cannot convert an extrajudicial assertion into a
241. See PA. R. App. P. 1921 (composition of record on appeal).
242. See supra text accompanying notes 222-228 as to the requirements of a lower
court's opinion.
243. See, e.g., Dunegan v. Apico Inns of Green Tree, Inc., - Pa. Super.
514 A.2d 912, 916-17 (1986) (Del Sole, J., dissenting); Hudgins v. Jewel T. Discount Store,
351 Pa. Super. 329, 505 A.2d 1007 (1986) (appellate court could not consider unchallenged
nonrecord affidavits referred to by trial court); Commonwealth v. Sinor, 264 Pa. Super. 178,
183-84 n.5, 399 A.2d 724, 727 n.5 (1979) (facts not supported by the record are not cogniza-
ble; lower court's "recollection" is not evidence if facts are not part of the record) (citing
Commonwealth v. Burdell, 176 Pa. Super. 219, 107 A.2d 739 (1954)); see also Common-
wealth v. Donaldson, 334 Pa. Super. 473, 483, 483 A.2d 549, 554-55 (1984) (no record evi-
dence that defendant waived his speedy trial right; no waiver will be found from silent record);
cf. Leach v. Hough, 352 Pa. Super. 213, 507 A.2d 848 .(1986) (lower court's opinion went
beyond the facts of record); Commonwealth v. McDonald, 285 Pa. Super. 534, 428 A.2d 174
(1981) (lower court's assertion in opinion that defendant was in fact advised of his jury trial
rights accepted).
244. Cases involving appellate remand for preparation or completion of a lower court's
opinion, including findings of fact or conclusions of law, include, for example, the following:
Delbaugh v. Delbaugh, 337 Pa. Super. 587, 487 A.2d 417 (1985) (custody); Commonwealth v.
Hicks, 328 Pa. Super. 233, 476 A.2d 978 (1984) (remand for discussion of issues presented in
post trial motions); Mellott v. Mellott, 328 Pa. Super. 200, 476 A.2d 961 (1984) (custody
case); Supka v. Monoskey, 314 Pa. Super. 469, 461 A.2d 253 (1983) (custody); Common-
wealth v. Coda, 283 Pa. Super. 408, 424 A.2d 529 (1981); Mims v. City of Philadelphia, 267
Pa. Super. 129, 406 A.2d 552 (1979); Kaiser v. Meinzer, 265 Pa. Super. 595, 402 A.2d 705
(1979); Commonwealth v. Costlow, 265 Pa. Super. 108, 401 A.2d 824 (1979). The supreme
court disapproved of the practice of sua sponte appellate remands to update record evidence in
Commonwealth ex rel. Robinson v. Robinson, 505 Pa. 226, 478 A.2d 800 (1984).
245. See supra note 243.
246. See supra note 240; but see Commonwealth v. Forrest, 508 Pa. 382, 498 A.2d 811
(1985) (appellate consideration of lower court opinion's summary of information not offered
into evidence); cf infra note 254.
247. See Cox v. Commonwealth, 507 Pa. 614, 618 n.5, 493 A.2d 680, 686 n.5 (1985)
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record fact by simply inserting it into an appellate document or
brief, which is not definitionally a part of the official lower court's
record.2 48 As one case emphasized, an attorney should never make a
factual allegation in a brief without being able to support it by ref-
erence to the official record.24M The practitioner is cautioned that in
order to assure inclusion of a matter in the official record, the matter
or document must be properly filed280 in the lower court before the
official record is sent to the appellate court for review. All records on
appeal must contain all the documents filed in the lower court and
the docket entries that are essential to appellate review. 258
Four-corner-review is a restraint that applies not only to the
parties and lower court, but also to the appellate courts. For exam-
ple, on occasion, the supreme court has admonished an appellate
court for improperly considering information that was outside the
official record.28 2 The application of the record concept, however, has
proven in practice to sometimes be an erratic one, as one case has
noted.2 8 There have been occasions, albeit infrequent, when the ap-
(Papadakos, J., dissenting) (dissent admonishes counsel); Commonwealth v. Bowers, 245 Pa.
Super. 214, 369 A.2d 370 (1976). Instances in which counsel improperly included nonrecord,
unsupported information in their briefs or reproduced record can be found in the following
illustrative cases: Commonwealth v. Ball, - Pa. Super. - , 515 A.2d 307 (1986); Hudg-
ins v. Jewel T. Discount Store, 351 Pa. Super. 329, 505 A.2d 1007 (1986); McFarlane v.
Hickman, 342 Pa. Super. 240, 248 n.4, 492 A.2d 740, 744 n.4 (1985); Auman v. Juchniewitz,
312 Pa. Super. 98, 458 A.2d 254 (1983); Sirava v. AAA Trucking Co., 306 Pa. Super. 217,
452 A.2d 521 (1982); Society Hill Towers Owners Ass'n. v. Matthew, 306 Pa. Super. 13, 451
A.2d 1366 (1982); Anmuth v. Chagan, 295 Pa. Super. 32, 440 A.2d 1208 (1982); Acker v.
Palena, 260 Pa. Super. 214, 393 A.2d 1230 (1978); Cercone v. Cercone, 254 Pa. Super. 381,
386 A.2d 1 (1978); see also Ritter v. Ritter, - Pa. Super. - 518 A.2d 319 (1986)
(improper inclusion of non-record material in supplemental reproduced record).
248. As the opinion in Commonwealth v. Rini, 285 Pa. Super. 475, 481, 427 A.2d 1385,
1389-90 (1981) points out, a nonrecord assertion in an appellate brief in the superior court is
impermissible because the appellate brief definitionally is not part of the official record. How-
ever, as to an appeal from the intermediate to the highest appellate court, the opinion writer
reasons that the briefs in the intermediate court are part of the "record" in the higher court.
249. Commonwealth v. Bowers, 245 Pa. Super. 214, 369 A.2d 370 (1976).
250. See Burns v. City of Philadelphia, 350 Pa. Super. 615, 504 A.2d 1321 (1986) (ad-
dressing the technical meaning of "filing" and requiring that all documents must be properly
filed with the lower court prothonotary). Burns noted the repeated problem of incomplete
records being transmitted to the superior court. Burns referred to 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. §§
2702, 2736 (Purdons 1981). When matters are improperly filed in the lower court, the result is
usually an incomplete record in the appellate court, oftentimes resulting in an unnecessary and
uneconomical remand. See Commonwealth v. Cargo, 498 Pa. 5, 6 n.5, 444 A.2d 639, 640 n.5
(1982); see also Commonwealth v. Lynch, 304 Pa. Super. 248, 450 A.2d 664 (1982) (citing 42
PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 2756 (Purdons 1981), document must be filed with lower court clerk;
handing documents to lower court judge is not sufficient or proper).
251. Burns v. City of Philadelphia, 350 Pa. Super. 615, 504 A.2d 1321 (1986); and see
Gorniak v. Gorniak, 350 Pa. Super. 502, 504 A.2d 1262 (1986) (stenographic notes of testi-
mony required in every trial).
252. See Franklin Interiors v. Wall of Fame Management Co., - Pa.....
511 A.2d 761, 763 (1986) (reversing 343 Pa. Super. 623, 494 A.2d 489 (1985)).
253. See Commonwealth v. Rini, 285 Pa. Super. 475, 427 A.2d 1385 (1981).
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pellate courts have considered nonrecord information. Nonrecord
matters have been considered when, for example, the parties do not
challenge the accuracy of the information or the nonrecord fact can
be inferentially gleaned from the official transcribed record. 54 The
exceptions, however, are rare. For the practitioner, scrupulous com-
pliance with the official record concept is imperative.
2. The Incomplete or Inadequate Record: Responsibili-
ties.-All appeals must include in the original record, for example,
all documents filed in the lower court and a certified copy of the
docket entries.25 5 Essential to appellate review, as the relevant rule
suggests, 2s 6 is a transcription of the lower court's proceedings. Some-
times, however, an appellate court will recognize that, in the unan-
ticipated absence of a trial transcript, an "equivalent picture" must
be provided.2 57 Inasmuch as appellate judges may prefer to rely on
the spontaneous drama and amplitude of a transcript rather than an
advocate's calculated and filtered representation of historical fact, 58
providing an adequate and complete record is tactically important.
The onus to provide an adequate and complete official record for
appellate review is a cooperative one, but primarily, the appellant's.
254. See, e.g., Modesta v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 503 Pa. 437, 445 n.8, 469
A.2d 1019, 1024 n.8 (1983) (supreme court denies motion to strike nonrecord letter when
petitioner did not challenge letter's authenticity, there was no evidence of prejudice, and the
letter was not ultimately relevant to disposition of appeal); Commonwealth v. Hughes, 477 Pa.
180, 188 n.2, 383 A.2d 882, 886 n.2 (1978) (in context of reviewing propriety of prosecution's
opening statement, which was not transcribed, appellate court considers appellant's version of
remarks when district attorney did not contest accuracy of version and record disclosed content
of the remark); Shrum v. Pennsylvania Elec. Co., 440 Pa. 383, 387, 269 A.2d 502, 506 (1970)
(consideration of typewritten nonrecord transcript); Dunegan v. Apico Inns of Green Tree,
- Pa. Super. -_, 514 A.2d 912 (1986) (appellate majority considers summary judgment
issue even though record did not contain such a motion; docket entries did not reflect filing but
record was clear that lower court considered and acted upon such a filed motion); Greenleaf v.
Robert J. Flood Co., 328 Pa. Super. 345, 348 n.3, 476 A.2d 1363, 1366 n.3 (1984) (no record
evidence of entry of judgment overlooked when parties do not challenge underlying fact);
Smith v. Mason, 328 Pa. Super. 314, 476 A.2d 1347 (1984) (attorney's uncontested affidavit);
Commonwealth v. Wall, 321 Pa. Super. 154, 467 A.2d 1175 (1983) (appellate court assumes
that motion to modify sentence was timely filed when record did not indicate when motion was
filed but lower court considered it); Himes v. Cameron County Const. Co., 289 Pa. Super. 143,
145 n.1, 432 A.2d 1092. 1094 n.l (1981) (reliance on nonrecord contract), affid, 497 Pa. 637,
444 A.2d 98 (1982). Note that PA. R. App. P. 1922(b)(3) (diminution of transcript) states as
follows: "In any case, untranscribed notes or recordings shall not be part of the record on
appeal for any purpose." Cf. infra note 270.
255. See Burns v. City of Philadelphia, 350 Pa. Super. 615, 504 A.2d 1321 (1986).
256. See PA. R. App. P. 1921 (composition of record on appeal), supra note 241; see also
Commonwealth v. Dixon, 253 Pa. Super. 383, 385 A.2d 391 (1978).
257. See Smith v. Mason, 328 Pa. Super. 314, 476 A.2d 1347 (1984); Nemeth v. Ne-
meth, 306 Pa. Super. 47. 451 A.2d 1384 (1982).
258. See T. MARVELL, supra note 232, at 170-71, noting that some judges prefer to read
the transcript because it gives them "a better feel" for the case.
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It is the appellant's duty to request the court reporter to transcribe
the notes of testimony, if they are essential to meaningful appellate
review.259 The notice of appeal, for example, must often include the
appellant's order for a transcript. 6 0 In a criminal proceeding, the
responsibility for producing the transcript for appellate review lies
with the state.2 61 The lower court also has a responsibility, after a
notice of appeal has been filed, to make sure that the court reporter's
duty to transcribe is performed without delay. a62 In addition, of
course, the court reporter has a duty to transcribe when requested by
the appellant or ordered by the court, regardless of the reporter's
right to recover his fees.23
3. The Incomplete or Inadequate Record.- Remedies.-An in-
complete record may handicap appellate review or make meaningful
review impossible. Depending upon the circumstances contributing to
the record deficiency, an appellate court may resort to the following
options when a record is incomplete or inadequate: (1) remand for
supplementation or development of the inadequate transmitted rec-
ord, including transcription of testimony that is missing from the
record; ' (2) grant a new trial if the absence of an opportunity to
259. See PA. R. App. P. 1911(a) (appellant shall order transcript); PA. R. J. A. 5000.5
(requests and order for transcript); PA. R. Civ. P. 227.3 (all post-trial motions shall contain a
request designating portions of record to be transcribed); see also Gorniak v. Gorniak, 350 Pa.
Super. 502, 504 A.2d 1261 (1986) (stenographic notes of testimony required in every trial);
Commonwealth v. Rivera, 339 Pa. Super. 242, 246-48, 253, 488 A.2d 642, 644-45, 647-48
(1985) (en banc) (Cirillo & Johnson, JJ., dissenting).
260. PA. R. App. P. 904(c). See supra notes 137-139 and infra notes 282-292.
261. See Commonwealth v. Dean, 348 Pa. Super. 1, 501 A.2d 269 (1985) (indigent
defendant is entitled to a transcript); Commonwealth v. Homsher, 264 Pa. Super. 271, 399
A.2d 772 (1979); Commonwealth v. Dixon, 253 Pa. Super. 383, 385 A.2d 391 (1978) (citing
Commonwealth v. Goldsmith, 452 Pa. 22, 304 A.2d 478 (1973)).
262. See PA. R. APP. P. 1931(b) (transmission of record; duty of lower court to cause
transcription); see also Duquesne Pub, Inc. v. Commonwealth, P.L.C.B., 64 Pa. Commw. 566,
441 A.2d 491 (1982) (lower court must order reporter to transcribe without prejudice to his
right to recover fee; issue of cost liability should not delay appellate process) (distinguishing
Cambria Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Capozzi, 44 Pa. Commw. 189, 403 A.2d 208 (1979)).
263. See Duquesne Pub, Inc. v. Commonwealth, P.L.C.B., 64 Pa. Commw. 566, 441
A.2d 491 (1982); PA. R. App. P. 1922(a); see also PA. R. J. A. 5000.9-.12 (court reporter's
duties in transcribing record).
264. See, e.g., Cox v. Commonwealth, 507 Pa. 14, 493 A.2d 680 (1985) (remand to
Board to develop sufficient factual record); Maginley v. Robert J. Elliott, Inc., 345 Pa. Super.
582, 498 A.2d 977 (1985); Commonwealth v. Rivera, 339 Pa. Super. 242, 488 A.2d 642
(1985) (en banc); Commonwealth v. Coburn, 335 Pa. Super. 536, 485 A.2d 24 (1984); Com-
monwealth v. Shirey, 333 Pa. Super. 85, 481 A.2d 1314 (1984); Commonwealth v. Velez, 329
Pa. Super. 15, 477 A.2d 879 (1984) (refusing dissent's suggestion to call prothonotary to ob-
tain the missing information regarding sentence); Pittsburgh's Airport Motel v. Airport
Asphalt, 322 Pa. Super. 149, 469 A.2d 226 (1983) (remand for lower court's consideration of
purported motion); Hatalowich v. Bednarsky, 315 Pa. Super. 303, 461 A.2d 1292 (1983) (cit-
ing cases in support of option to remand); Auman v. Juchniewitz, 312 Pa. Super. 98, 458 A.2d
254 (1983); Anmuth v. Chagan, 295 Pa. Super. 32, 440 A.2d 1208 (1982), on remand, 336
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procure an adequate transcript would result in an abridgement of an
appellant's constitutional 2 5 right of appeal;" (3) dismiss the appeal
or refuse to consider a proferred issue, since there is no official rec-
ord evidence in the appellate court to support the appellant;267 or (4)
refuse to remand for supplementation if the absence of record evi-
dence is not critical268 or if there is an adequate equivalent pic-
ture. 69 In such circumstances, an appellate court will often consider
proffered nonrecord matters, not on their merits, but in the proce-
dural context of deciding the propriety of a remand.270
The appellate rules have attempted to make accommodation for
the troublesome situation when an appellate court has inadequate
information from the lower court's record. The rules provide as
follows:
Correction or Modification of the Record
If any difference arises as to whether the record truly discloses
what occurred in the lower court, the difference shall be submit-
ted to and settled by that court after notice to the parties and
opportunity for objection, and the record made to conform to the
truth. If anything material to either party is omitted from the
record by error or accident or is misstated therein, the parties by
stipulation, or the lower court either before or after the record is
transmitted to the appellate court, or the appellate court, on
proper suggestion or of its own initiative, may direct that the
omission or misstatement be corrected, and if necessary, that a
Pa. Super. 216, 485 A.2d 769 (1984); Commonwealth v. Rini, 285 Pa. Super. 475, 427 A.2d
1385 (1981).
265. See Pines, supra note 1, at 57-58.
266. See, e.g., Pawol v, Pawol, 293 Pa. Super. 29, 437 A.2d 974 (1981) (support; new
hearing ordered); Mansfield v. Lopez, 288 Pa. Super. 567, 432 A.2d 1016 (1981) (new trial)
(citing Mutual Loan & Say. Ass'n v. National Sur. Co., 253 Pa. 351, 98 A. 600 (1916));
Commonwealth v. Dixon, 253 Pa. Super. 383, 385 A.2d 391 (1978) (new trial).
267. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Williams, - Pa. Super. - , 516 A.2d 352 (1986)
(refusal to consider issue); Commonwealth v. Ball, - Pa. Super. - , 515 A.2d 307
(1986) (refusal to consider issue); Gorniak v. Gorniak, 350 Pa. Super. 502, 504 A.2d 1262
(1986) (dismissal); Rappaport v. Stein, 351 Pa. Super. 370, 374 n.1, 506 A.2d 393, 395 n.1
(1985) (in appropriate case, violation of record rule may result in sanction of dismissal);
McAllonis v. Pryor, 301 Pa. Super. 473, 448 A.2d 5 (1982) (appeal dismissed since no suffi-
cient evidentiary record); Acker v. Palena, 260 Pa. Super. 214, 218 n.2, 393 A.2d 1230, 1241
n.2 (1978) (refusal to consider deposition not entered in record).
268. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hughes, 477 Pa. 180, 188 n.2, 383 A.2d 882, 886 n.2
(1978) (gap not crucial).
269. See Smith v. Mason, 328 Pa. Super. 314, 476 A.2d 1347 (1984); Nemeth v. Ne-
meth, 306 Pa. Super. 47, 451 A.2d 1384 (1982); see also procedure regarding the "agreed
statement of record" infra text accompanying notes 276 to 277.
270. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex. rel Robinson v. Robinson, 505 Pa. 226, 232 n.3, 478
A.2d 800, 804 n.3 (1984) (material in reproduced record, not contained in original record,
should be corrected on remand); Anmuth v. Chagan, 295 Pa. Super. 32, 440 A.2d 1208
(1982).
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supplemental record be certified and transmitted. All other ques-
tions as to the form and content of the record shall be presented
to the appellate court.
271
It is important to note that the rule also empowers the lower court to
take necessary action, before or after an appeal, in order to assure an
adequate and accurate record for appellate review.272
4. Record When No Transcript is Available.-Although sten-
ographic notes of testimony must be taken in every trial of fact,273
the procedural posture of a case or unforeseen circumstances may
make a transcript unavailable. The appellate rules contain a special
provision if "no report of the evidence or proceedings at a hearing or
trial was made, or if a transcript is unavailable. 27 4 Basically, the
appellant sets forth his version of the proceedings. The appellee then
has an opportunity to respond by objecting or proposing amend-
ments. The lower court settles the dispute and the final statement
"as settled and approved" is included by the lower court clerk in the
record on appeal.27 5
5. The "Agreed Statement of Record" Alterna-
tive.-Notwithstanding the importance of the record concept and the
beneficial impact of providing an appellate court with the drama and
accuracy of an actual record,27 the parties may elect under the rules
to forego complete (and perhaps expensive) transcription. Transcrip-
tion and transmission of all the notes of testimony may be avoided if
the parties can cooperate in preparing and signing an agreed "state-
ment of the case." The statement should show (1) how the issues
presented by the appeal arose, (2) how the issues were decided in the
lower court and (3) so many of the facts averred and proved (or
sought to be proved) that are essential to the issues presented.277
With the concurrence of the lower court, if the statement conforms
to the truth, the statement can be certified to the appellate court.
271. PA. R. App. P. 1926.
272. See PA. R. App. P. 1701(b)(1) (lower court's power during appeal to correct record
or cause it to be transcribed); supra text accompanying notes 186-209; see also Common-
wealth v. McDonald, 285 Pa. Super. 534, 428 A.2d 174 (1981) (citing Commonwealth v.
Claudy, 378 Pa. 429, 106 A.2d 401 (1954)).
273. See Duquesne Pub, Inc. v. Commonwealth, P.L.C.B., 64 Pa. Commw. 566, 441
A.2d 491 (1982).
274. See PA. R. App. P. 1923 (statement in absence of transcript).
275. Id.
276. See supra note 258.
277. See PA. R. App. P. 1924 (agreed statement of record); see also Commonwealth v.
Mason, 483 Pa. 409, 397 A.2d 408 (1979).
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That statement can then constitute the "record" on appeal.
B. Transcription of the Official Lower Court's Record
Transcription of the lower court's record is important for two
different reasons. From a mechanistic point of view, the transcription
of the record facilitates prompt transmittal of the record to the ap-
pellate court. Once the official record arrives in the appellate court,
the appellate prothonotary can then give the briefing schedule to the
parties. In addition, from the point of view of strategy, adequate and
accurate transcription of the record is indispensable to a party's right
to secure meaningful appellate review. For once the record is tran-
scribed and transmitted, the parties are bound by the certified rec-
ord.178 The parties cannot later contradict the official written word.
1. Transcription: Notice.-As noted previously, the appellant,
when filing the notice of appeal, must contemporaneously serve the
official court reporter below with a copy of the notice of appeal.27 9
This notice is an important step because the court reporter is respon-
sible under the appellate rules for "lodging" the transcript with the
clerk of the trial court and notifying the parties.280 It should be
noted that, even prior to an appeal, local rules may require, subject
to appropriate sanctions for noncompliance, 281 notification and pay-
278. See Commonwealth v. Stanton, 294 Pa. Super. 516, 440 A.2d 585 (1982); Com-
monwealth v. Percell, 274 Pa. Super. 152, 159 n.4, 418 A.2d 340, 344 n.4 (1979), rev'd on
other grounds, 499 Pa. 589, 454 A.2d 542 (1982); Commonwealth v. Raymond, 451 Pa. 500,
304 A.2d 146 (1973).
279. PA. R. App. P. 906 (service of notice of appeal); see also supra note 151.
280. See PA. R. App. P. 1922(a) (transcription of notes of testimony), which states as
follows:
(a) General rule. Upon receipt of the order for transcript and any required
deposit to secure the payment of transcript fees the official court reporter shall
proceed to have his notes transcribed, and not later than 14 days after receipt of
such order and any required deposit shall lodge the transcript (with proof of
service of notice of such lodgment on all parties to the matter) with the clerk of
the trial court. Such notice by the court reporter shall state that if no objections
are made to the text of the transcript within five days after such notice, the
transcript will become a part of the record. If objections are made the difference
shall be submitted to and settled by the trial court. The trial court or the appel-
late court may on application or upon its own motion shorten the time prescribed
in this subdivision.
281. See, e.g., DeFazio v. Labe, 352 Pa. Super. 120, 507 A.2d 410 (1986) (interpreting
local rule as requiring automatic dismissal of post-trial motions for noncompliance with tran-
scription rule was an abuse of discretion); Davison v. John W. Harper, Inc., 342 Pa. Super.
560, 493 A.2d 732 (1985); Gutman v. Rissinger, 334 Pa. Super. 259, 482 A.2d 1324 (1984)
(noting that failure to properly notify the lower court reporter or untimely payment of fees did
not warrant dismissal of post-trial motions).
PA. R. Civ. P. 227.3, requiring that all post-trial motions shall contain a request for tran-
scription, states as follows:
All post-trial motions shall contain a request designating that portion of the
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ment of fees in connection with the transcription of the notes of testi-
mony at the post-trial motion stage in the lower court.
2. "Transcription Order".- Duties of Appellant, Court Re-
porter, and Lower Court.-If the notes of testimony of the trial
court's proceeding have not been transcribed at the time of the filing
of the notice of appeal, and if such notes are necessary for appellate
review of the appeal, then appellant must order a transcript.2 8 2 The
"transcript order" must be in writing and delivered to the following:
(1) the reporter; (2) the clerk of the trial court in which the proceed-
ing took place; (3) the district court administrator or designee; and
(4) the clerk of the appellate court. 283 The transcript order must ac-
company the notice of appeal. 84 Local rules may require a deposit
for transcription. 285 Uniform fees for transcription are governed by
special rules of court.286 In certain circumstances, transcription by a
reporter who was not present at the lower court proceeding may be
permissible.287
After the transcript order is filed and served and the deposit is
paid, the reporter's obligation is to begin transcription promptly. It is
the lower court's obligation, if necessary, to ultimately decide what
portions of the record shall be transcribed and to make sure that the
record to be transcribed in order to enable the court to dispose of the motion.
Within ten days after the filing of the motion, any other party may file an objec-
tion requesting that an additional, lesser or different portion of the record be
transcribed. If no portion is indicated, the transcription of the record shall be
deemed unnecessary to the disposition of the motion. The trial judge shall
promptly decide the objection to the portion of the record to be transcribed.
282. See PA. R. App. P. 1911(a) (order for transcript). If there is a cross-appeal, how-
ever, the cross-appellant may have an equal duty to order and pay for transcription. See PA. R.
App. P. 1911(b) (order for transcript; cross appeals).
283. See PA. R. J. A. 5000.5 (requests and orders for transcripts). PA. R. App. P.
1911(c), specifying the proper form for the transcription order, states as follows:
(c) Form. The order for transcript may be endorsed on, incorporated into or
attached to the notice of appeal or other document and shall be in substantially
the following form:
[Caption]
A (notice of appeal) (petition for review) (other appellate paper, as
appropriate) having been filed in this matter, the official court reporter is
hereby ordered to produce, certify and file the transcript in this matter in
conformity with Rule 1922 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
Signature
284. See PA. R. App. P. 904(c) (content of notice of appeal; order for transcript).
285. See PA. R. J. A. 5000.6 (deposit of partial transcript fee).
286. See PA. R. J. A. 5000.7 (fees for transcript).
287. See PA. R. J. A. 5000.12 (certification of transcript; transcription by another); see
also Emerick v. Carson, 325 Pa. Super. 308, 472 A.2d 1133 (1984).
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court reporter's duties are performed without delay.2 88 Transcription,
however, often occurs without the need for critical intervention by
the lower court. The lower court must order the court reporter to
transcribe without prejudice to his or her right to recover the appli-
cable fees, which the court may determine at a hearing in the ab-
sence of mutual agreement.2 89 The reporter is obligated to have the
notes transcribed, the accuracy certified, and the record lodged (with
proof of service on all parties) in the trial court within fourteen days
after receipt of the transcript order.2 90 Sanctions may be imposed on
a court reporter for delinquency.291 In addition, if the appellant fails
to comply with his obligation to assure transcription, the appellate
court may dismiss the appeal.
2 92
3. Assessment of Costs.-Payment for transcription must be
initially borne by the appellant. However, there may be circum-
stances when imposition of the entire cost of transcription upon the
appellant may be inappropriate.2 93 For example, in cross appeals, the
cross appellant may also have a duty to equally pay for and cause
the transcript to be filed. 94 It should also be noted that, after a deci-
sion in the appeal, costs incurred in the preparation and transmission
of the record may be taxed in the lower court as costs of the
appeal.2
95
4. Alternatives to Transcription of Complete Record.-There
may be times when the transcription of the entire lower court record
is not feasible or necessary. In such circumstances, the following op-
tions might be considered.
(a) Agreed statement of record.-As noted previously in the
288. See Davison v. John W. Harper, Inc., 342 Pa. Super. 560, 565 n.2, 493 A.2d 732,
735 n.2 (1985).
289. See Commonwealth v. Morgan, 469 Pa. 35, 38 n.2, 364 A.2d 891, 892 n.2 (1976);
Duquesne Pub, Inc. v. Commonwealth, P.L.C.B., 64 Pa. Commw. 566, 441 A.2d 491 (1982)
(citing Commonwealth v. Ezell, 212 Pa. 293, 61 A. 930 (1905)).
290. See PA. R. App. P. 1922(a); PA. R. J. A. 5000.9. PA. R. J. A. 5000.11(b) notes that
the reporter may refuse to deliver the transcript until any balance is paid. See also PA. R. App.
P. 1911 note.
291. See PA. R. J. A. 5000.10 (sanctions for delayed transcript).
292. See PA. R. App. P. 1911(d) (order for transcript; effect of failure to comply).
293. See Duquesne Pub, Inc. v. Commonwealth, P.L.C.B., 64 Pa. Commw. 566, 441
A.2d 491 (1982); see also Cambria Say. & Loan Ass'n. v. Capozzi, 44 Pa. Commw. 189, 403
A.2d 208 (1979). In criminal cases, it is the state's burden to produce a transcript. See supra
notes 259-263.
294. See PA. R. App. P. 1911(b) (order for transcript; cross appeals).
295. See PA. R. App. P. 2771 (costs on appeal taxable in the lower court).
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context of the traditional record requirement, 96 the parties may opt
for a "statement of the case," prepared by the parties and approved
by the lower court.
(b) "Diminuted" records.-The transcription of a trial or pro-
tracted proceeding may require considerable expense. Rather than
requiring a full transcript, the appellant or any party can request the
trial court in civil cases to permit an abbreviated or "diminuted"
transcription. 97 The request must be made within two days after the
transcript order is filed. Importantly, however, any party has the
right to require that any specified part of the record be transcribed.
Prior caselaw indicates that only material not relevant to the issue
submitted for appellate review should be excluded. 98 When the dim-
inution of the lower court record results in glaring inadequacy, an
appellate court may remand.2 9
5. Transcription Disputes.-The parties are bound by the
transcribed official court record as certified by the court reporter
and approved by the lower court.300 Therefore, all parties must be
vigilant in making certain that the transcribed record is accurate,
preferably before it is transmitted to the appellate court. The court
reporter is required to advise the parties that if no objections are
made to the transcription within five days after such notice, the tran-
script will become an official part of the record. 0 1 If there are no
objections, the record is approved by the trial judge 02 and transmit-
ted by the trial court clerk to the appellate court.3 03
It is incumbent upon counsel to examine the transcribed record
within the five-day period. If omissions or errors exist, a party
should approach the trial court and request immediate corrective ac-
tion. The trial court is in the best position to resolve any transcrip-
296. See PA. R. App. P. 1924 (agreed statement of record), discussed supra text accom-
panying notes 229-254 and infra 351-352.
297. See PA. R. App. P. 1922(b) (diminution of transcription), which emphasizes that
"untranscribed notes or recordings shall not be part of the record on appeal for any purpose."
298. See Laughlin v. Mt. Carmel & Locust Gap Transit Co., 241 Pa. 281, 88 A. 441
(1913).
299. See Clark v. Commonwealth, 45 Pa. Commw. 38, 404 A.2d 774 (1979); see also
Snyder's Estate, 279 Pa. 63, 83-84, 123 A. 663, 669 (1927) (abbreviated record must provide
appellate court with information essential or relevant to questions presented).
300. The transmitted, transcribed record thus becomes conclusive. See, e.g., In re Wood-
ward & Williamson, 274 Pa. 567, 118 A. 552 (1922); Whitney v. Jersey Store, 266 Pa. 537,
109 A. 767 (1920); Edwards v. Gimbel, 187 Pa. 78, 41 A. 39 (1898); Commonwealth v. Stan-
ton, 294 Pa. Super. 516, 440 A.2d 585 (1982).
301. See PA. R. App. P. 1922(a) (transcription of notes of testimony).
302. See PA. R. App. P. 1922(c), 1931(b).
303. See PA. R. App. P. 1931(c) (transmission of record; duty of clerk to transmit).
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tion disputes and it has authority under the rules to correct or mod-
ify the record.30' The appellate courts have recognized that
objections to the transcript are properly settled in the trial court.305
When there is a dispute between the stenographer's notes and the
judge's recollection, the latter controls. 30 6 Errors or omissions may
also be corrected upon stipulation of the parties.0 7
If the transcribed record has already been transmitted to the
appellate court, a party is nevertheless entitled to request the appel-
late court to remand the record to the trial court for purposes of
correction or supplementation. Such requests should be promptly
made in order to minimize the time and expense attending what
could have been an avoidable remand. 0 8 Arguably, such a remand
would be requested only if the dispute concerns material misstate-
ments or omissions.
C. Transmission of the Official Record: Forty-Day Rule
After (1) the notes of testimony are transcribed and paid for,
(2) the lower court has written its statement or opinion under Rule
1925, and (3) any dispute concerning the accuracy or completeness
of the record is resolved, rule 1922 specifies that the official record is
then ready for lodging, filing and certification by the lower court re-
porter. The record is then transmitted to the appellate court. The
rules currently specify that the official record must be transmitted
to the appellate court within forty days after the filing of the notice
of appeal.309 The responsibility for assuring timely filing is ulti-
mately upon the lower court.310 Upon receipt of the official court
record, the appellate court prothonotary thereafter (1) files the rec-
ord in the appellate court, (2) notifies the parties and the Adminis-
trative Office, and (3) gives notice to all the parties as to the briefing
304. See PA. R. App. P. 1701(b)(1) (effect of appeal generally; authority of trial court);
1922(a) (transcription of notes of testimony); 1926 (correction or modification of the record);
see also Commonwealth v. McDonald, 285 Pa. Super. 534, 428 A.2d 174 (1981).
305. Commonwealth v. Wilder, 259 Pa. Super. 479, 393 A.2d 927 (1978).
306. See Dental Mfg. Supply Co. v. Southern Ry. Co., 82 Pa. Super. 558 (1924); Com-
monwealth v. Fitzpatrick, I Pa. Super. 518 (1892); but cf. Commonwealth v. Sinor, 264 Pa.
Super. 178, 399 A.2d 724 (1979).
307. See PA. R. App. P. 1926 (correction or modification of the record); see also Schrei-
ber v. Schreiber. 308 Pa. Super. 243, 454 A.2d 112 (1982).
308. See Commonwealth v. Hoburn, 335 Pa. Super. 536, 485 A.2d 24 (1984); Common-
wealth v. Harbaugh, 253 Pa. Super. 24, 384 A.2d 957 (1978); see also Commonwealth v.
Fields, 478 Pa. 479, 387 A.2d 83 (1978); Commonwealth v. Hamm, 474 Pa. 487, 378 A.2d
1219 (1977).
309. See PA. R. App. P. 1931(a) (time for transmission).
310. See PA. R. App. P. 1931(b) (transmission, duty of lower court).
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schedule.3 11
1. Bulky Materials (Advance Arrangements).-Documents of
unusual weight or bulk and all physical exhibits other than docu-
ments should not be transmitted by the clerk unless he is directed to
do so by a party or by the prothonotary of the appellate court. If a
party intends to rely on such bulky materials, advance arrangements
should be made with the lower court clerk for transmittal.312
2. Lower Court's Retention of Record.-The appellate rules
make provisions for temporarily retaining substantial portions of the
record in the lower court in order to assist the parties in preparing
their appellate papers. The lower court clerk, however, must still
cause the record to be filed in the appellate court within the specified
time constraints for the purpose of facilitating the briefing process. 13
The appellate court may also permit the docket entries alone to be
transmitted in lieu of the entire record.31' The parties may also stip-
ulate that designated parts of the record shall be retained in the
lower court. The designated parts, nevertheless, shall be a part of the
record on appeal.31 5
3. Delinquent Transmission: The Delay of Justice.-Perhaps
the most culpable factor contributing to delayed appellate review is
the tardy transmission of the lower court record. Such delinquency
can be especially detrimental when important rights of liberty and
property are involved. Delinquency can also have a substantial nega-
tive impact on the expeditious administration of appellate justice.
Ideally and technically, the lower court record should be transferred
from the lower to the appellate courts within forty days after the
filing of the notice of appeal. The appellate court prothonotaries are
entrusted with the important administrative obligation to monitor
appeals and report delinquencies.31 6
311. See PA. R. App. P. 1934 (filing of the record).
312. See PA. R. App. P. 1931(c) (transmission, duty of clerk).
313. See PA. R. App. P. 1932(a) (temporary retention of record); see also Wilson v.
Wilson, 297 Pa. Super. 14, 442 A.2d 1189 (1981).
314. See PA. R. App. P. 1932(b) (retention by order of court).
315. See PA. R. App. P. 1932(c) (stipulation of parties that parts of the record be re-
tained in lower court).
316. See PA, R. App. P. 1935 (notices and reports concerning delinquent transmission);
see also Commonwealth v. Morgan, 469 Pa. 35, 38 n.2, 364 A.2d 891, 892 n.2 (1976).
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V. Phase Four: The Reproduced Record
A. Preliminary: Nature, Purpose, and Importance of the Repro-
duced Record
The filing of the transcribed official record in the appellate court
starts the appellate ball rolling, so to speak. The party appealing
then is faced with three distinct obligations:
(1) filing in the appellate court a designation statement of the con-
tents of the official record to be reproduced and an identification of
the issues to be presented for appellate review, with service on all
parties;
(2) serving and filing a reproduced record in the appellate court; and
(3) serving and filing an appellate brief in the appellate court.
Unless special dispensation is obtained by court order or special
rule, an appellant must file with the brief booklet-type copies of se-
lected portions of the official record that will be relevant to the ap-
pellate court's review. This booklet, the "reproduced record," is what
its name implies: a reproduction of the original record. Other juris-
dictions refer to this document as the briefs "appendix." While the
appellate court receives only one original court record, it receives
multiple copies of the reproduced record. Essentially, the reproduced
record represents an anthology or reader's digest-type selection of
the lower court's proceedings.
There are approximately sixteen specific rules817 governing the
preparation and filing of the reproduced record. Compliance with the
rules for the reproduced record is mandatory. Failure to comply with
the applicable rules may result in sanctions, including dismissal.3 18
The reproduced record is functionally important because it en-
ables an appellate panel of judges (usually three, sometimes seven or
nine) to overcome the limitations attending the multiple and simulta-
neous review of only one original record. Therefore, with a repro-
duced record, more efficient and economical appellate review is pro-
moted. The reproduced record, however, is not intended to be a
317. See PA. R. App. P. 2151-2156, 2171-2176, 2186-2189.
318. See PA. R. App. P. 2188 (consequence of failure to file briefs and reproduced rec-
ord); see also Rappaport v. Stein, - Pa. Super. -, - n.1, 506 A.2d 393, 395 n.I
(1986); Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v. Graybill, 482 Pa. 143, 147 n.3, 393 A.2d
420, 422 n.3 (1978); Shirk v. Caterbone, 201 Pa. Super. 544, 193 A.2d 664 (1963); Ginsburg
v. Custer Frazer Corp., 409 Pa. 116, 185 A.2d 793 (1962); In re Roberts, 309 Pa. 389, 164 A.
57 (1932).
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duplication of the entire official record. Only what is necessary for
intelligent appellate review should be included in the reproduced rec-
ord. Therefore, selectivity rather than indiscriminate assemblage is
advisable.3 19 Regardless of what is or is not included in the repro-
duced record, the appellate court is always free to rely on the official
transmitted record. 20
B. Procedural Requirements
1. Who Must File a Reproduced Record and When.-As a
general rule,32 1 the appellant must file the reproduced record with
the brief.82 2 A reproduced record containing materials pertinent to
the appeal must be filed in all cases unless (1) the court dispenses by
rule with such requirement; (2) a party has been granted leave to
proceed in forma pauperis,3 23 (3) the case is an original hearing
before the court,824 or (4) the court grants an appellant's application
to be excused from reproducing the record. 26 Such application must
be made within fourteen days after taking the appeal.
3 26
2. Preparation of the Reproduced Record: The "Designation
Statements" of Issues and Reproduction.-Preliminary designation
of the contents of the official record to be reproduced and identifica-
tion of issues for review are important steps in the appellate process.
Generally, after the official record has been transmitted to the appel-
late court and appellant has received a notice of the briefing sched-
ule from the appellate court prothonotary, appellant will be given a
period of time to review the record. During this time, counsel must
make a decision as to (1) the issues that will be presented 2 7 and (2)
319. Cf. Shapiro v. Malarkey, 278 Pa. 78, 122 A. 34 (1923); see also infra note 331.
320. See PA. R. App. P. 2152(c) (effect of reproduction of record).
321. For the special procedure for the "large record" exception, see infra text accompa-
nying notes 354-356.
322. PA. R. App. P. 2186(a) (time for serving and filing reproduced record).
323. See supra text accompanying notes 154-167 (in forma pauperis status).
324. See supra notes 6 and 232. The commentary herein is restricted to appellate
review.
325. PA. R. App. P. 2151(a) (consideration of matters on original record); PA. R. App. P.
123 (applications for relief).
326. PA. R. App. P. 123, 2151(a).
327. The appellant may have already advised the lower court and parties of the appel-
late issues when he filed the "statement of matters complained of" under Pa. R. App. P. 1925.
See supra text accompanying notes 211-220. In such a case, appellant is arguably restricted to
those issues. If appellant was not requested or compelled to file such a statement, then this
designation statement will help to inform the parties of the issues that will be raised on appeal.
Whether an appellant can file a designation of issues statement, which substantially departs
from a prior Rule 1925 statement, is not addressed by the rules. Orderly appellate review
would seem to prohibit such a practice.
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the portions of the record that will be reproduced for inclusion in the
reproduced record. Appellant then advises the other parties of his or
her decision by filing in the appellate court a "designation state-
ment" as to the issues and portions of the record selected.32 8 The
general rule3 29 is that appellant must serve and file the designation
statement thirty days before the date fixed for filing appellant's
brief.
After the appellant has submitted the designation statement,
the appellee is given an opportunity to advise appellant of those ad-
ditional portions of the record that the appellee may want repro-
duced for appellate review. If so, the appellee must file a counter- or
supplemental designation statement within ten days after receipt of
appellant's designation statements. 3 ' For example, the appellee may
feel that material testimony favorable to its side was omitted in ap-
pellant's designation statement; the counter-statement would desig-
nate the additional material for inclusion. The appellee's response,
however, should not vexatiously demand the inclusion of irrelevant
material not essential to effective appellate review. 31 Upon such re-
quest, the appellant must thereafter include the parts of the record
designated by the appellee. If, however, the parties cannot agree on
the contents of the reproduced record, the appellee may prepare to
file a supplemental reproduced record.33 2
3. Reproduced Record Timetable.-After the designation
statements are filed, appellant's obligation is to prepare the briefs
and reproduced record for filing. The general rule (that is, when the
record is not a "large" onesss or when the court has not ordered
otherwise) is that the reproduced record must be filed at the same
time that the appellant's brief must be served.33' This is usually forty
days after the lodging of the official lower court record in the appel-
late court.
4. Contents of Reproduced Record.-The reproduced record,
328. See PA. R. App. P. 2154 (designation of contents of reproduced record).
329. Again, there is an exception for "large records." See PA. R. App. P. 2154(b); infra
text accompanying notes 354-356.
330. See PA. R. App. P. 2154(a) (designation of contents of reproduced record).
331. PA. R. App. P. 2154(a) cautions against "unnecessary designation."
332. See infra text accompanying note 350 regarding the supplemental reproduced
record.
333. See infra text accompanying note 354-356.
334. See PA. R. App. P. 2186(a)(i) (time for serving reproduced record), 2185(a) (time
for serving briefs).
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which is subject to the constraints of the official record concept,"3 5
must contain the following: (1) relevant docket entries; (2) relevant
portions of the pleadings, charge, or findings; and (3) other portions
of the record that the parties wish to bring to the court's attention.-3 6
The "relevant docket entries" must be set forth chronologically, in a
single column. They consist of the information needed to reveal
clearly the following: the character of the proceedings; the pleadings
or papers upon which the case was tried; the trial or hearing; the
order to be reviewed; all subsequent proceedings of relevance; and all
other matters relevant to the questions involved.
33 7
5. Form.-Reproduced records may be produced by conven-
tional typographical printing or by a duplicating or copying process
that produces a clear black image on white paper. In the latter case,
they should be firmly bound at the left margin. 33 8 If the brief and
reproduced record total more than 100 pages, the reproduced record
must be printed separately. " Pages are numbered separately and
continuously, regardless of the number of volumes, by arabic figures
followed by a small "a" (for example, "la," "2a," "3a," and so
forth). The table of contents is numbered in roman numerals (for
example, i, ii, iii, and so forth). 4
6. Table of Contents.-The rule 4" is specific in this regard. It
must contain a reference to all reproduced exhibits and the location
of each type of testimony of witnesses (for example, direct, cross),
identified individually by name. When the reproduced record com-
prises more than one volume, only one table of contents is required.
That table of contents must indicate in which volume each part of
the record will be found. Pagination is continuous.
7. Original Pagination.-The rule3 42 prescribes that original
335. See supra text accompanying notes 229-254 and infra notes 351-352.
336. See PA. R. App. P. 2152(a); see also Sanker v. Pennsylvania Ry. Co., 205 Pa. 609.
615-16, 55 A. 833, 835 (1903) (lower court opinion must be included). Under present rules,
the lower court's opinion must be attached to appellant's brief. PA. R. App. P. 2111 (brief of
the appellant).
337. See PA. R. App. P. 2153(a), which prohibits inclusion of docket entries that are not
relevant or do not amplify. Cf. North Mountain Water Supply Co. v. Troxell, 223 Pa. 315, 72
A. 621 (1909).
338. PA. R. App. P. 2171 (method of reproduction). See proposed amendment to Rule
2171(b), supra notes 39 and 143.
339. Id.
340. PA. R. App. P. 2173, 2174(c).
341. See PA. R. App. P. 2174(a) (table of contents).
342. See PA. R. App. P. 2176(a) (notes of testimony, indication of original pagination).
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pagination regarding material contained in the notes of testimony
must be clearly indicated. This is important if, for example, a judge
wishes to examine the original record.
8. Sequence of Materials.-The arrangement of the repro-
duced record material should begin with the relevant docket entries,
followed by the other parts of the record presented chronologi-
cally.343 The lower court's opinion, it should be noted, is included in
the appellant's brief.
9. Exhibits.-These may be contained in a separate volume.
34 4
10. Covers.45_-If the reproduced record is prepared sepa-
rately, the cover must contain the following: (1) the name of the
appellate court; (2) the docket number of the case in the appellate
court; (3) the caption of the case identifying the parties in the same
fashion as listed in the lower court at the time the appeal was taken;
(4) an identification of the document (for example, "Brief for Appel-
lant and Reproduced Record," or "Brief for Appellee and Supple-
mental Reproduced Record," or simply "Reproduced Record"); (5)
a designation of the order appealed from and the court from which
the appeal was taken, including the lower court's docket number;
and (6) the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of counsel.
The covers must be light enough to permit any writing in ink to be
easily read.
11. Filing Copies and Service.846-The reproduced record
must be timely filed in the appellate court with the appellant's brief.
Counsel should consult the specific rules and amendments for proce-
dural requirements on service and copies to be filed. Current practice
specifies, in the supreme court, the filing of twenty-five copies of the
reproduced record; in the superior and commonwealth courts, fifteen
copies are required. As to service, two copies of the reproduced rec-
ord must be provided to each party represented on appeal.
12. Costs.-The general rule is that the cost of reproducing
the record, including those parts of the record designated by the ap-
pellee or appellees, must be paid by the appellant. Of course, the
parties may agree otherwise. If the appellant believes that appellee's
343. See PA. R. App. P. 2175 (sequence of material in reproduced record).
344. See PA. R. App. P. 2176(d) (exhibits).
345. See PA. R. App. P. 2172 (covers).
346. See PA. R. App. P. 2187 (number of copies to be served and filed).
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designation of record parts to be reproduced is unnecessary, appel-
lant should notify the appellee and request payment for those addi-
tional parts to be reproduced. If payment is not provided within ten
days of a written demand, appellant can refuse to reproduce those
designated parts of the record considered to be unnecessary)
4
Upon final disposition of the appeal, the cost of reproducing the
record shall be taxed as costs.8 8 It is important to note that if a
party has reproduced the record unnecessarily, an objecting party
must file an application in the appellate court within ten days after
the filing of the last paperbook. The appellate court can thereafter
impose costs in its order disposing of the appeal.3 9
C. The Supplemental Reproduced Record3a 0
Preferably, the reproduced record should be a single document.
The reproduced record should be a cooperative venture among all
the parties to act reasonably in including only those portions of the
original record that are relevant to the issues presented and essential
to meaningful appellate review. The reproduced record should not be
used as a strategic ploy to unfairly bias the picture presented to the
appellate court, especially since that court has direct access to the
complete, original record. Good faith is certainly implied in the task
of preparing a reproduced record.
Nevertheless, there may be "exceptional circumstances," as the
rules themselves acknowledge, when the parties honestly disagree on
how much to include in the reproduced record. If the parties cannot
agree on the contents of the reproduced record, the appellee can pre-
pare and file a separate "Supplemental Reproduced Record" setting
forth the portions of the record designated by the appellee. The com-
mentary, however, cautions that separate reproduced records make a
record less intelligible. Therefore, separate preparation is not fa-
vored. The appellate court may suppress a supplemental reproduced
record that has been prepared without good cause.
D. The Original Record Limitation
Since an appellate court's review is limited to the four corners
347. See PA. R. App. P. 2155(a) (allocation of cost of reproduced record).
348. See PA. R. App. P. 2741-2771 (costs).
349. See PA. R. App. P. 2155(b) (allocation by court); see also Baehr v. Commonwealth,
487 Pa. 233, 409 A.2d 326 (1981); Commonwealth, Dept. of Transp. v. DePaul, 32 Pa.
Commw. 211, 378 A.2d 1032 (1977).
350. See PA. R. App. P. 2156 (supplemental reproduced record) and commentary.
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of the official lower court record, 8 1 the parties can never use a back
door approach by including unofficial, nonrecord matters in the re-
produced record."' 2 Such inclusion is highly improper.
E. Special: Death Penalty Cases
3
3
In all cases involving the death penalty, eight copies of the en-
tire record must be reproduced and filed with the prothonotary of the
supreme court, which has jurisdiction in such appeals. The supreme
court, however, may permit a lesser number to be filed. Depending
upon appellant's financial status, either the appellant or county in
which the prosecution was commenced must bear the costs.
F. The "Large Record" Exception
54
Sometimes the original record will be of such considerable vol-
ume that the regular briefing schedule presents difficulty in the selec-
tion of appellate issues and portions of the record to be reproduced.
In such circumstances, time and expense are important considera-
tions. The appellate rules have responded to this type of situation by
providing for a "large record" exception under which reproduction of
the record is deferred. The rules, however, do not define a "large
record." The exception enables a party to prepare an "advance
form" or "page proof" nondefinitive brief. The brief need not be
filed, but must be served on the other parties when the regular brief
would ordinarily have been due, that is, generally forty days after
the lower court record is lodged in the appellate court. The "advance
form brief" is nondefinitive only in the sense that it will refer to
pages of the original record. Substantial changes in the advance
form brief, it should be noted, are not permitted. Moreover, this ex-
ception is a very limited one and cannot be used to circumvent the
regular briefing schedule in appeals not covered by the large record
351. See supra text accompanying notes 232-277.
352. Although the general rule is that an appellate court will not take judicial notice of
other proceedings, see supra note 240 and Pa. R. App. P. 2153(b), which permits the inclusion
of related proceedings in the reproduced record if the appellate issue "grows out of some other
proceeding." If such material is included, the following should be presented at the beginning of
the reproduced record: (1) relevant docket entries, opinions, and directions of both the lower
and appellate courts relating to the original case; and (2) issues framed (or ordered to be
framed) and relevant pleadings. See, e.g., Steel v. Levy, 282 Pa. 338, 127 A. 766 (1925),
which is cited in the commentary to Rule 2153.
353. See PA. R. App. P. 2189 (reproduced record in death penalty cases); see also 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. ]] 9711 (Purdons 1982) (supreme court prothonotary must send copy of the
lower court record to the governor).
354. See generally PA. R. App. P. 2154(b) (designation of contents of reproduced
records; large records).
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exception.
Basically, the "large record" procedure involves the following
five stages:
1. "Notice of Intent" to Proceed under Rule 2154(b).-Thirty
days before the date on which appellant's brief would ordinarily be
due, appellant must file a notice of intent to proceed on a "large
record" basis with the appellate court.
2. "Designation Statement" and "Advance Form"
Brief.-The prothonotary will notify the parties when the lower
court record was filed and when briefs are due. Appellant's brief is
generally due forty days after the filing of the lower court record. On
this date, appellant must (1) serve the other parties with two copies
of his advance form brief, (2) serve the other parties with a state-
ment identifying the parts of the record that will be reproduced, and
(3) file the designation statement and proofs of service in the appel-
late court. Filing of the advance form brief is not necessary. In large
record situations, a designation statement of the issues is
unnecessary.
3. Appellee's Proof Brief and Designation Statement.-Thirty
days after the date that appellant must serve his advance form brief
(or in other words, generally seventy days after the lodging of the
lower court record in the appellate court), appellee must serve his
proof brief. If appellee wishes to add to appellant's designation state-
ment, he must also serve and file an appellee's designation statement.
4. Reproduced Record.-This must be served and filed fifty-
one days after appellant's proof brief and designation statement were
served.
35 5
5. Parties Definitive Briefs.-Definitive briefs are due four-
teen days after the filing of the reproduced record."
VI. Phase Five: The Briefs
A. Preliminary Comments
Designating the briefing stage as the fifth phase in the appellate
355. See PA. R. App. P. 2186(a)(2) (time for serving and filing supplemental reproduced
record); see supra text accompanying note 346 concerning generally the number of copies to
be filed under PA. R. App. P. 2187.
356. See PA. R. App. P. 2185(c) (definitive copies; time for serving and filing).
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process is potentially misleading. Since the reproduced record and
appellant's brief must be simultaneously prepared and filed after the
lower court's record is transmitted to the appellate court, the prepa-
ration of appellant's brief does not necessarily represent a separate
and distinct phase. Nevertheless, the briefing stage has been sepa-
rately represented herein as temporally subsequent to the reproduced
record for three reasons. First, after the transmission of the record to
the appellate court, appellant has the distinct, important duty to de-
cide what parts of the original record to include in the parties' coop-
erative reproduced record. Second, appellant's decision in creating
the reproduced record requires a written commitment (the "designa-
tion statement" of issues and parts of the record) 357 that must be
filed well in advance of the filing of the brief. Third, because of this
procedural commitment and the time-consuming task of assembling
a mutually agreeable reproduced record, the appellant must often
make the necessary arrangements for reproduction with the printer
well before the brief is even written. Thus, for purposes of analytical
and functional convenience, the reproduced record has received sepa-
rate and advance treatment from the brief. This separate treatment,
however, should not be interpreted as allocating preference or prece-
dence to these two important documents.
1. Nature and Purpose of the Brief.-The briefing stage rep-
resents the first major transition from conception and procedure to
action and confutative advocacy. Next to the original record, the
parties' briefs are the most critical documents in the appellate pro-
cess. The word "brief" is a deceptively simple and perhaps silly
word. Nevertheless, that term of art represents the culminating point
in the appellate process for the written word. Essentially, a party's
brief is a written document that addresses the relevant record facts,
procedure, and substantive law for the partisan purpose of persuad-
ing the decision-maker to grant or deny relief by affirming or revers-
ing the lower court's order.
For many practitioners, the brief is as important as or even
more critical than oral argument before the appellate panel. This
view is understandable. Unlike oral argument, the brief possesses a
quality of permanency. The embodiment of an assertion or argument
in written form is like a sustained echo that either supports or haunts
its creator. The irretrievability of the written word, subject to contin-
ual, meticulous scrutiny unconstrained by time or place, demands
357. See supra text accompanying notes 327-332.
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utmost care and attention from the practitioner. In addition, oral ar-
gument is basically constrained by the legal parameters set out in
the brief.
2. Strategic Caveats Concerning Procedural Compliance and
Sanctions.-The adage that "it's not necessarily what you say but
how you say it" has arguable relevance to the appellate process. The
procedural packaging of a brief can be as consequentially significant
as the brief's contents. In attempting to anticipate and calculate the
unpredictable interaction of idiosyncratic fact and stare decisis in
the pursuit of a liberty or property interest, the practitioner must be
alert to procedural hurdles and pitfalls that may sabotage appellate
review of the merits of a case. The purpose of this section is to out-
line basic procedural requirements that will help to secure an audi-
ence for the advocate's written word; no attempt is made to offer
technical advice as to effective appellate advocacy in creating or
presenting the written word.358
The appellate rules caution litigants that noncompliance with
the rules for filing the written documents may result in an abortive
appeal. The prefatory rule to the specific briefing requirements states
as follows:
Conformance with Requirements.
Briefs and reproduced records shall conform in all material re-
spects with the requirements of these rules as nearly as the cir-
cumstances of the particular case will admit, otherwise they may
be suppressed, and, if the defects are in the brief or reproduced
record of the appellant and are substantial, the appeal or other
matter may be quashed or dismissed. " 9
The appellate cases indicate that the failure to comply with the pro-
cedural rules can result in a number of drastic sanctions, including
dismissal of the appeal, refusal of the appellate court to consider is-
sues on their merits, or suppression of a brief.3 60 At times, however,
358. For such advice, see, for example, W. STATSKY & R. WERNET, JR., CASE ANALYSIS
AND FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL WRITING (2nd ed. 1984) [hereinafter STATSKY & WERNET l .
See also Godbold, Twenty Pages and Twenty Minutes - Effective Advocacy on Appeal, 30
Sw. L.J. 801 (1976); Samuelson, Good Legal Writing: Of Orwell and Window Panes, 46 U.
PITT. L. REV. 149 (1984); Tate, The Art of Brief Writing. What a Judge Wants to Read, 4
LITIGATION 11 (1978).
359. PA. R. App. P. 2101, 2188 (consequence of failure to file briefs and reproduced
record), supra notes 11 and 318; see also Ellsworth v. Bradford Dist., 52 Pa. Super. 603
(1913).
360. There are a number of appellate cases applying various sanctions depending upon
the gravity of counsel's noncompliance with the rules. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Unger, 494
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an appellate court has sternly cautioned against but excused non-
compliance. 361 For purposes of introductory emphasis, the practi-
tioner should observe the following guidelines as essential:
* Observe the factual limitations of the official record. Never assert
or include nonrecord information.
* Be sure to specifically identify preliminarily each properly pre-
Pa. 592, 595 n.I, 432 A.2d 146, 147 n.1 (1980) (inadequate statement of questions resulted in
waiver); In re Estate of Smith, 492 Pa. 178, 181 n.2, 423 A.2d 331, 332 n.2 (1980) (failure to
refer to record and general allusions to location of alleged error in record were inadequacies
compelling conclusion that issues had no merit); Commonwealth v. Colbert, 476 Pa. 531, 534-
35 n.1, 383 A.2d 490, 491 n.l (1978) (issues not included in discussion portion of brief
waived); Commonwealth v. Drew, - Pa. Super. -, 510 A.2d 1244 (1986) (total non-
compliance with rules governing brief's form and contents compelled quashing); Common-
wealth v. Stoppie, 337 Pa. Super. 235, 486 A.2d 994 (1984) (warning that procedural viola-
tions would have justified quash); Commonwealth v. Gillespie, 333 Pa. Super. 576, 580-81,
482 A.2d 1023, 1024-25 (1984) (court refuses to consider merits of issues because questions in
brief defined no specific issue for review and argument consisted of twenty numbered
paragraphs amounting to bald assertions); Commonwealth v. Jones, 329 Pa. Super. 20, 477
A.2d 882 (1984) (garbled statement of questions and argument devoid of any substance, with-
out citations or references, required appeal to be quashed); Commonwealth v. Duden, 326 Pa.
Super. 73, 80, 473 A.2d 614, 618 (1984) (appellant's tacking on of ineffectiveness claims with-
out presenting them in statement of questions resulted in waiver); Commonwealth v. Sanford,
299 Pa. Super. 64, 445 A.2d 149 (1982) (substantial defects in brief, including general ram-
bling argument and nonspecific statement of issues, required appeal to be quashed); Common-
wealth v. Harper, 292 Pa. Super. 192, 196 n.3, 436 A.2d 1217, 1219 n.3 (1981) (appellate
court will not consider issues not addressed in briefs); Commonwealth v. Rozanski, 289 Pa.
Super. 531, 433 A.2d 1382 (1981) (defendant waived objections to prosecutor's statements
when defendant failed to cite to the record indicating where error occurred or how objection
was preserved); Commonwealth v. Wyant, 254 Pa. Super. 464, 386 A.2d 43 (1978) (appeal
quashed when brief set forth no issues for consideration, statement of case contained no con-
densed recitation of facts, and brief contained no summary of argument); Eisenberg v. Com-
monwealth, 86 Pa. Commw. 358, 362-63, 485 A.2d 511, 513-14 (1984) (in interests of judicial
economy, appellate court invokes sanctions and refuses to consider issue not raised specifically
or by implication in statement of questions presented); Wicker v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 74 Pa.
Commw. 548, 460 A.2d 407 (1983) (failure to posit statement of questions mandates appellate
court's refusal to consider; when appellate court's ability to review is substantially impaired,
court can quash brief or dismiss appeal); In re Appeal of Elias, 70 Pa. Commw. 404, 453 A.2d
372 (1982) (appellate court need not consider due process arguments not specifically identified
as questions involved); cf. Appeal of Radio Broadcasting Co., 55 Pa. Commw. 147, 423 A.2d
444 (1980) (appellate court may suppress brief for failure to conform to rules of court, but
there is no authority for suppressing appellee's brief).
361. See. e.g., Big Knob Volunteer Fire Co. v. Lowe & Moyer Garage, 338 Pa. Super.
257, 260 n.1, 487 A.2d 953, 955 n.I (1985) (noncompliance not so egregious as to justify
suppression or dismissal); Fannin v. Cratty, 331 Pa. Super. 326, 337 n.8, 480 A.2d 1056, 1061
n.8 (1984) (noncompliance with statement of questions overlooked when issue was raised be-
low and addressed by lower court); Commonwealth v. Bell, 328 Pa. Super. 35, 476 A.2d 439
(1984) (flagrant violation regarding statement of questions overlooked and issues addressed);
Commonwealth v. Colon, 317 Pa. Super. 412, 464 A.2d 388 (1983) (substantial defects over-
looked when appellate court can formulate precise issues preserved for appeal); McDaniel v.
Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 253 Pa. Super. 51, 53 n.3, 384 A.2d 971, 972 n.3 (1978)
(counsel warned about factual misstatements in brief and potential sanction of suppression);
cf. Commonwealth v. Tracy, 266 Pa. Super. 357, 404 A.2d 1328 (1979) (en banc) (remand for
appointment of new counsel following submission of inadequate appellate briefs).
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served3 62 question presented for appellate review.
* Be specific in arguing the facts and points of law that are relevant
to meaningful appellate review. Do not handicap the appellate court
with excessive factual or legal generalities.
* Cite specifically to the lower court record to identify such matters
as when an issue was presented, how it was resolved, or where evi-
dence substantiating a fact can be found. 63
* Timely file and serve the brief.
B. Briefs: Timetables
1. Appellant's Brief.-Generally, appellant's brief must be
timely served and filed within forty days after the filing of the official
lower court record in the appellate court or within such time spe-
cially specified by the appellate court3 64 The appellate prothonotary
usually notifies the parties when the record was filed and when briefs
are due. 3 5 The limited exception to this timetable occurs when ap-
pellant is proceeding on a "large record" basis. 66 The filing of a
motion for continuance or extension does not operate as a suspension
of appellant's briefing obligations.6
2. Appellee's Brief.-Appellee must file his brief within thirty
days after service of appellant's brief.3 68
3. Reply Briefs: Submitted Cases and Cross Ap-
peals.-Generally, a reply brief is permitted only if leave of court is
obtained. If, however, the case is presented on a "submitted" basis
362. See PA. R. App. P. 302 (requisites for reviewable issue), 1972(5) (dismissal for
failure to preserve issues); PA. R. CRIM. P. 1123 (post-verdict motions); PA. R. Civ. P. 227
(exceptions), 227.1 (post-trial relief); see also Reilly by Reilly v. Southeastern Pa. Transp.
Auth., 507 Pa. 204, 214-15, 489 A.2d 1291, 1296 (1985); Tagnani v. Lew, 493 Pa. 371, 426
A.2d 595 (1981); Commonwealth v. Gravely, 486 Pa. 194, 404 A.2d 1296 (1979); Dilliplaine
v. Lehigh Valley Trust Co., 457 Pa. 255, 322 A.2d 114 (1974); Commonwealth v. Holmes,
315 Pa. Super. 256, 461 A.2d 1268 (1983); Carnicelli v. Bartram, 289 Pa. Super. 424, 433
A.2d 878 (1981).
363. See PA. R. App. P. 2117(c) (statement of the case), 2119(c) (argument). Common-
wealth v. Dozier, 294 Pa. Super. 249, 255 n.2, 439 A.2d 1185, 1188 n.2 (1982) notes that the
better practice is to include specific references to the record of alleged errors and objections in
both the Argument and Statement of Case sections of the brief.
364. See PA. R. App. P. 2185(a) (time for serving and filing briefs).
365. See PA. R. App. P. 1934 (filing of the record).
366. See PA. R. App. P. 2185(a), (c); see also supra text accompanying notes 354-356.
367. See PA. R. App. P. 1972 (dispositions on motion) and commentary.
368. See PA. R. App. P. 2185(a) (time for serving and filing briefs.
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(that is, without oral argument), appellant may file a reply brief.a63
Appellant is also permitted to file a reply brief in answer to the brief
of the appellee on a cross appeal.370 Likewise, in "submitted cases"
without oral argument, appellee may file a reply brief to appellant's
reply brief if the appellee has cross-appealed.3 71 A reply brief, if per-
mitted, must be filed within fourteen days of the preceding brief.
372
In all other situations, a party must request leave of court to file a
reply brief.
C. Appellant's Briefs: Procedural Requirements
1. Length.-The substantive portions of appellant's brief can-
not exceed fifty pages of conventional typographical printing or sev-
enty pages of reproduction by any other duplicating process. Reply
briefs, if permitted, must be limited to twenty-five pages conven-
tional typographical or thirty-five pages by any other process. 73
2. Contents and Arrangement.-The rules are precise as to the
contents and sequential arrangement of briefs. Generally, appellant's
brief must contain the following material, separately and distinctly
identifiable in the following order:
374
(a) The cover. 7 -- The cover, which must be light enough to
permit writing in ink to be discernible, must contain the following
information: (1) name of the appellate court; (2) the appellate court
docket number; (3) the caption of the case in the appellate court; (4)
the title of the document (for example "Brief for Appellant," "Reply
Brief of Appellant," "Brief for Appellant and Reproduced Record");
(5) a designation of the order appealed from (such as "Appeal from
the Order of . . ."), including the lower court's docket number; and
(6) the names, telephone numbers and addresses of counsel.
(b) Table of contents.17 6-The table should be placed either on
369. See PA. R. App. P. 2113 (reply brief).
370. See PA. R. App. P. 2136 (briefs in cases involving cross appeals).
371. See PA. R. App. P. 2113 (reply brief).
372. See PA. R. App. P. 2185(a) (time for serving and filing briefs).
373. See PA. R. App. P. 2135 (length of briefs). These limits are exclusive of pages
containing the table of contents, tables of citations, and any addendum containing opinions.
See also Frisk v. The News Co., - Pa. Super. -, - n.1, - A.2d -, - n.1
(1986) (excessive length excused); Commonwealth v. Sirbaugh, 347 Pa. Super. 154, 500 A.2d
453 (1985) (expressing disapproval of excessive length of brief).
374. See generally PA. R. App. P. 2111(a) (brief of the appellant).
375. See generally PA. R. App. P. 2172 (covers).
376. See PA. R. App. P. 2174(a), (c) (table of contents and citations), 2173 (numbering
of pages).
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the inside of the front cover or on the first and immediately suc-
ceeding pages, which should be numbered in roman numerals.
(c) Table of citations.37 7 -This table follows the Table of Con-
tents and should be arranged alphabetically. The pages, if numbered,
should also be in roman numerals.
(d) Statement of appellate court's jurisdiction.378 -An appel-
late court cannot decide an appeal unless it has jurisdiction, which
may be based on statute or rule of court. The appellant, therefore,
must include a precise citation to the authority conferring appellate
jurisdiction.
(e) Order in question.379-The appellant must set forth the
lower court's appealed order verbatim. In exceptional circumstances,
if the appeal lies from the trial court's failure to act, s' 0 the appellant
must so state and refer to the proper authority requiring action.
(0 Statement of question(s) involved.381-This rule, sometimes
referred to as the "statement of issues presented" or "questions for
review" is imperative because noncompliance can be fatal.
A recent text on the skills and technique of legal writing sug-
gests that the statement of question or questions involved on appeal
provides the first major opportunity for advocacy in the appellate
brief. The statement of issues, the authors add:
.. . is very much a tool of persuasion. The writer's statement
of the issues will generally be the first thing that the judge will
377. See PA. R. App. P. 2174(b), (c), 2173.
378. See PA. R. APp. P. 2114 (statement of jurisdiction); see also Pines, supra note 1, at
75-139.
379. See PA. R. App. P. 2115 (order or other determination in question). One of the
immediate, beneficial consequences of this requirement is that the appellate court is often able
to determine preliminarily and quickly whether the appellate court has, in fact, jurisdiction
over the appeal and the general substance of the appealed order.
380. See PA. R. App. P. 2115(b); cf. PA. R. App. P. 301(e) (emergency appeals).
381. See PA. R. App. P. 2116 (statement of questions involved). As a noted scholar has
observed, parties in a conflict-solving legal process are the sovereign shapers of factual issues
and must assume responsibility in the formulation of the legal issues. Judicial intervention in
issue formulation may be viewed as both unwise and unfair in the adversarial process. "When-
ever (the judge] expands the scope of the legal issues, potentially dispositive elements enter the
case independent of party contest and the side disfavored by the adjudicator's pet theory may
believe that the decision-maker has unfairly aided the adversary." M. DAMASKA, THE FACES
OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY 114 (1986). The author notes that such interference may
undermine the integrity of the conflict-solving process. See also New Jersey v. T.L.O., 468
U.S. 1214, 1215-16 (1984) (". . . the adversary process functions more effectively when we
rely on the initiative of lawyers, rather than the activism of judges, to fashion the questions for
review").
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turn to in reading the brief. The manner in which the issues are
phrased can have a significant impact upon his or her perspec-
tive in reading and evaluating the remaining portions of the
brief.3 82
The appellate rules are precise in delineating the proper manner
in which to present the questions for review. The appellate rules em-
phatically state as follows:
(a) General rule. The statement of the questions involved must
state the question or questions in the briefest and most general
terms, without names, dates, amounts or particulars of any kind.
It should not ordinarily exceed 15 lines, must never exceed one
page, and must always be on a separate page, without any other
matter appearing thereon. This rule is to be considered in the
highest degree mandatory, admitting of no exception; ordinarily
no point will be considered which is not set forth in the state-
ment of questions involved or suggested thereby. Whenever pos-
sible each question must be followed immediately by an answer
stating simply whether it was affirmed, negatived, qualified or
not answered by the court or government unit below. If a quali-
fied answer was given to the question, appellant shall indicate,
most briefly, the nature of the qualification, or if the question
was not answered and the record shows the reason for such fail-
ure, the reason shall be stated briefly in each instance without
quoting the court or government unit below."' 3
One can perhaps appreciate the importance and stability of these
specific requirements by looking back at the historical pronounce-
ments of the superior and supreme courts in the early part of the
twentieth century. In 1902, before criticizing two defective state-
ments of questions, the superior court observed as follows:
The object of such a statement is to give the court, at a glance, a
comprehensive view of the case, so as to be able to follow intelli-
gently the oral arguments which are valuable only as they pre-
sent the points of law arising from the questions of fact which
are fairly raised by the entire record. 84
382. See STATSKY AND WERNET, supra note 358, at 310-11. The persuasive impact of
the statement of issues or questions presented, however, may be compromised given the Rule
2116(a)'s emphasis on generality and brevity.
383. PA. R. App. P. 2116 (emphasis supplied). The same requirements were expressed by
the supreme court in Seaman v. Tamaqua Nat'l Bank, 297 Pa. 294, 297-98, 147 A. 56, 57
(1929).
384. See Swisher v. Sipps, 19 Pa. Super. 43, 47-48 (1902); see also Commonwealth v.
Cauffiel, 298 Pa. 319, 148 A. 311 (1929) (citing cases); Creaken v. Bromley Bros., 214 Pa. 15,
63 A. 195 (1906); Seaman v. Tamaqua Nat'l Bank, 297 Pa. 294, 147 A. 56 (1929).
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The critical aspect of this part of the brief is evident by those
appellate cases that have either dismissed appeals because of woe-
fully deficient statements of questions or have refused to address is-
sues that were not specifically identified in the "Statement of Ques-
tions" portion of the appellant's brief.883 Occasionally, the appellate
courts will overlook a violation of this rule, depending upon the cir-
cumstances of the case.386 Nevertheless, the practitioner is cautioned
that all questions sought to be reviewed must be separately and spe-
cifically identified by the "Statement of Questions. '3 87 The appellant
may be precluded from presenting argument on questions and issues
not properly identified.,3 88
It is also important for the practitioner to realize that selectivity
of issues is tactically preferable to indiscriminate assemblage of
multitudinous issues. Too many issues in an appellate brief may be
counterproductive because the sheer volume of such issues may di-
minish their importance and unduly jeopardize the quality of appel-
late attention. Addressing the special responsibilities of the appellate
advocate, former Chief Justice Burger gave the following words of
caution:
Experienced advocates since time beyond memory have empha-
sized the importance of winnowing out weaker arguments on ap-
peal and focusing on one central issue if possible, or at most on a
few key issues. Justice Jackson, after observing appellate advo-
cates for many years, stated:
"One of the first tests of a discriminating advocate is to select
the question, or questions, that he will present orally. Legal con-
tentions, like the currency, depreciate through over-issue. The
mind of an appellate judge is habitually receptive to the sugges-
385. See Commonwealth v. Gillespie, 33 Pa. Super. 576, 482 A.2d 1023 (1984); Com-
monwealth v. Sanford, 299 Pa. Super. 64, 445 A.2d 149 (1982); Commonwealth v. Wyant,
254 Pa. Super. 464, 386 A.2d 43 (1978); Eisenberg v. Commonwealth, 86 Pa. Commw. 358,
485 A.2d 511 (1984); Wicker v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 74 Pa. Commw. 548, 460 A.2d 407
(1983); In re Appeal of Elias, 70 Pa. Commw. 404, 453 A.2d 372 (1982).
386. See Fannin v. Cratty, 331 Pa. Super. 326, 480 A.2d 1056 (1984); Commonwealth
v. Bell, 328 Pa. Super. 35, 476 A.2d 439 (1984). For a particularly troublesome case involving
technical noncompliance with respect to a grave constitutional issue, see the majority, concur-
ring, and dissenting opinions in Batson v. Kentucky, No. 84-6263 (U.S. Apr. 30, 1986). In
another significant constitutional case, the Supreme Court openly declined to adopt the peti-
tioner's formulation of issues. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
387. For an example of Statements and Counter-Statements of Questions, see DeFazio
v. Labe, - Pa. Super. -, - n.3, 507 A.2d 410, 412 n.3 (1986); Hodge v. Hodge, 337
Pa. Super. 151, 163 n.5, 486 A.2d 951, 957 n.5 (1984) (Wickersham, J., concurring and
dissenting).
388. See Swaney v. George, 309 Pa. 385, 145 A. 338 (1932); Henning v. Keiper, 37 Pa.
Super. 488, 495 (1908).
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tion that a lower court committed an error. But receptiveness
declines as the number of assigned errors increases. Multiplicity
hints at lack of confidence in any one . . . [E]xperience on the
bench convinces me that multiplying assignments of error will
dilute and weaken a good case and will not save a bad one." '389
(g) Statement of the case.5-90 -Three specific constraints are im-
posed on the appellant in selecting the information to present in the
"Statement of the Case." These restraints are relevance, substantia-
tion, and balance.
The "Statement of the Case," often referred to as the "State-
ment of Facts," must contain five essential types of information. The
"Statement" must include (1) a statement of the form of the action,
followed by a brief procedural history of the case; (2) a brief state-
ment of any prior determination of any court and, if reported, where
such determinations can be found; (3) names of the judges whose
determinations are to be reviewed; (4) a "closely condensed chrono-
logical statement, in narrative form, of all the facts which are neces-
sary to be known in order to determine the points in controversy, ' ' 91
substantiated by appropriate references to the record; and (5) a brief
statement of the order under review. The statement of the case can-
not contain any argument 92 or nonrecord facts.393
389. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-52 (1983) (quoting Jackson, Advocacy Before
the United States Supreme Court, 25 TEMP. L. Q. 115, 119 (1951)); see also United States v.
Hart, 693 F.2d 286, 287 n.1 (3d Cir. 1982), in which Judge Higginbotham states as follows:
Because of the inordinate number of meritless objections pressed on appeal,
spotting the one bona fide issue was like finding a needle in a haystack. One of
our colleagues has recently cautioned on the danger of "loquaciousness":
With a decade and a half of federal appellate court experience be-
hind me, I can say that even when we reverse a trial court it is rare that a
brief successfully demonstrates that the trial court committed more than
one or two reversible errors. I have said in open court that when I read an
appellant's brief that contains ten or twelve points, a presumption arises
that there is no merit to any of them. I do not say that it is an irrebut-
table presumption, but it is a presumption nevertheless that reduces the
effectiveness of appellate advocacy. Appellate advocacy is measured by
effectiveness, not loquaciousness.
Aldisert, The Appellate Bar: Professional Competence and Professional
Responsibility - A View From the Jaundiced Eye of One Appellate Judge, I I
CAP. U. L. REV. 445, 458 (1982).
See also Commonwealth v. Sirbaugh, - Pa. Super. - , 500 A.2d 453 (1985); Common-
wealth v. Bell, 328 Pa. Super. 35, 41-43, 476 A.2d 439, 443 (1984).
390. See PA. R. App. P. 2117(a) (statement of the case).
391. Id. (emphasis supplied).
392. See PA. R. App. P. 2117(b).
393. See, e.g., Daniels Co. v. Nevling, 385 Pa. 276, 122 A.2d 814 (1956); First Nat'l
Bank v. Bosler, 297 Pa. 7, 146 A. 145 (1929); Solomon v. Corlette, 20 Pa. Commw. 361, 340
A.2d 920 (1975); see also supra text accompanying notes 232-277 regarding the original,
official record concept.
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Many practitioners recognize that the statement of the case is
often strategically important as to the fourth type of information, the
closely condensed chronological statement of facts. Justice Jackson
of the United States Supreme Court once remarked as follows:
It may sound paradoxical, but most contentions of law are won
or lost on the facts. The facts often incline a judge to one side or
the other. A large part of the time of conference is given to dis-
cussion of the facts, to determine under what rule of law they
fall. Dissents are not usually rooted in disagreement as to a rule
of law but as to whether the facts warrant its application.3
94
The advocate's winnowing of record facts is not only strategi-
cally important but also functionally necessary. Thomas Marvell's
analysis of the appellate process points out that
A dispute brought to the courts is likely to involve an extremely
large number of fact details, but only a tiny portion is relevant
to a trial court decision and even fewer to an appellate decision.
The work load and efficiency of appellate courts depend greatly
on the ability of counsel to condense and winnow the facts, a
process that takes place all during the history of a particular
litigation. The great bulk is done before the appellate level; the
lawyers select the facts they think will help their sides at trial,
and the trial judge further limits the facts by applying the rules
of evidence and, in general, trying to retain only facts that make
a difference under the law and that help him or the jury decide
the case ....
Appellate judges, then, are overloaded with factual information;
they do not have time to read the record in each case they hear,
and they must rely on others - on counsel, colleagues, and the
court staff - to condense it.895
The condensation of facts is an important and difficult task sub-
ject to two essential attributes - relevance and balance. The appel-
394. Jackson, Advocacy Before the United States Supreme Court, 37 CORNELL L.Q. 1,
6 (1951). STATSKY & WERNET, supra note 358, at 316, offers the following advice:
The facts in the brief must be based upon the record below. You should
attempt to describe them in a clear, concise, and easy-to-read fashion. Avoid
tedious and unnecessary inventories of the transcripts and exhibits, and attempt
to translate the evidence and findings into a vivid narrative which will hold the
reader's interest and attention . . . . [B]e selective and critical about the por-
tions of the record you choose to incorporate into your statement of facts. Un-
necessry detail will only make the facts difficult to read and comprehend. Above
all, be accurate . . . . False or misleading statements of fact, or omission of an
important but adverse fact, may well cause the court to question the accuracy
and reliability of your entire brief.
395. T. MARVELL, supra note 232, at 167-68.
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late rule not only requires a concise presentation of all relevant facts,
but also "a balanced presentation of the history of the proceedings
and the respective contention of the parties. 3 96  In this regard,
Thomas Marvell's following comment may help to underscore the
importance of a balanced presentation, which, as he notes, represents
a limited attempt to temporarily suspend the adversarial process:
In the judges' writings on appellate advocacy, the great majority
who discussed the presentation of facts cautioned against bias or
excess argumentation, particularly in the briefs. For example,
Judge Tuttle said, "Nothing more quickly generates in the
minds of the judges complete confidence in the lawyer's advo-
cacy than an accurate, well-documented statement of facts -
facts that hurt as well as facts that help his cause.
'3 97
Furthermore, since the appellate courts seek to assure that their time
and energy are not needlessly wasted in reviewing issues that were
not properly preserved, 898 the appellant must specifically substanti-
ate, that is, identify how, where, and when the proferred issues were
presented and disposed of in the court below. 9 9 Thus, the appellant's
396. See PA. R. App. P. 2117(b).
397. T. MARVELL, supra note 232, at 169 (quoting Tuttle, Book Review, 33 Miss. L.J.
147 (1961)); see also supra note 394. Nevertheless, Thomas Marvel notes that judges will
often resort to reading the record themselves rather than relying on counsel's condensation of
the facts. The conflict resolving aspect of the adversarial system is thus, to some extent, com-
promised. T. MARVELL, supra note 232, at 170.
398. See supra note 362.
399. PA. R. App. P. 2117(c) provides as follows:
(c) Statement of place of raising or preservation of issues.
Where under the applicable law an issue is not reviewable on appeal unless
raised or preserved below, the statement of the case shall also specify:
(I) The stage of the proceedings in the court of first instance, and in
any appellate court below, at which, and the manner in which, the ques-
tions sought to be reviewed were raised.
(2) The method of raising them (e.g., by a pleading, by a request to
charge and exceptions, etc.).
(3) The way in which they were passed upon by the court.
(4) Such pertinent quotations of specific portions of the record, or
summary thereof, with specific reference to the places in the record where
the matter appears (e.g., ruling or exception thereto, etc.) as will show
that the question was timely and properly raised below so as to preserve
the question on appeal.
Where the portions of the record relied upon under this subdivision are vo-
luminous, they shall be included in an appendix to the brief, which may, if more
convenient, be separately presented (emphasis supplied).
See also Commonwealth v. Dozier, 294 Pa. Super. 249, 255 n.2, 439 A.2d 1185, 1188 n.2
(1982) (better practice is to include specific references to errors and objections in the record in
both the argument and statement of the case sections of the brief); Commonwealth v. Rozan-
ski, 289 Pa. Super. 531, 545-46, 433 A.2d 1382, 1390 (1981) (defendant waived objections to
alleged errors when he failed to advise appellate court where such errors and objections oc-
curred in the record).
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duty of substantiation in the "Statement of the Case" is two-fold:
substantiation of essential record facts and substantiation of proce-
dural preservation.
(h) Summary of argument.4 00-The attorney should, with clar-
ity and brevity, summarize the arguments presented. The summary
should (1) not be a mere repetition of the statement of questions
presented, (2) not exceed one page, and (3) never exceed two pages.
As the commentary notes, the summary of argument assists the ap-
pellate court in following oral argument.
(i) The argument.401-The persistent preoccupation with proce-
dural propriety can easily cause one to lose sight of the focal point of
the appeal, the appellant's argument. The appellant's argument is
really what the appeal is all about. The appellant's argument is the
climactic point in the appeal when the appellant has the opportunity
to address the appellate audience by exposing grievances and ex-
horting. The argument section of the brief, as one author explained:
is the core of the appellate brief. It is in this component that the
parties present and analyze what they believe to be the control-
ling authorities on each issue presented in the brief and urge
that the court adopt their analysis and conclusions on those
questions. The argument constitutes the bulk of the brief and
. . . is also the most highly structured. The text of the argument
is broken down into major sections, with each section represent-
ing the party's analysis and discussion on a separate issue in the
brief. Each section begins with an identifying label called a
point heading. The point heading represents the party's assertion
of the conclusion which it wants the court to adopt on that
issue. 02
Consistent with this approach, the appellate rules state that the ar-
gument should be divided into as many sections as there are ques-
tions addressed, each with a distinctive heading. 0 s The argument
should contain a discussion and citation of authorities.
404
400. See PA. R. App. P. 2118 (summary of argument).
401. See PA. R. App. P. 2119 (argument).
402. STATSKY AND WERNET, supra note 358, at 318 (emphasis in original).
403. PA. R. App. P. 2119(a) (argument).
404. See, e.g., Duggan v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 159 Pa. 248, 256, 289 A. 182, 185-86
(1893) (relevant and material Pennsylvania cases receive precedence). For cases on the prece-
dential effect of opinions, see Mt. Lebanon v. County Bd. of Elections, 470 Pa. 317, 368 A.2d
648 (1977); Commonwealth v. Mason, 456 Pa. 602, 322 A.2d 357 (1974); Commonwealth v.
Silverman, 442 Pa. 211, 275 A.2d 308 (1971); Commonwealth v. Brown, 328 Pa. Super. 207,
476 A.2d 965 (1984).
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The "Argument" portion is also subject to the constraints of
substantiation that were relevant to the "Statement of the Case. ' 0a
If reference is made to the pleadings or record, the argument must
contain information concerning the precise location of such material
in the record. Likewise, the appellant must provide essential refer-
ences to indicate that the issues were properly preserved. In this re-
gard, appellant may simply rely on the prior references contained in
the "Statement of the Case"4 06 or refer specifically to the record.
It is important for the practitioner to note that issues not ade-
quately developed and discussed in the brief will not be considered
by the appellate court.
40 7
(j) Conclusion.-The conclusion should concisely state the spe-
cific relief sought.4 °6
(k) Opinions and pleadings.-The final section of appellant's
brief should include any opinion of the lower court that is pertinent
to the issues and orders under review.4°0 If an opinion has been re-
ported, the appropriate citation must be given. 10
D. Appellee's Brief
The appellee's brief only needs to contain (1) a summary of ar-
gument and (2) a complete argument.41' The previous procedural
specifications governing these two sections are equally applicable to
the appellee. ' 2 The appellee, however, may add a "Counterstate-
ment of the Questions Involved" and a "Counterstatement of the
Case."4 " The prior requirements of specificity, substantiation, and
relevance are arguably applicable to the appellee. If the appellee
does not present such counterstatements, the appellate court will as-
405. PA. R. App. P. 2119(e) (argument; place of preservation of issues); see also supra
note 399.
406. PA. R. App. P. 2119(e) states that the appellant can "cross reference to the page or
pages of the statement of the case which set forth the information relating thereto." See also
infra text accompanying notes 419-421.
407. See, e.g., Cosner v. United Penn Bank, - Pa. Super. -, 517 A.2d 1337
(1986); Commonwealth v. Sanford, 299 Pa. Super. 64, 445 A.2d 149 (1982); Commonwealth
v. Harper, 292 Pa. Super. 192, 436 A.2d 192 (1981).
408. PA. R. App. P. 2111(a)(7) (brief of the appellant).
409. See PA. R. App. P. 2111 (a)(8), (b) (brief of the appellant).
410. See also PA. R. App. P. 2133 (citations in opinions below).
411. See PA. R. App. P. 2112 (brief of the appellee).
412. See PA. R. App. P. 2118 (summary of argument), 2119 (argument); see also supra
text accompanying notes 400-407.
413. See, e.g., Green v. Green, 255 Pa. 224, 231-32, 99 A. 801, 803-04 (1916); Hodge v.
Hodge, 337 Pa. Super. 151, 486 A.2d 951 (1984).
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sume that the appellee is satisfied with appellant's recitation of the
unchallenged statements.
If the appellant has waived issues, either by not specifically or
properly raising them in the lower court or by failing to properly
preserve them in his brief, the appellee should clearly address such
issue preservation in his brief.41" ' The appellate court will then be in
a better position to focus its attention on the merits of the remaining
issues that are amenable to appellate resolution.
E. Briefs in the Supreme Court"5
On a further appeal to the supreme court from the superior or
commonwealth court, the parties may utilize the same briefs (with a
new cover) or prepare new briefs. The appellant should set forth the
following: the order allowing the appeal; the opinion and dissenting
opinions, if any, of the appellate court below, including information
regarding whether such opinions were reported; and any additional
argument. The appellee may also submit the prior or new brief and
provide additional argument.
F. Briefs by Amicus Curiae
Although the lack of aggrievement and party status may pre-
vent one from filing a notice of appeal, anyone "interested" in the
questions involved in an appeal may participate by filing an amicus
curiae brief.41' If an amicus curiae is adopting appellant's position,
for example, to reverse, then the amicus brief must be filed in the
same manner and number as required by the rules for an appellant's
brief. The same procedure applies if the amicus is adopting an appel-
lee's position to affirm. If the amicus does not support the position of
any party, the amicus must file its brief in the same manner as appli-
cable to the appellant."
1 7
G. Briefs: Style
1. Reference to Parties.4"8-The parties preferably should not
414. See PA. R. App. P. 302 (requisites for reviewable issue), 1972 (motion to dismiss for
failure to preserve issues for review); see also supra note 362.
415. See PA. R. App. P. 2139 (briefs on appeals from the superior or commonwealth
courts).
416. See PA. R. App. P. 531 (participation by amicus curiae); supra notes 183-185; see
also Drislov, The Amicus Curiae Brief: From Friendship to Advocacy, 72 YALE L.J. 694
(1963); Pines, supra note I, at 68.
417. See PA. R. App. P. 531(a) (participation by amicus curiae).
418. See PA. R. App. P. 2131 (references in briefs to parties).
91 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW WINTER 1986
be referred to as "appellant" and "appellee." Such references should
be kept to a minimum. The parties should use the actual or descrip-
tive names of the parties or the designations used by the court below
(for example, "the employee," "the injured person").
2. References to the Record . -19 -References to the un-
reproduced original record should be to the pleading or document
and the page (for example, "Motion for Summary Judgment, p.2,"
"Notes of Testimony, 9/11/86, pp. 24-26" or "Trial Transcript pp.
279-280"). As was indicated previously, references to the record are
important to secure meaningful appellate review of the issues and
noncompliance can be fatal. 5 0
3. References to the Reproduced Record.-References should
be to the pages in the reproduced record where the designated mate-
rial appears (for example, "R.26a"). 2 '
4. Citations .4 1-Citations of authorities must set forth the
principle for which they are cited. Reference to the Pennsylvania
statutes may be in the following form: "1 Pa. C.S. § 1928 (rule of
strict and liberal construction)." Quotations must be identified by a
page reference. Opinions must, if applicable, include citations from
the National Reporter System (for example, "_ A.2d .") and
to the official appellate court reports (for example, " Pa.
_"), including dates.
H. Sanctions: Untimely Filing
28
If the appellant fails to timely file his brief, his appeal may be
dismissed. Appellee's tardy filing of his brief precludes that party
from oral argument.
VII. Summary and Appellate Checklist
The filing of briefs, of course, does not represent the termination
419. See PA. R. App. P. 2132(b) (reference in briefs to the unreproduced record); see
also Hodge v. Hodge, 337 Pa. Super. 151, 486 A.2d 951 (1984).
420. See supra note 399.
421. See PA. R. App. P. 2132(a) (references in briefs to the record).
422. See PA. R. App. P. 2119(b) (argument; citation of authorities).
423. See PA. R. App. P. 2188 (consequence of failure to file briefs and reproduced rec-
ord); see also supra notes 333-334 regarding timely filing of reproduced record; but see Peter-
son v. Philadelphia Suburban Transp. Co., 435 Pa. 232, 255 A.2d 577 (1969) (noting, in
context of excused illness, that the requirement of timely filing is not only based on courtesy,
but also it is important to appellate review); Appeal of Riley, 77 Pa. Commw. 191, 192-93 n.2,
466 A. 2d 236, 238 n.2 (1983) (untimely filing excused).
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of the appellate process. Significant events, both before and after an
appellate decision, may occur. Once the briefs are filed, for example,
the parties must ordinarily prepare for those compact, pressure-filled
moments when the appellate court entertains the oration phase of
appellate advocacy. 24 As a general rule, however, after the argu-
ment of the case or submission 4 2  of the case to the appellate court
without oral argument, the parties cannot submit any further briefs
or memoranda without authorization of the court. 426 An orderly and
fair decision-making process recognizably requires that there be
some definitive point when the parties' informational input must ter-
minate so that the deliberative stage can begin.
In the absence of a further appeal as of right to a higher appel-
late tribunal'2 7 and after an appellate decision, the parties neverthe-
less have two limited options for further review: (1) reargument or
reconsideration before the same appellate tribunal or an en banc
court4 2 8 and (2) review by the supreme court upon the granting of an
application for allowance of appeal (commonly referred to as alloca-
tur).'2 9 Such further review is fundamentally a rare occurrence.
Generally, one who seeks such extraordinary review must file a
timely application'30 and demonstrate compelling, special or impor-
tant reasons.' 1 The commentary to the relevant procedural rule on
rearguments, for example, indicates that a compelling reason may
exist where a panel decision is inconsistent with another decision, the
424. See PA. R. App. P. 2311 to 2323. Oral argument is not a matter of right. See PA. R.
App. P. 2315(a). As for sanctions, if an appellant is not ready for oral argument, the court
may dismiss the case. See PA. R. App. P. 2314. There is no specific sanction for an unprepared
appellee.
425. See PA. R. App. P. 2311. The parties may agree to submit an appeal without oral
argument. Also, as a general rule, post conviction hearing cases are submitted on briefs with-
out oral argument.
426. See PA. R. App. P. 2501. There is an exception, however, when an authority relied
upon has been undermined or significantly affected during the post-argument phase. See PA. R.
App. P. 2501(b).
427. See, for example, PA. R. App. P. 1101, regarding appeals as of right from the com-
monwealth court, and 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 723 (Purdon 1981).
428. See generally PA. R, App. P. 2541 to 2547 (reargument) and 3103 (court en banc).
See also Internal Operating Procedures of the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, Rule
291, and Internal Operating Procedures of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, V(10 and 11).
429. See PA. R. App. P. 1111 to 1123. See also 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 724 (Purdon
1981), cited in Pines, supra note I at 141-142.
430. A petition for reargument/reconsideration must be filed within 14 days after the
entry of the appellate court's judgment or order. A petition for allowance of appeal must be
filed in the supreme court within 30 days of the entry of the lower appellate court's order
sought to be reviewed. See PA. R. App. P. 2542 (reargument) and 1113(a) (petition for allow-
ance of appeal).
431. See PA. R. App. P. i1l14 (petition for allowance of appeal) and 2543 (reargument).
See also Internal Operating Procedures of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, supra note
428.
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appellate court overlooked or misapprehended a material fact of rec-
ord or directly relevant authority, or the appellate court relied on
directly relevant authority which has been reversed, modified or
overruled. 3
The preceding discussion and analysis should have suggested the
complexity and importance of the precise rules that attempt to en-
sure a rational and orderly process governing the informational input
of an appeal prior to the climactic decision of the appellate court. A
summarization of the appellate stages discussed would be a feckless
venture. One can truly appreciate and understand the significance of
the procedural precepts by reviewing this commentary, reading the
rules with caution, and applying the knowledge gained into practice.
Nevertheless, a capsulization of the major appellate stages and their
governing considerations may assist the practitioner or student. The
following "Appellate Checklist" is thus offered as a retrospective re-
view or recapitulation of the pivotal considerations that the parties
should have addressed in preparing their legal and factual scenarios
for the appellate court's review.
FILING THE NOTICE OF APPEAL
1. Timely filing. Was the notice of appeal timely filed in the
lower court within the requisite time period measured from the lower
court's date of entry of the appealed order? 43 Was the requisite
time to appeal tolled by an express and timely grant of reconsidera-
tion by the lower court?
3 4
2. Appellate Jurisdiction: Was the lower court's order jurisdic-
tionally appealable as a final order or an interlocutory order made
appealable by statute or rule of court? " 5 Is there a need to secure
the formal entry of a judgment on the lower court's docket? " 6
3. Entry of Order: Was the lower court's order formally and
properly entered on the docket of the lower court with notice to the
parties?
8 7
4. Accurate notice of appeal: Did the notice(s) of appeal accu-
rately describe the parties and the precise order(s) to be reviewed by
432. See the official note to PA. R. App. P. 2543 (considerations governing allowance of
reargument).
433. See PA. R. App. P. 108 (date of entry of orders). See also supra sections II(A)(1, 4
and 5).
434. See supra sections II(A)(4)(c and d).
435. See Pines, supra note 1 at 75-139; see also supra section If(A)(2).
436. See supra section II(A)(2).
437. See PA. R. App. P. 108, PA. R. Civ. P. 236, and PA. R. CtIM. P. 9024. See also
supra section lI(A)(l).
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the appellate court? 4 8
5. Separated document: If there is more than one order to be
reviewed, has a separate notice of appeal been filed for each appeala-
ble order?
43 9
6. Standing, aggrievement: Is the person appealing an aggrieved
party with standing to appeal the adverse order?4 40
7. Designation of appellate forum: Did the notice of appeal des-
ignate the proper appellate forum for the appeal (otherwise, a trans-
fer to the appropriate appellate forum may be necessary)? 441
8. Procedural requirements: Have contemporaneous procedural
requirements (e.g., filing fees, filing of a transcription order, proof of
service, copy of docket entries) and service of interested individuals
(parties, lower court judge, court reporter, district court administra-
tor) been satisfied?"
2
9. Cross-appeal: If the opposing party (the appellee) wishes to
separately challenge a separately appealable adverse order, has a
separate cross appeal been timely filed in the lower court? 448
10. Exceptional circumstances to obtain appellate participa-
tion: If a timely appeal has not been filed, are there grounds (a) for
an aggrieved party to seek an appeal out of time (that is, nunc pro
tunc)4"4 or (b) for an interested non-party to participate as an ami-
cus curiae?' 4"
INTERIM STATEMENTS BEFORE TRANSMISSION OF OF-
FICIAL RECORD
1. Appellant's statement: If appellant has been directed by the
lower court judge or by rule of court, has appellant filed a concise
"statement of matters complained of" in the lower court for the pur-
pose of identifying the issues and errors to be raised on appeal and
addressed in the lower court's opinion? If the appellant has failed to
comply, is effective appellate review defeated, thereby precluding ap-
pellate consideration of issues not previously identified? 446
2. Lower court's statement: Has the lower court prepared and
filed a brief statement, in the form of an opinion, explaining its rea-
438. See supra section II(A)(3).
439. See supra section II(A)(I).
440. See Pines, supra note I at 62-75.
441. See supra section II(A)(5).
442. See supra sections II(A)(6 and 7).
443. See supra section II(B).
444. See supra section II(A)(4)(d).
445. See supra section II(B)(2).
446. See supra section Ill(A).
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sons for rulings on the matters to be raised in the appeal, or specified
where in the record such reasons can be found? Is the lower court's
statement or opinion adequate for appellate review of the issues
raised on appeal?"7
TRANSCRIPTION AND TRANSMISSION OF OFFICIAL REC-
ORD TO THE APPELLATE COURT
1. Transcription: Have the lower court, court stenographer, and
the parties taken the necessary steps to secure the timely""* tran-
scription and filing of the official lower court record (as defined by
Rule 1921) so that the appeal can proceed expeditiously to the brief-
ing and argument stages in the appellate court?44 9 If necessary, was




2. Transmission: Has an adequate, complete, and certified rec-
ord been timely transmitted from the lower court to the appellate
court WITHOUT inclusion of any matter that was not filed or not
formally made part of the official record?4
5 1
3. Adequacy of transmitted record: If the official record from
the lower court is technically incomplete, does it nevertheless provide
an "equivalent picture" or an "agreed statement" of what occurred
in the court below sufficient for appellate review purposes? Is there a
need for supplementation, correction, or modification of the official
record? Or is the transmitted official record so inexcusably inade-
quate as to warrant an appellate court to dismiss the appeal or con-
clude that the issues are waived?
45 2
4. Accuracy of record: If there is a transcription dispute as to a
material fact, was the lower court properly notified and given an op-
portunity to resolve the dispute? If not, are there adequate grounds




1. Designation: After the transmittal of the official record to the
447. See supra section Ill(B).
448. See PA. R. App. P. 1922(a) (transcription of notes of testimony).
449. See supra section IV(B).
450. See supra section IV(B)(2). See also PA. R. App. P. 904(c) and 1911 (order for
transcript.
451. See PA. R. App. P. 1931(c) (transmission of the record); and supra section IV(A)
and (C).
452. See supra sections IV(A)(2 to 5) and (B)(4). See also PA. R. App. P. 1911(d)
(order for transcript), 1923 (statement in absence of transcript), 1924 (agreed statement of
record), 1926 (correction or modification of record), 1972 (disposition on motion) and 105
(waiver and modification of rules).
453. See PA. R. App. P. 1922 (transcription of notes of testimony), 1926 (correction or
modification of record) and supra section IV(B)(5).
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appellate court, have the parties, in preparation for the filing of the
reproduced record, (a) selected and designated those portions of the
official record to be reproduced in the booklet accompanying appel-
lant's brief and (b) identified those issues which will be presented in
the briefs for appellate review? Has appellant filed the "designation
statement" in the appellate court? If desirable, has the appellee filed
a counter or supplemental designation statement?
454
2. Contents: Does the reproduced record contain the necessary
subject matter (e.g., docket entries and relevant portions of the
pleadings, charge or findings) WITHOUT the inclusion of any non-
record, unfiled information?
455
3. Procedural: Has the reproduced record been timely filed with
service on the parties?4
5 1
4. Special supplementation: If the parties have disagreed on the
contents of the reproduced record, should the appellee have consid-
ered the advisability of preparing and filing a supplemental repro-
duced record?
57
5. Costs: If there is inclusion of unnecessary material in the re-
produced record, would a timely application to the appellate court
for taxation of costs be advisable?
58
BRIEFS
1. Appellant: Does appellant's brief conform to the critical pro-
cedural requirements and limitations (e.g., exclusion of non-record
information or assertions, selective and specific identification of is-
sues/questions presented for appellate review, specific identification
and substantiation of where/how/when appellate issues were pre-
served in the lower court, specific argumentation of facts and law
concerning those issues previously identified for appellate review, and
adherence to typographical and sequential arrangement and length
specifications) ?459
Has appellant's brief, along with the reproduced record, been timely
454. See supra section V(B)(2).
455. See PA. R. App. P. 2151-2156 (reproduced record) and supra section V(B) and (D)
generally.
456. See supra section V(B)( I1).
457. See supra section V(C).
458. See supra section V(B)(12).
459. See supra section VI(A), (B)(I), and (C).
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filed, with service on the parties? 460
2. Appellee: Does appellee's brief contain the minimal require-
ments of a summary of argument and argument? Did appellee's po-
sition strategically require an additional counter-statement of ques-
tions involved or a counter-statement of the case?461
3. Reply: Were the parties entitled to file reply briefs (e.g.,
when the case is "submitted" without oral argument4 62 or when the
appellee has filed a cross-appeal)?
45
4. Sanctions: If a party has failed to comply with essential pro-
cedural requirements (e.g., timely filing, inclusion of only record in-
formation, identification and preservation of issues), are sanctions
(e.g., dismissal, waiver, preclusion of oral argument) appropriate? 4"
460. See supra section VI(B).
461. See supra section VI(D).
462. See PA. R. App. P. 2311 (submission on briefs).
463. See supra section VI(B)(3).
464. See PA. R. App. P. 123 (applications for relief), 301 (requisites for an appealable
order), 302 (requisites for reviewable issue), 903 (time for appeal), 1921 (composition of rec-
ord on appeal), 1972 (disposition on motion), 2101 (conformance with requirements), 2185
(time for filing and serving briefs) and supra section VI(H).
